Wagoner v. JPMorgan Chase & Company

1 WO — 2 — — 3 — — 4 — — 5 — 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA — 8 — 9 Gary L. Wagoner, et al., No. CV-25-02826-PHX-DWL 10 Plaintiffs, ORDER 11 v. 12 JPMorgan Chase & Company, 13 Defendant. — 14 — 15 On July 11, 2025, pro se Plaintiff filed a complaint in Maricopa County Justice 16 Court. (Doc. 1-1 at 4-9.) The complaint alleges that Plaintiff is a licensed physician and 17 trustee of the Catalina Seaward Trust, a medical services entity; that Defendant acts as a 18 plan sponsor for a health-related benefit plan; that Defendant “issued material 19 communications regarding payment expectations to Arizona providers” and made 20 “material misrepresentations and omissions regarding how claims would be handled and 21 evaluated”; that Plaintiff relied on those representations when deciding to provide medical 22 services to non-party S.H.; and that when Plaintiff sought payment from Defendant based 23 on S.H.’s assignment of rights to him, Defendant improperly denied payment. (Id.) Based 24 on those allegations, Plaintiff asserts state-law claims for “unjust enrichment, negligent 25 misrepresentation, and equitable estoppel,” as well as state-law statutory claims under 26 “A.R.S. §§ 12-541 [malicious prosecution; false imprisonment], 12-543 [oral debt; stated 27 or open account], 20-443 [misrepresentations and false advertising of policies; false 28 disclosure of compensation], 20-461 [unfair claim settlement practices], 44-1522 [unlawful 1 practices; intended interpretation of provisions].” (Id.) 2 Attached to the complaint is an invoice showing that Plaintiff provided $6,800 of 3 medical services to S.H. (Id. at 9.) Nevertheless, the complaint only seeks $3,500 in 4 damages, because this is “within the statutory maximum for Small Claims jurisdiction,” 5 but the complaint also clarifies that “[i]f transferred to a higher court by valid legal order, 6 Plaintiff reserves the right to amend this claim to demand the full amount of $6,800, the 7 originally billed amount for unpaid anesthesia services.” (Id. at 5-6 ¶¶ 3, 6.) Finally, the 8 complaint “explicitly disclaims any reliance upon, or assertion of, any rights, benefits, or 9 remedies governed by federal statute, including 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (ERISA). This 10 case does not arise under ERISA, nor does it require interpretation of any plan document. 11 . . . If this case is wrongfully removed to federal court, Plaintiff shall immediately seek 12 remand and the harshest sanctions permitted by law . . . .” (Id. at 5-6 ¶¶ 2, 5.) 13 After being served, and notwithstanding the assertions in the complaint regarding 14 the inapplicability of ERISA, Defendant timely removed the action to federal court under 15 the theory that because Plaintiff’s “claims stem entirely from payment of medical bills he 16 claims are owed by Defendant, acting as a plan sponsor of its ERISA-governed group 17 health plan,” “this case is properly removable.” (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 7-8.) Plaintiff, in turn, has filed 18 a motion to remand (Doc. 13) and Defendant has filed a response in opposition (Doc. 15). 19 Plaintiff did not file a reply or request oral argument.1 20 The Court does not write on a blank slate in addressing these issues. In recent years, 21 Plaintiff has filed an array of lawsuits in Arizona small claims court against plan sponsors 22 of health-related benefit plans. Wagoner v. UnitedHealthCare, 2:22-CV-00827-DJH (Doc. 23 1-3 at 4-16); Wagoner v. First Fleet Inc., 2:22-CV-00990-JAT (Doc. 1-3 at 5-15); Wagoner 24 v. State Industrial Products, 2:22-CV-01238-SPL (Doc. 1-1 at 2-10); Wagoner v. Pinnacle 25 West Capital Corp., 2:22-CV-1359-SMB (Doc. 1-3 at 5-15); Wagoner v. First Fleet Inc., 26 2:25-CV-01474-PHX-JJT (Doc. 1-1 at 2); Wagoner v. State Industrial Products Corp., 27 2:25-CV-01763-JJT (Doc. 1-1 at 2-4); Wagoner v. FirstFleet Inc., 2:25-CV-02349-DJH 28 1 Defendant’s request for a hearing is denied because the issues are fully briefed and argument would not aid the decisional process. See LRCiv 7.2(f). 1 (Doc. 1-1 at 6-11); Wagoner v. FirstFleet Inc., 2:25-CV-03099-SMB (Doc. 1-1 at 6-10). 2 After removing those actions to federal court, several defendants successfully 3 moved to dismiss under the theory that Plaintiff’s state-law claims were preempted by 4 ERISA. See, e.g., Wagoner v. UnitedHealthCare, 2:22-CV-00827-DJH (Doc. 16 at 3-4 5 [concluding that Plaintiff’s “common law claims for breach of contract and unjust 6 enrichment” were “preempted by Section 514(a)” of ERISA, even though they arose from 7 state-law doctrines of general applicability, because they “have a ‘connection with’ an 8 ERISA plan”]); Wagoner v. First Fleet Inc., 2:22-CV-00990-JAT (Doc. 14 at 9 [“[T]he 9 Court finds the following: (1) Claim One, encompassing breach of contract and unjust 10 enrichment, is preempted under ERISA; (2) Claim Two fails to state a claim under which 11 Plaintiff is entitled to relief; (3) Claim Three is preempted under ERISA; and (4) Claim 12 Four reflects damages Plaintiff seeks and is not an independent cause of action.”]); 13 Wagoner v. Pinnacle West Capital Corp., 2:22-CV-1359-SMB (Doc. 13 at 2, cleaned up 14 [“The Supreme Court has held that ERISA preempts state common law tort and contract 15 causes of action asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits under an insured 16 employee benefit plan. The Ninth Circuit has held that claims under state insurance statutes 17 are also preempted by ERISA. Therefore, the Court finds that all of Plaintiff’s claims are 18 preempted by ERISA and his only remedy is to file a claim under ERISA.”].) In other 19 cases, Plaintiff either voluntarily dismissed his claims, Wagoner v. First Fleet Inc., 2:2520 CV-01474-PHX-JJT (Doc. 6), or had his claims summarily dismissed for failure to respond 21 to the defendant’s ERISA-based motion to dismiss, Wagoner v. State Industrial Products, 22 2:22-CV-01238-SPL (Doc. 9). Finally, in a more recent case, Plaintiff filed a motion to 23 remand before the defendant could file a motion to dismiss, advancing many of the same 24 arguments he advances here, only for the court to deny his motion. Wagoner v. State 25 Industrial Products Corp., 2:25-CV-01763-JJT (Doc. 15). 26 For similar reasons, the Court denies Plaintiff’s remand request here. “[C]omplete 27 preemption under ERISA § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (a), . . . is really a jurisdictional rather 28 than a preemption doctrine, as it confers exclusive federal jurisdiction in certain instances 1 where Congress intended the scope of a federal law to be so broad as to entirely replace 2 any state-law claim. . . . [W]hile federal pre-emption is ordinarily a federal defense to the 3 plaintiff’s suit, Congress had clearly manifested an intent to make causes of action within 4 the scope of the civil enforcement provisions of § 502(a) removable to federal court. 5 Complete preemption removal is an exception to the otherwise applicable rule that a 6 plaintiff is ordinarily entitled to remain in state court so long as its complaint does not, on 7 its face, affirmatively allege a federal claim.” Marin Gen. Hosp. v. Modesto & Empire 8 Traction Co., 581 F.3d 941, 944-45 (9th Cir. 2009) (cleaned up).2 As a result, Plaintiff’s 9 contention that a remand is required because “[t]he Plaintiff’s Complaint Expressly 10 Disclaims ERISA” (Doc. 13 at 2) is unavailing. If Defendant is correct that any of 11 Plaintiff’s state-law claims are completely preempted under § 502(a) of ERISA, Defendant 12 could permissibly remove this action to federal court. Fossen v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield 13 of Montana, Inc., 660 F.3d 1102, 1110-11 (9th Cir. 2011) (“This question requires a 14 practical, rather than a formalistic, analysis because claimants simply cannot obtain relief 15 by dressing up an ERISA benefits claim in the garb of a state law tort. . . . [D]istinguishing 16 between pre-empted and non-pre-empted claims based on the particular label affixed to 17 them would elevate form over substance and allow parties to evade the pre-emptive scope 18 of ERISA simply by relabeling their claims.”) (cleaned up); Marin Gen. Hosp., 581 U.S. 19 at 946 (“If state-law causes of action come within the scope of § 502(a)(1)(B), those causes 20 of action are completely preempted, and the only possible cause of action is under 21 § 502(a)(1)(B). In that event, a federal district court has federal question jurisdiction, either 22 original jurisdiction under § 1331(a) or removal jurisdiction under § 1441(a), to decide 23 whether the plaintiff has stated a cause of action under § 502(a)(1)(B).”). — 24 — 2 In contrast, “different jurisprudential consequences” arise when a defendant raises 25 a claim of “conflict preemption under ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (a)”—namely, “a defense of conflict preemption under § 514(a) does not confer federal question jurisdiction 26 on a federal district court” and thus “even if the defendant has a defense of conflict preemption within the meaning of § 514(a) because the plaintiff’s claims ‘relate to’ an 27 ERISA plan, the district court is without subject matter jurisdiction.” Marin Gen. Hosp., 581 F.3d at 944-45 (cleaned up). Put another way, “[a] defense of conflict preemption 28 under § 514(a) does not provide a basis for federal question jurisdiction under either § 1331(a) or § 1441(a).” Id. at 949. 1 Turning to the merits, under Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004), “a 2 state-law cause of action is completely preempted if (1) an individual, at some point in 3 time, could have brought the claim under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), and (2) where there is no 4 other independent legal duty that is implicated by a defendant’s actions. . . . The two-prong 5 test of Davila is in the conjunctive. A state-law cause of action is preempted by 6 § 502(a)(1)(B) only if both prongs of the test are satisfied.” Marin Gen. Hosp., 581 F.3d 7 at 946-47 (cleaned up). The Court will focus its analysis on Plaintiff’s claim for unjust 8 enrichment because if that claim is completely preempted, Defendant’s removal effort was 9 permissible. Fossen, 660 F.3d at 1113 & n.7 (so long as one cause of action is completely 10 preempted under ERISA, a defendant may seek removal and the district court may then 11 exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any non-preempted state-law claims that form part 12 of the same case or controversy); Melamed v. Blue Cross of Cal., 557 F. App’x 659 , 661 13 (9th Cir. 2014) (“When one of a plaintiff’s state-law claims is completely preempted by 14 ERISA, the case may be removed to federal court even though the complaint does not state 15 a federal cause of action on its face.”).3 16 Under Arizona law, an unjust enrichment claim has “five elements: (1) an 17 enrichment, (2) an impoverishment, (3) a connection between the enrichment and 18 impoverishment, (4) the absence of justification for the enrichment and impoverishment, 19 and (5) the absence of a remedy provided by law.” Freeman v. Sorchych, 245 P.3d 927 , 20 936 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011). As for the first element, Defendant only could have obtained 21 an “enrichment” if it had some obligation, under the underlying health-related plan, to pay 22 for the medical services Plaintiff provided to S.H. (Doc. 15 at 11 [“It logically follows that 23 Plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment . . . claim[] reference[s] Defendant’s ERISA plan because 24 without an ERISA plan in question, Defendant as Plan Sponsor would not be under any 25 obligation to pay [S.H.’s] claims.”].) The allegations in the complaint are consistent with 26 this conclusion. The complaint alleges that Defendant is “a plan sponsor for a health27 3 The Court also clarifies that the result here would be the same if the complete preemption analysis focused on Plaintiff’s other claims, such as the overlapping claims that 28 were found to be completely preempted in Wagoner v. State Industrial Products Corp., 2:25-CV-01763-JJT (Doc. 5). 1 related benefit plan”;4 that Plaintiff is suing in his capacity as an assignee of S.H. (“The 2 patient lawfully assigned the right to payment to Plaintiff prior to the date of service”); that 3 Defendant wrongfully denied a request for payment for the medical services Plaintiff 4 provided to S.H. (“Defendant failed to remit any payment for these services . . . .”); and 5 that Defendant was unjustly enriched as a result of this non-payment (“Defendant’s 6 conduct constitutes unjust enrichment under Arizona law: the benefit of medical services 7 was delivered and retained, yet Defendant avoided compensating the Plaintiff entity that 8 lawfully performed them”). (Doc. 1-1 at 6-7 ¶¶ 8-12.) The complaint also clarifies that 9 the damages being sought are the value of the medical services Plaintiff provided to S.H. 10 ($6,800), although Plaintiff artificially reduced that demand to $3,500 to comply with the 11 small claims court’s jurisdictional limit without prejudice to his ability to increase the 12 demand to $6,800 should the case be successfully removed. (Id. at 5-6 ¶¶ 3, 6.) Further, 13 Plaintiff clarifies in the motion to remand that he, himself, is “not a plan participant or 14 beneficiary.” (Doc. 13 at 4.) The upshot is that Plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim rests 15 on the premise that Defendant had an obligation to S.H., pursuant to the underlying health 16 care plan, to pay for the medical services Plaintiff provided to S.H. 17 Given this backdrop, the first prong of Davila’s test for complete preemption is 18 satisfied—Plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim is a claim that an individual (i.e., S.H.) could 19 have, at some point in time, brought under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B). Plaintiff is simply 20 asserting that claim derivatively here, based on an assignment of rights from S.H. Spinedex 21 Physical Therapy USA Inc. v. United Healthcare of Ariz., Inc., 770 F.3d 1282 , 1288-89 22 (9th Cir. 2014) (“As a non-participant health care provider, Spinedex cannot bring claims 23 for benefits on its own behalf. It must do so derivatively, relying on its patients’ 24 assignments of their benefits claims.”). This case is thus akin to Davila, where the Supreme 25 Court determined that the first prong of the complete preemption test was satisfied because — 26 — 27 4 Given this allegation, there is no merit to Plaintiff’s contention that a remand is required because Defendant did not “identify[] any specific plan, group number, or member 28 ID.” (Doc. 13 at 1.) Defendant also confirms in its response that S.H. “is a participant of Defendant’s health-related benefit plan.” (Doc. 15 at 3.) 1 the plaintiffs “complain[ed] only about denials of coverage promised under the terms of 2 ERISA-regulated employee benefit plans.” Davila, 542 U.S. at 211 .5 In contrast, this case 3 is easily distinguishable from Marin General Hospital, where “the patient assigned to the 4 Hospital any claim he had under his ERISA plan,” the Hospital was then “paid the money 5 owed to the patient under the ERISA plan,” and the Hospital then sought “more money 6 based upon a different obligation.” Marin Gen. Hosp., 581 F.3d at 948 . Under those 7 circumstances, the Ninth Circuit concluded that “[t]he obligation to pay this additional 8 money does not stem from the ERISA plan, and the Hospital is therefore not suing as the 9 assignee of an ERISA plan participant or beneficiary under § 502(a)(1)(B).” Id. Again, 10 that is not the situation here.6 11 “The question under the second prong of Davila is whether there is no other 12 independent legal duty that is implicated by a defendant’s actions. If there is some other 13 independent legal duty beyond that imposed by an ERISA plan, a claim based on that duty 14 is not completely preempted under § 502(a)(1)(B).” Marin Gen. Hosp., 581 F.3d at 949 15 (cleaned up). In Wagoner v. State Industrial Products Corp., 2:25-CV-01763-JJT, Plaintiff 16 asserted various state-law claims against the sponsor of a health-related plan, including that 17 the defendant “misrepresented the terms of its policy, . . . made false statements regarding 18 eligibility, [and] denied service in a fraudulent manner,” and argued that “ERISA [was] 19 neither pleaded nor implicated” because his claims “were brought exclusively under 20 Arizona law.” (Wagoner, Doc. 5 at 2, 4.) The court rejected those arguments and 21 concluded that the second prong of the complete preemption test was satisfied because 22 “regardless of the applicability of the cited Arizona statutes, each of Plaintiffs’ claims is — 23 — 5 Indeed, as Defendant observes in its response to the motion to remand, “the Davila 24 court noted Davila’s requested recovery of tort damages sustained from the denial was a step removed from the language of § 1132(a). Such a concern is not present here as the 25 Plaintiffs’ requested recovery is the reimbursement for medical services performed, i.e. benefits due to a participant under the terms of the plan.” (Doc. 15 at 14.) — 26 — 6 To be clear, “the mere fact of assignment” does not necessarily mean that a 27 provider’s claim against the sponsor of a health-related benefit plan satisfies the first prong of the test for complete preemption. Marin Gen. Hosp., 581 F.3d at 949 (citing Blue Cross 28 of Cal. v. Anesthesia Care Associates Med. Grp., Inc., 187 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 1999)). It is the substance of the claim that matters. 