Marshall Burgess, Jr. v. Washoe County Jail, et al.

[2] 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 5 * * * 6 MARSHALL BURGESS, JR., Case No. 3:24-cv-00555-MMD-CLB 7 Plaintiff, ORDER v. [8] WASHOE COUNTY JAIL, et al., [9] Defendants. [10] 11 Pro se Plaintiff Marshall Burgess, Jr., brings this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. 12 § 1983 to redress constitutional violations that he claims he suffered while incarcerated 13 at Washoe County Detention Center. (ECF No. 8.) On September 8, 2025, the Court 14 ordered Plaintiff to file an amended complaint by October 8, 2025. (ECF No. 7.) The Court 15 warned Plaintiff that the action could be dismissed if he failed to file an amended 16 complaint by that deadline. (Id. at 12, 14.) That deadline expired and Plaintiff did not file 17 an amended complaint, move for an extension, or otherwise respond. 18 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the 19 exercise of that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . 20 dismissal” of a case. Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of L.A., 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 21 1986). A court may dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to obey a court order or 22 comply with local rules. See Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440-41 (9th Cir. 1988) 23 (affirming dismissal for failure to comply with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to keep 24 court apprised of address); Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987) 25 (affirming dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In determining whether to 26 dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the Court must consider: (1) the public’s 27 interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to manage its docket; 28 (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of 2 Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting 3 Malone, 833 F.2d at 130 ). 4 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation 5 and the Court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of Plaintiff’s 6 claims. The third factor, risk of prejudice to Defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal 7 because a presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing 8 a pleading ordered by the court or prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West, 542 9 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). The fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of 10 cases on their merits—is greatly outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal. 11 The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic alternatives can 12 be used to correct the party’s failure that brought about the Court’s need to consider 13 dismissal. See Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983 , 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining 14 that considering less drastic alternatives before the party has disobeyed a court order 15 does not satisfy this factor); accord Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639 , 643 & n.4 (9th 16 Cir. 2002) (explaining that “the persuasive force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that 17 “implicitly accepted pursuit of less drastic alternatives prior to disobedience of the court’s 18 order as satisfying this element[,]” i.e., like the “initial granting of leave to amend coupled 19 with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have been “eroded” by Yourish). 20 Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally dismissing a 21 case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v. Duncan, 779 22 F.2d 1421 , 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). Because this action cannot realistically proceed until and 23 unless Plaintiff files an amended complaint, the only alternative is to enter a second order 24 setting another deadline. But the reality of repeating an ignored order is that it often only 25 delays the inevitable and squanders the Court’s finite resources. The circumstances here 26 do not indicate that this case will be an exception: there is no hint that Plaintiff needs 27 additional time or evidence that he did not receive the Court’s screening order. Setting [28] 1 || another deadline is not a meaningful alternative given these circumstances. So the fifth 2 || factor favors dismissal. 3 Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, the Court finds that they 4 || weigh in favor of dismissal. It is therefore ordered that this action is dismissed without 5 || prejudice based on Plaintiff's failure to file an amended complaint in compliance with this 6 || Court’s order on September 8, 2025 (ECF No. 7). The Clerk of Court is kindly directed to 7 || enter judgment accordingly and close this case. No other documents may be filed in this 8 || now-closed case. If Plaintiff wishes to pursue his claims, he must file a complaint in a new 9 || case. 10 It is further ordered that Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF 11 |} No. 1) is denied as moot. [12] 13 DATED THIS 20" Day of October, 2025 [15] MIRANDA M. DU 16 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE