IDHW v. Jane Doe

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO Docket No. 51581 In the Interest of: Jane Doe I, John Doe ) I, and Jane Doe II, Children Under ) Eighteen (18) Years of Age. ) STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF ) HEALTH AND WELFARE, ) Filed: July 18, 2024 ) Petitioner-Respondent, ) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk ) v. ) ) JANE DOE (2024-06), ) ) Respondent-Appellant. ) ) Appeal from the Magistrate Division of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Twin Falls County. Hon. Benjamin D. Harmer, Magistrate. Judgment terminating parental rights, affirmed. Benjamin P. Anderson, Twin Falls County Public Defender; Adam Ondo, Deputy Public Defender, Twin Falls, for appellant. Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; James T. Baird, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. ________________________________________________ HUSKEY, Judge 1 Jane Doe (Doe) appeals from the magistrate court’s judgment terminating her parental 2 rights to her children, Jane Doe I, Jane Doe II, and John Doe I (Children). Doe argues the 3 magistrate court erred in finding she neglected Children. The magistrate court’s judgment 4 terminating Doe’s parental rights is affirmed. 5 I. 6 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 7 Doe is the mother of Children. The Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (Department) 8 received a report that Children were suffering from abuse and neglect. The Department attempted 9 to work informally with Doe, but that attempt was unsuccessful. Pursuant to the Child Protective [1] 1 Act, Children were placed in the custody of the Department and a case plan was ordered. The case 2 plan was filed October 8, 2021, and delineated the tasks Doe was required to successfully complete 3 to reunify with Children. Following a hearing, which Doe attended, the magistrate court approved 4 and adopted the case plan, excepting some typographical errors, which the court ordered corrected. 5 The amended case plan ordered by the court was filed October 22, 2021, and considered 6 reunification as the primary goal. 7 Based on Doe’s lack of progress on the case plan, the primary goal was eventually changed 8 from reunification to termination of Doe’s parental rights and adoption of Children. After multiple 9 review hearings, all of which Doe attended, the Department filed a petition to terminate Doe’s 10 parental rights to Children. Following a hearing, the magistrate court found that Doe had neglected 11 Children, and it is in Children’s best interests to terminate Doe’s parental rights. Doe appeals. 12 II. 13 STANDARD OF REVIEW 14 On appeal from a decision terminating parental rights, this Court examines whether the 15 decision is supported by substantial and competent evidence, which means such evidence as a 16 reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Doe v. Doe, 148 Idaho 243 , 17 245-46, 220 P.3d 1062, 1064-65 (2009). The appellate court will indulge all reasonable inferences 18 in support of the trial court’s judgment when reviewing an order that parental rights be terminated. [19] Id. The Idaho Supreme Court has also said that the substantial evidence test requires a greater 20 quantum of evidence in cases where the trial court’s finding must be supported by clear and 21 convincing evidence than in cases where a mere preponderance is required. State v. Doe, 143 22 Idaho 343, 346 , 144 P.3d 597, 600 (2006). Clear and convincing evidence is generally understood 23 to be evidence indicating that the thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably certain. Roe 24 v. Doe, 143 Idaho 188, 191 , 141 P.3d 1057, 1060 (2006). Further, the magistrate court’s decision 25 must be supported by objectively supportable grounds. Doe, 143 Idaho at 346, 144 P.3d at 600 . 26 III. 27 ANALYSIS 28 On appeal, Doe argues there was insufficient evidence that she: (1) had notice of the case 29 plan tasks; (2) failed to protect and feed her children; and (3) neglected her children. The 30 Department argues the evidentiary burden was satisfied as to each argument. [2] 1 A parent has a fundamental liberty interest in maintaining a relationship with his child. 