1 dependent on ERISA, because they are each dependent on the existence of a plan and the 2 duties imposed on those who administrate such plans. . . . Liability under the state statutes 3 could exist only because of Defendant’s administration of ERISA-governed plans, and thus 4 no independent legal duty has been implicated here.” (Id. at 6-7.) For substantially the 5 same reasons, the second prong of the complete preemption test is satisfied here in relation 6 to Plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim. As Defendant correctly notes, “every alleged legal 7 violation in the Complaint, including unjust enrichment . . . , is predicated on Defendant’s 8 wrongful denial of reimbursement under the Defendant’s health-related benefit plan which 9 is governed by ERISA. To the extent the Defendant is obligated to reimburse Plaintiffs for 10 its services performed on the participant, [S.H], the obligation stems from Defendant’s 11 establishment and maintenance of an ERISA regulated plan.” (Doc. 15 at 15.) 12 The remaining arguments raised in Plaintiff’s motion do not compel a different 13 conclusion. Although Plaintiff purports to identify a variety of reasons why his “claims 14 arise from . . . independent misrepresentations and diversions, not from enforcement of 15 plan benefits” (Doc. 13 at 2-5), Plaintiff ignores that if Defendant “correctly concluded 16 that, under the terms of the relevant plan, a particular treatment was not covered, [its] denial 17 of coverage would not be a proximate cause of any injuries arising from the denial. Rather, 18 the failure of the plan itself to cover the requested treatment would be the proximate cause. 19 . . . [Defendant’s] potential liability under [state law], then, derives entirely from the 20 particular rights and obligations established by the benefit plan[].” Davila, 542 U.S. at 21 213.7 This is particularly true with regard to the unjust enrichment claim. Cf. Plastic 22 Surgery Center, P.A. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 967 F.3d 218, 241-42 (3d Cir. 2020) 23 (“[Plaintiff’s] unjust enrichment claims require the court to find that an ERISA plan exists 24 in order to demonstrate that Aetna received a benefit—i.e., the discharge of its duties under 25 that plan—and that retention of that benefit without payment would be unjust. . . . [T]here — 26 — 7 In a related vein, this case is distinguishable from Marin General Hospital because 27 the plaintiff there, unlike here, “contend[ed] that [the defendant] entered into an independent oral contract during [a] telephone call” and the “various state-law claims 28 asserted by the [plaintiff] all [arose] out of what was allegedly said during that call.” Marin Gen. Hosp., 581 F.3d at 950 . 1 || simply is no cause of action for unjust enrichment if there is no plan.”); Abira Med. Labs., LLC vy. Anthem Blue Cross Life & Health Ins. Co., 2025 WL 1664596 , *11 (C.D. Cal. 2025) 3 || (“Without the relevant ERISA plan, there would be no basis for a breach of contract claim; accordingly, the existence of the plan is essential to the claim’s survival. [T]he 5 || conclusion is no different for the claim for quantum meruit / unjust enrichment.”’). 6 Plaintiff also identifies three purported technical defects in Defendant’s removal effort: (1) “Defendant did not attach all state-court process and pleadings”; (2) “Defendant 8 || filed two inconsistent removal notices”; and (3) “Defendant asserted ERISA despite 9|| Plaintiff’s express disclaimer.” (Ud. at 5.) As for the first purported defect, Plaintiff has 10 || not identified which, if any, documents are missing and the Court can remedy any omission |} by imposing a new deadline for Defendant to file any missing documents. Alston v. Midland Credit Mgmt. Inc., 2025 WL 2444056 , *4 (D. Ariz. 2025). As for the second 13} purported defect, Plaintiff does not explain why the two notices are inconsistent and the || second merely appears to be the notice that Defendant filed in state court. As for the third 15 || purported defect, as discussed in earlier portions of this order, Plaintiff’s express disclaimer of any reliance on ERISA is not dispositive. Fossen, 660 F.3d at 1110-11 (‘This question 17 || requires a practical, rather than a formalistic, analysis because claimants simply cannot obtain relief by dressing up an ERISA benefits claim in the garb of a state law tort.”). 19 Accordingly, 20 IT IS ORDERED that: 21 1. Plaintiff's motion to remand (Doc. 13) is denied. 22 2. Within 30 days of the issuance of this order, Defendant must provide (a) a 23 || certified copy of the entire state court record, as required by LRCiv 3.6, or (b) a notice 24 || avowing that the entire state court record has already been provided. 25 Dated this 7th day of October, 2025. 26 Am ee Dominic W. Lanza 28 United States District Judge -9-