Aram Mkrtchyan v. Sacramento County, California et al.

[7] 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA [10] 11 ARAM MKRTCHYAN, No. 2:25-cv-01405-DJC-CSK [12] Plaintiff, [13] v. ORDER [14] SACRAMENTO COUNTY, 15 CALIFORNIA et al., 16 Defendants. [18] 19 Pending before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s second 20 cause of action for Monell liability in the First Amended Complaint. Defendant alleges 21 that Plaintiff’s allegations are too conclusory and fail to state a theory of liability under 22 Monell. Plaintiff argues that the allegations are sufficient and requests to have 23 discovery proceed should the Court grant the Motion to Dismiss. For the reasons 24 below the Court DENIES the Motion to Dismiss. 25 BACKGROUND 26 In November 2024, Plaintiff Aram Mkrtchyan was seated on his bunk in the G 27 Dorm of the Rio Cosumnes Correctional Center (“RCCC”) playing video games with 28 his headphones on. (FAC (ECF No. 10) ¶¶ 8, 10.) Plaintiff was in custody at the RCCC, 1 which is staffed and operated by Defendant Sacramento County’s Sheriff’s 2 Department (“SCSD”) and is where Defendant Deputy Mark Dugdale was working. 3 (Id. ¶¶ 5,6,8.) While playing, Plaintiff experienced a setback in the game and lost all of 4 the electronic coins he had collected over about 20 minutes of play. (Id. ¶ 9.) Plaintiff 5 exclaimed “You son of a bitch,” in a tone of voice louder than usual because of his 6 wearing headphones. (Id.) Deputy Dugdale, who was doing a “count time” for 7 inmates, heard the expletive and told Plaintiff to walk to the area outside the control 8 center for the G Dorm and sit on a bench. (Id. ¶¶ 10,11.) Plaintiff was left to sit on the 9 bench for twenty to thirty minutes and attempted to apologize and explain that the 10 phrase was not directed toward Deputy Dugdale. (Id. ¶¶ 11,12.) Deputy Dugdale 11 told Plaintiff he would be “rolled up” that night, meaning he would be transferred to 12 higher security. (Id.) Plaintiff also alleges that while he was waiting on the bench, he 13 asked to get a sweater or blanket while he waited but was denied permission and 14 instead sat in a t-shirt. (Id. ¶ 13.) 15 At the bench, Deputy Dugdale approached Plaintiff from behind, told Plaintiff 16 to get ready to be cuffed, and Plaintiff stood up with his hands behind his back. (Id. 17 ¶ 14.) Without warning, Plaintiff was then attacked by Deputy Dugdale and another 18 SCSD officer who shoved him into a fence and threw him on the ground, at which 19 point he lost consciousness for up to thirty seconds. (Id.) Sometime during the attack, 20 Plaintiff heard the officers call for backup and two other officers joined the assault on 21 Plaintiff. (Id. ¶¶ 14,15.) Plaintiff alleges that officers told him to “stop resisting” but 22 Plaintiff had not resisted in any manner. (Id. ¶ 15.) Plaintiff experienced several 23 injuries following the incident: including having two teeth knocked loose and losing 24 one tooth completely, suffering significant cuts and bruises, and being struck in his 25 testicles. (Id.) Two of the officers, including Deputy Dugdale, then took Plaintiff to the 26 medical unit where he had his wounds cleaned. (Id. ¶ 16.) Plaintiff was then taken to 27 the maximum-security area and received a disciplinary write up for the beating based 28 on what Plaintiff contends were fabricated charges. (Id. ¶ 16,17.) 1 Plaintiff now brings suit against Defendant Sacramento County alleging 2 violations of various state and federal laws. Defendant brings the instant Motion to 3 Dismiss Plaintiff’s second cause of action alleging Monell liability. (MTD (ECF No. 14).) 4 Plaintiff issued an Opposition (Opp’n (ECF No. 17),) to the Motion and Defendant 5 Replied (Reply (ECF No. 18)). The matter was submitted without oral argument under 6 Local Rule 230(g). (ECF No. 20.) 7 LEGAL STANDARD 8 A party may move to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can 9 be granted[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The motion may be granted only if “the 10 complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable 11 legal theory.” Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 12 2008). While the court assumes all factual allegations are true and construes “them in 13 the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,” Steinle v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 919 14 F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 2019), if the complaint’s allegations do not “plausibly give 15 rise to an entitlement to relief” the motion must be granted. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 16 662, 679 (2009). 17 A complaint need contain only “a short and plain statement of the claim 18 showing that the pleader is entitled to relief [,]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), not “detailed 19 factual allegations.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). However, 20 this rule demands more than unadorned accusations; “sufficient factual matter” must 21 make the claim at least plausible. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 . In the same vein, conclusory 22 or formulaic recitations of elements do not alone suffice. Id. “A claim has facial 23 plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 24 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. This 25 evaluation of plausibility is a context-specific task drawing on “judicial experience and 26 common sense.” Id. at 679. 27 These same standards apply to claims against municipal governments under 28 Section 1983. See A.E. ex rel. Hernandez v. Cnty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 1 2012). A plaintiff’s allegations “may not simply recite the elements” of a claim under 2 Monell. Id. (quoting Starr v. Baca, 651 F.3d 1202 , 1216 (9th Cir. 2011)). Rather, the 3 complaint “must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice” of 4 the claims and allow the municipal government “to defend itself effectively.” Id. 5 (quoting Starr, 652 F.3d at 1216). The plaintiff’s allegations “must plausibly suggest an 6 entitlement to relief, such that it is not unfair to require the opposing party to be 7 subjected to the expense of discovery and continued litigation.” Id. (quoting Starr, 8 652 F.3d at 1216). 9 DISCUSSION 10 The Supreme Court held in Monell v. Department of Social Services that local 11 governments may be held liable under section 1983 for wrongs done by the local 12 government itself. 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). A municipality or other local 13 government entity is subject to Monell liability when that government, “under color of 14 some official policy, ‘causes’ an employee to violate another’s constitutional rights.” [15] Id. at 692 ; see Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation 16 omitted) (“A government entity may not be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , unless 17 a policy, practice, or custom of the entity can be shown to be a moving force behind a 18 violation of constitutional rights.”). To establish liability for a government entity under 19 Monell, a plaintiff must prove “(1) that [the plaintiff] possessed a constitutional right of 20 which he was deprived; (2) that the municipality had a policy; (3) that this policy 21 amounts to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional right; and, (4) that 22 the policy is the moving force behind the constitutional violation.’” Dougherty, 654 23 F.3d at 900 (citations omitted). 24 Monell liability may be established even where the municipality does not 25 expressly adopt the alleged policy. Along with an official policy, the Ninth Circuit has 26 recognized three other theories for establishing liability under Monell: a pervasive 27 practice or custom; a failure to train, supervise, or discipline; or a decision or act by a 28 final policymaker. Horton by Horton v. City of Santa Maria, 915 F.3d 592 , 602–03 (9th 1 Cir. 2019). A municipality, however, cannot be held liable solely for the purported 2 constitutional violations of its employees, “or, in other words, a municipality cannot be 3 held liable under [section] 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 4 691. The municipality itself must have acted through an official municipal policy or 5 custom. Id. at 694 . 6 I. Custom, Policy or Practice 7 Defendant contends that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a pervasive custom 8 or practice because the prior incidents and cases Plaintiff references do not 9 sufficiently illustrate a widespread, permanent pattern and do not identify how 10 Defendant’s challenged practices are deficient. (MTD at 6–9.) Plaintiff argues that the 11 prior incidents included the FAC plausibly demonstrate a problem with the policy, 12 practices or procedures for the use of force by jail officers. (Opp’n at 5–6.) 13 “[A] custom or practice can be inferred from widespread practices or evidence 14 of repeated constitutional violations for which the errant municipal officers were not 15 discharged or reprimanded.” Hunter v. County of Sacramento, 652 F.3d 1225 , 1233 16 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotations and citations omitted). To show a violation by 17 practice or custom, the plaintiff must show more than “isolated or sporadic events.” 18 Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996). Rather, liability “must be founded 19 upon practices of sufficient duration, frequency and consistency that the conduct has 20 become a traditional method of carrying out policy.” Id. (citations omitted). While “[i]t 21 is difficult to discern from the caselaw the quantum of allegations needed to survive a 22 motion to dismiss a pattern and practice claim,” Gonzalez v. County of Merced, 289 F. 23 Supp. 3d 1094, 1099 (E.D. Cal. 2017), “where more than a few incidents are alleged, 24 the determination appears to require a fully-developed factual record,” Lemus v. 25 County of Merced, No. 1:15-cv-00359-MCE-EPG, 2016 WL 2930523 , at *4 (E.D. Cal. 26 May 19, 2016), aff'd, 711 Fed. App'x 859 (9th Cir. 2017). 27 As an initial matter, Plaintiff concedes that Defendant “had a facially 28 constitutional policy regarding the use of excessive force in its jails.” (Opp’n at 6.) 1 Plaintiff points to the General Order on the Use of Force and the Operations Order 2 regarding the use of force at the RCCC. Even with such policies in place, Plaintiff 3 contends that there was a pattern of excessive force by jail officers against inmates 4 because such policies were not followed. See Est. of Osuna v. County of Stanislaus, [5] 392 F. Supp. 3d 1162 , 1174–75 (E.D. Cal. 2019) (“[A]lthough factual allegations of the 6 complaint must plausibly allege the existence of a policy or custom that was the 7 moving force behind the constitutional violation at issue, the policy or custom itself 8 need only be alleged in general terms.”); Adams v. City of Redding, No. 2:20-cv9 01610-TLN-DMC, 2022 WL 16964025 , at *3 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2022) (finding that 10 where Plaintiff alleged Defendant’s specific policies were wrongfully ignored by the 11 officers, fair notice to Defendant existed). 12 To support the argument that the practice was longstanding, Plaintiff includes 13 seventeen prior incidents of excessive force used by SCSD officers against inmates in 14 the Main Jail and RCCC. (FAC ¶¶ 25(a)–(q).) Plaintiff’s injury occurred in the RCCC, 15 and only three of the cited incidents occurred there while the rest occurred in the 16 Main Jail. (FAC ¶¶ 25(a),(d),(h).) That said, given Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendant 17 operates and staffs both sites, the Court does not find that distinction to be 18 dispositive. Reviewing the incidents, nearly all involved SCSD “sustain[ing]” a finding 19 of excessive force by an officer against an inmate or detainee.1 Each incident involved 20 some form of “nominal” discipline. (Opp’n at 2.) The incidents took place between 21 2013 and 2023. The types of force used by the SCSD officers resemble the type of 22 force alleged to have been used against Plaintiff in fourteen of the cited incidents, with 23 the most recent one alleged to have occurred in March 2023, which was a year and 24 half before the events involving Plaintiff.2 [25] 1 Plaintiff includes an incident where the Defendant officer was improperly deemed “exonerated” for a 26 use of force during a jail intake process. A civil rights lawsuit was then filed and the case settled pretrial. However, the Court does not consider this incident as the factual circumstances differ from the 27 incident at hand. (FAC ¶ 25(n).) 28 2 Plaintiff also cites to four cases where Defendant was sued under section 1983 for the use of excessive 1 Contrary to the Defendant’s argument that the incidents are too “isolated” and 2 “sporadic,” the events appear to demonstrate a continuous pattern of excessive force 3 used by officers over the course of a decade. The Court finds that Plaintiff has 4 plausibly alleged the existence of a claim against Defendant for an unconstitutional 5 custom or policy of excessive force by jail officers against inmates or detainees. See 6 Lemus, 2016 WL 2930523 , at *4 (“Where more than a few incidents are alleged, the 7 determination appears to require a fully-developed factual record.”). 8 II. Failure to Train 9 Next, Defendant argues that the failure to train, supervise and discipline theory 10 fails because no facts allege that the SCSD failed to train its correctional officers, or 11 that the alleged failure was a cause of the alleged constitutional violation. (MTD at 9– 12 11.) Defendant also contends that Plaintiff has not demonstrated deliberate 13 indifference. (Id. at 11.) In the Opposition, Plaintiff points to several allegations that 14 he claims support the failure to train theory. 15 A municipality may be held liable under section 1983 for the inadequacy of law16 enforcement training “only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate 17 indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact.” City of 18 Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). To state such a claim, a plaintiff must 19 show (1) “the existing training program” is inadequate “in relation to the tasks that the 20 particular officers must perform,”; (2) the officials have been deliberately indifferent to 21 the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact and (3) the inadequacy 22 of the training “actually caused” the deprivation of the alleged constitutional right. 23 Merritt v. County of Los Angeles, 875 F.2d 765, 770 (9th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted). [25] 26 has not provided enough context for the Court to determine that the cases support Plaintiff’s contention, or whether a settlement resulted from the case. It also appears that at least one case, 27 Predybaylo v. County of Sacramento, No. 22-15972, 2023 WL 5125048 , at *1 (9th Cir. Aug. 10, 2023), does not support Plaintiff’s argument. [28] 1 Here, the FAC asserts that Defendant failed to train jail officers in the use of 2 | excessive force in violation of the General Order and the Operations Order. 3 | (FAC 936.) Defendant also failed to monitor or enforce the policies involving 4 | excessive use of force and failed to supervise the implementation of such order. (/d. 5 | 938.) Plaintiff points to the prior incidents of “sustained” findings of excessive force to 6 | show that Defendants had awareness of constitutional violations occurring yet failed 7 | to implement any “heighted supervision or additional supervisory measures” to 8 | ensure that the violations ceased. (/d 4] 20.) Given the Court's findings that the prior 9 | incidents sufficiently allege a pattern, at this stage in the proceedings, it is plausible 10 | that a failure to train existed such that a Monell violation may exist. 11 lll. Ratification 12 Lastly, Plaintiff alleges a theory of ratification premised on allegations that there 13 | was a failure in the chain of command within SCSD and that supervisory officers were 14 | aware of untruthful officer reports that made it more likely for officers to use excessive 15 | force on detainees and inmates. However, the FAC does not identify any specific 16 | individuals who were allegedly policymakers for the County. The only named 17 | Defendants are the County of Sacramento and Deputy Dugdale. The remainder are 18 | “Doe” Defendants who have not been individually identifies. Given that the FAC does 19 | not identify anyone who had the capacity to act as a policymaker, the Complaint fails 20 | to allege sufficient facts to establish municipal liability under a “policymaker” theory. 21 CONCLUSION 22 For the reasons discussed above Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 14) is 23 | DENIED. [24] 95 IT IS SO ORDERED. 26 | Dated: _September 15, 2025 Donel J CoDbnatto Hon. Daniel alabretta 27 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE [28] °