Linh Wang v. Esurance Insurance Company, et al.

THE HONORABLE JOHN C. COUGHENOUR [6] UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT [7] WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 8 AT SEATTLE 9 LINH WANG, CASE NO. C24-0447-JCC [10] Plaintiff, ORDER 11 v. 12 ESURANCE INSUANCE COMPANY, et al., [13] Defendants. [15] This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration (Dkt. No. [16] 111). Such motions are generally disfavored. LCR 7(h)(1). Nevertheless, they are warranted [17] when there is “manifest error in the prior ruling or a showing of new facts or legal authority [18] which could not have been brought to [the Court’s] attention earlier with reasonable diligence.” [19] Id. In this instance, Plaintiff’s reconsideration motion demonstrates manifest error. Thus, the [20] Court GRANTS the motion for the reasons described herein. [21] The issue at hand is the preclusive effect of the arbitrator’s ruling, as it relates to certain [22] offsets to Defendant’s UIM policy limit. (See Dkt. No. 107 at 6–8.) The offset in question is the [23] $15,000 Plaintiff received from State Farm, in settlement of her suit against Ms. Duong. In so [24] ruling that it applied here, the Court focused on the arbitrator’s use of the term “amounts [25] received.” (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff received $15,000 from Ms. Duong in settlement of Plaintiff’s suit, [26] 1 thus, the Court concluded that (according to the arbitrator) this amount was available as an 2 offset. (Id.) The Court now realizes that its interpretation of the phrasing the arbitrator used was 3 in error. This is because, at the time, the Court failed to understand the import of her reference to 4 amounts “legally available”— as Plaintiff points out in her briefing in support of the instant 5 motion, (see Dkt. No. 111 at 3–7)—and as addressed in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Dejbod, 818 P.2d 6 608, 613 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991). 7 According to Dejbod, a settlement payment alone “does not . . . establish that the carrier’s 8 insured is liable to the claimant within the meaning of RCW 48.22.030(1).” 818 P.2d at 612. And 9 the arbitrator indicates in no uncertain terms that she relied on Dejbod’s analysis in issuing her 10 decision. (See Dkt. No. 63-48 at 3–4.) Thus, there is nothing “more” than the settlement (which 11 is inadequate under Dejbod) to make Ms. Duong’s State Farm policy “applicable” within the 12 meaning of RCW 48.22.030(1). See 818 P.2d at 612.1 As no one contested at the time that Mr. 13 Wang was 100% at fault for the collision. (See Dkt. No. 42-3, 42-4 at 2.) 14 Thus, Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration (Dkt. No. 111) is GRANTED. 15 As a matter of law, Ms. Duong’s $15,000 settlement may not offset UIM coverage 16 owed. Plaintiff is thus entitled to the full UIM policy limit, $250,000, in satisfaction of the 17 $513,143 arbitration award—not the $238,143 the Court previously determined. (See Dkt. No. 18 107 at 8.) 19 // 20 // 21 // [22] 1 Defendant’s arguments in opposition to Plaintiff’s reconsideration motion, which focus on (a) 23 the import of its policy language (precluding duplicative payments) and/or (b) Plaintiff’s resulting windfall, (see Dkt. No. 117 at 3–6), are inapt. That is because they speak to the merits [24] of the arbitrator’s decision, rather than its interpretation, which the Court cannot question absent 25 “facial legal error.” Salewski v. Pilchuck Veterinary Hosp., Inc., P.S., 359 P.3d 884, 888 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015); see RCW 7.04A.230(2), .240(1). And here, the Court sees no such error. [26] 1 DATED this 29th day of October 2025. A [4] John C. Coughenour 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE