McAllister v. Clark County

[3] UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT [4] DISTRICT OF NEVADA [5] 6 LISA MCALLISTER, et al., Case No. 2:24-cv-00334-JAD-NJK 7 Plaintiffs, Order 8 v. [Docket No. 89] 9 CLARK COUNTY, et al., 10 Defendants. 11 The parties have come to an agreement as to the designation and handling of material they 12 deem to be confidential, and seek judicial approval of that agreement in the form of a protective 13 order. Docket No. 89. 14 Discovery is meant to proceed “largely unsupervised by the district court.” Sali v. Corona 15 Reg. Med. Ctr., 884 F.3d 1218, 1219 (9th Cir. 2018); see also Cardoza v. Bloomin’ Brands, Inc., [16] 141 F. Supp. 3d 1137, 1145 (D. Nev. 2015) (quoting F.D.I.C. v. Butcher, 116 F.R.D. 196 , 203 17 (E.D. Tenn. 1986)). Unless such stipulation interferes with court proceedings or deadlines, parties 18 may agree among themselves to discovery procedures without obtaining judicial approval. Fed. 19 R. Civ. P. 29(b). Permissible extra-judicial discovery agreements may extend to establishing 20 procedures and protections regarding the exchange of confidential discovery material. See, e.g., 21 Midwest Athletics & Sports All. LLC v. Ricoh USA, Inc., 332 F.R.D. 159 , 161 (E.D. Penn. 2019) 22 (denying stipulated protective order, while also explaining that, “[n]otwithstanding the absence of 23 judicial imprimatur, the parties may agree to maintain confidentiality of discovery materials”); 24 David J. Frank Landscape Cont’g, Inc. v. La Rosa Landscape, 199 F.R.D. 314, 315 (E.D. Wis. 25 2001) (denying stipulated protective order, while also explaining that “[t]he parties are free to enter 26 agreements between themselves regarding how they will disseminate material produced in [28] 1| discovery”).! When parties seek judicial approval of a discovery agreement that does not require 2|| judicial approval, judges are well within their discretion to deny such request as unnecessary. See, 3] e.g., Comminey v. Sam’s W. Inc., 2020 WL 2764610 , at *1 (D. Nev. May 27, 2020) (overruling 4] objection). 5 The parties in this case have reached an agreement as to the designation and treatment of 6|| documents they deem to be confidential. The request for a protective order does not provide a 7| factual basis for the Court to determine that any discovery material warrants confidential treatment. 8|| Instead, the request indicates that the parties may in the future designate material as confidential 9] based on “review of the documents by an attorney who has, in good faith, determined that the 10] documents contain ‘Confidential Information,’ as defined [by the agreement].” Docket No. 89 at 11] 2. As explained above, the parties’ agreement for a designation procedure already appears to be enforceable pursuant to Rule 29(b). The agreement itself acknowledges that “[nJothing herein 13] shall be construed or presented as a judicial determination that any specific document or item of 14] information designated as CONFIDENTIAL by counsel is subject to protection ... until such time 15|| as a document-specific ruling shall have been made.” /d. at 10. No meaningful showing has been 16] made as to why judicial oversight in the form of a protective order is warranted. 17 Accordingly, the stipulation is DENIED without prejudice. 18 IT IS SO ORDERED. 19 Dated: September 26, 2025 Nancy J. Koppa, 21 United States Magistrate Judge [26] 27), ——_________ ' If discovery material is later filed with the Court, a proper showing must be made at that 28] point to support any request for sealing or redaction. See, e.g., Ricoh, 332 F.R.D. at 161.