2 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); Doe v. State, 137 Idaho 758, 760 , 53 P.3d 341 , 343 3 (2002). This interest is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 4 State v. Doe, 144 Idaho 839, 842 , 172 P.3d 1114, 1117 (2007). Implicit in the Termination of 5 Parent and Child Relationship Act is the philosophy that, wherever possible, family life should be 6 strengthened and preserved. I.C. § 16-2001(2). Therefore, the requisites of due process must be 7 met when terminating the parent-child relationship. State v. Doe, 143 Idaho 383, 386 , 146 P.3d 8 649, 652 (2006). Due process requires that the grounds for terminating a parent-child relationship 9 be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Id. Because a fundamental liberty interest is at stake, 10 the United States Supreme Court has determined that a court may terminate a parent-child 11 relationship only if that decision is supported by clear and convincing evidence. Santosky v. 12 Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982); see also I.C. § 16-2009; Doe v. Dep’t of Health & Welfare, [13] 146 Idaho 759, 761-62 , 203 P.3d 689, 691-92 (2009); Doe, 143 Idaho at 386, 146 P.3d at 652 . [14] Idaho Code § 16-2005 (1) permits a party to petition the court for termination of the parent15 child relationship when it is in the child’s best interests and any one of the following five factors 16 exist: (a) abandonment; (b) neglect or abuse; (c) lack of a biological relationship between the child 17 and a presumptive parent; (d) the parent is unable to discharge parental responsibilities for a 18 prolonged period that will be injurious to the health, morals, or well-being of the child; or (e) the 19 parent is incarcerated and will remain incarcerated for a substantial period of time. Each statutory 20 ground is an independent basis for termination. Doe, 144 Idaho at 842 , 172 P.3d at 1117 . [21] Idaho Code § 16-2002 (3)(a) defines “neglect” as any conduct included in I.C. § 16-1602(31). 22 Section 16-1602(31)(a) provides, in pertinent part, that a child is neglected when the child is without 23 proper parental care and control, or subsistence, medical or other care or control necessary for his or 24 her well-being because of the conduct or omission of his or her parents, guardian, or other custodian 25 or their neglect or refusal to provide them. Neglect also exists where the parent has failed to comply 26 with the court’s orders or the case plan in a Child Protective Act case and the Department has had 27 temporary or legal custody of the child for fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months and 28 reunification has not been accomplished by the last day of the fifteenth month in which the child has 29 been in the temporary or legal custody of the Department. I.C. § 16-2002(3)(b). [3] 1 A. Neglect 2 Doe argues there was insufficient evidence that Doe neglected Children pursuant to I.C. 3 § 16-1602(31)(a). The Department argues there was sufficient evidence presented. 4 1. Notice 5 Doe makes two arguments regarding the case plan. First, she argues the copy of the case 6 plan admitted as State’s Exhibit 1 is not signed or file stamped and, therefore, there is no evidence 7 that State’s Exhibit 1 was the court-ordered case plan. Second, Doe argues she did not have notice 8 of the contents of the case plan. 9 State’s Exhibit 1, which was admitted without objection at the termination trial, is a copy 10 of the case plan, parts 1 and 2. Case plan part 1 identified the steps Doe needed to successfully 11 complete in order to reunify with Children. Doe argues that this case plan was not signed by Doe, 12 was not file-stamped by the clerk, and did not contain a certificate of service or otherwise indicate 13 Doe had been served a copy of it. This argument was rejected by the magistrate court. The court 14 held that Doe stipulated to the court taking judicial notice of the hearing wherein the terms of the 15 case plan were modified,1 a Department witness testified that the case plan offered was the same 16 case plan ordered by the court, both the Guardian Ad Litem (GAL) and one of Doe’s caseworkers 17 discussed the contents of the case plan with Doe on several occasions, and Doe discussed the case 18 plan with her case manager but Doe declined to provide a copy of the case plan to her case [1] Doe takes issue with the magistrate court’s conclusion that the magistrate court took judicial notice of the hearing wherein the terms of the case plan were modified. Doe argues that instead, the court only took judicial notice of the order modifying case plan, which does not identify the tasks of the case plan. We find this disingenuous. For context, Doe stipulated in a document entitled, “Stipulation to Take Judicial Notice of Hearing and Order,” that the court could: take judicial notice, for purposes of making its findings of fact and conclusions of law in the termination of parental rights proceedings, that a motion hearing on [Doe’s] motion to modify case plan was held on December 29, 2022, and the Court entered an order modifying case plan on January 4, 2023. The Court may further take judicial notice of the contents of the order modifying case plan. The order modifying case plan indicates that a hearing on the case plan was held on December 29, 2022, and that Task 1N was modified but Task 1F would remain as worded. The court entered an order captioned, “Order to Take Judicial Notice of Hearing and Order” taking judicial notice of the “order on the case plan hearing, which was conducted on December 29, 2022,” and based on the stipulation, that it could be relied upon by the magistrate court. It is clear from the context of the stipulation, including the heading on both the motion and subsequent order, that the parties and court intended for the court to take judicial notice of the substance of the hearing and the order memorializing what occurred during the hearing. [4] 1 manager. Based on that evidence, the magistrate court found as a matter of fact that Doe was 2 provided notice of the case plan and the tasks therein. 3 Doe argues that in order to be a case plan as defined by the statute, the case plan must be 4 one ordered by the Court. The magistrate court’s factual finding that State’s Exhibit 1, a copy of 5 the case plan, is the same as the case plan ordered in the case is supported by clear and convincing 6 evidence. The first court-ordered case plan was filed October 8, 2021. The corrected court-ordered 7 case plan was filed October 22, 2021. At the termination trial, the State moved to admit State’s 8 Exhibit 1, which is a copy of the case plan; Doe did not object. The Department’s caseworker 9 testified that State’s Exhibit 1 is a copy of the case plan for the parents of Children; Doe did not 10 object. Another witness, the Court-Appointed Special Advocate volunteer, testified that State’s 11 Exhibit 1 is the case plan that was ordered. At the termination hearing, the magistrate court took 12 judicial notice of the Order Modifying Case Plan. Thus, the record provides clear and convincing 13 evidence supporting the magistrate court’s conclusion that State’s Exhibit 1 is a copy of the court14 ordered case plan. 15 Next, Doe argues the Department failed to establish the “implied element” that Doe had 16 knowledge of the case plan that was admitted as State’s Exhibit 1. Doe cites several cases to 17 support her contention that knowledge of the case plan is an implied element the Department must 18 establish in order to show Doe failed to comply with the case plan as a basis for neglect. The 19 magistrate court found that Doe had notice and knowledge of the case plan and its contents. We 20 need not address whether knowledge is an implied element because, in this case, there is clear and 21 convincing evidence that Doe had actual knowledge of the case plan and the tasks she needed to 22 complete in order to reunify with Children. 23 Doe stipulated in the Child Protective Act (CPA) case to the Department’s custody of 24 Children. Challenges to circumstances arising in the Child Protective Act are irrelevant to 25 termination proceedings. Idaho Dep't of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 161 Idaho 754, 758 , 390 P.3d 26 1281, 1285 (2017) (rejecting Mother’s argument that case plans were invalid, in part, because 27 Mother never objected when case plans were entered in CPA case); Idaho Dep't of Health & 28 Welfare v. Doe (2016-11), 160 Idaho 824, 834 , 379 P.3d 1094, 1104 (2016) (noting that inquiry 29 into reunification efforts is not relevant for court to terminate parental rights). If Doe had concerns 30 or issues regarding the terms of the case plan, those concerns needed to be raised in the CPA case, [5] 1 not the termination case. Doe’s failure to challenge the validity of the case plan or her knowledge 2 of the case plan tasks in the CPA case precludes our review in the termination case. 3 Even if Doe had preserved a challenge to the case plan, the magistrate court found that both 4 the GAL and a caseworker discussed the details of the case plan with Doe when they feared Doe 5 would not be able to complete the case plan and that Doe discussed the case plan with her case 6 manager but declined to provide a copy. These findings are supported by clear and convincing 7 evidence. 8 The record indicates that Doe was present and stipulated to the Department having custody 9 of Children at the adjudicatory hearing on September 23, 2021, and she was aware a case plan was 10 ordered. The case plan was filed October 8, 2021, and delineated the tasks Doe was required to 11 successfully complete to reunify with Children. On October 14, 2021, the magistrate court held a 12 hearing, at which the case plan was discussed; Doe was present. At that hearing, corrections and 13 changes were made to the case plan and the court indicated it would adopt the case plan. 14 Thereafter, after discussing the corrections and changes, the minutes indicate the last thing the 15 magistrate court did was “inquire of [Doe]” and “[Doe] responds.” The minutes then reflect that 16 the case plan was filed, and the court approved the case plan with the exception of the 17 typographical errors. The court issued an order adopting the case plan and incorporating by 18 reference the case plan into the order. The corrected, court-ordered and court-approved case plan 19 was filed on October 22, 2021. The certificate of service indicates a copy of the proposed case 20 plan and the corrected court-approved case plan were served on Doe’s counsel. Pursuant to Idaho 21 Rule of Civil Procedure 5(b)(1), “If a party is represented by an attorney, service under this rule 22 must be made on the attorney unless the court orders service on the party.” Here, Doe’s counsel 23 was served with copies of both the proposed and court-ordered case plan so Doe was served 24 through her attorney. Additionally, Doe had actual knowledge of the case plan tasks. 25 As noted above, Doe was present when the case plan was presented, corrected, approved, 26 and adopted. In addition to that hearing, Doe was present and made comments during the review 27 hearing on January 6, 2022. At that hearing, the Department moved to update the case plan, Doe 28 responded, and the court granted the motion to modify, which included additional tasks for Doe; 29 accordingly, Doe clearly had notice and knowledge of the modifications as she was present when 30 they were announced. The modified case plan was incorporated by reference into the order, and 31 the order was served on Doe’s counsel. [6] 1 Another review hearing was held March 31, 2022; Doe attended, and the court spoke with 2 her. The court added an additional task for Doe, incorporated the amended case plan into the order, 3 and the order was served on Doe’s counsel. A review hearing was held June 23, 2022; Doe was 4 present. At that hearing, the magistrate court ordered the Department to schedule an extended 5 home visit between Doe and Children. The court entered an order, incorporated the case plan by 6 reference, and Doe’s counsel was served a copy of the order. The same occurred on August 25, 7 2022, with the court approving extended home visits, entering an order, incorporating by reference 8 the case plan into the order, and serving Doe’s counsel with a copy. At no point in any of the 9 above proceedings did Doe claim she had no knowledge of, or was unclear about, the terms of the 10 case plan. In fact, in each of the hearings, at least one task, if not more, was discussed and Doe 11 was present for that discussion; thus, there is clear and convincing evidence in the record to support 12 the magistrate court’s conclusion that Doe had knowledge of the case plan and the tasks she was 13 required to complete in order to successfully reunify with Children. 14 Moreover, we disagree with Doe’s statement that “at the conclusion of the trial, the record 15 was totally devoid of proof that [Doe] had knowledge of each particular task and whether each 16 was formally ordered by the court.” As noted above, all tasks had been formally ordered by the 17 court, various witnesses testified that the case plan admitted as Exhibit 1 was identical to the court18 ordered case plan, and the court-ordered case plan was discussed with Doe. At the termination 19 trial, the caseworker testified about each task Doe was supposed to complete in the case plan and 20 conversations the caseworker had with Doe about those requirements. For example, the first task 21 required Doe to provide safe, stable, sanitary, and drug-free housing for Children. However, in 22 March 2023, Doe became homeless, “couch-surfed” for several months, and ultimately moved to 23 Utah. The caseworker testified that she discussed the housing requirement with Doe, and that once 24 Doe lost her housing, Doe was not able to provide information about the individuals with whom 25 she was staying. 26 The second task required Doe to permit random and scheduled home visits. The 27 caseworker testified that she provided various home visits until Doe lost her housing and that, at 28 times thereafter, Doe would not provide the address where she was staying. The third task required 29 Doe to ensure that all individuals in the home are approved by the Department prior to moving in; 30 Doe did not comply. The next task required that Doe demonstrate the ability to financially provide 31 for Children’s needs. Doe was employed through April 2023, then obtained another job, but was [7] 1 not getting enough hours and was having financial struggles. She stopped working that job and 2 continued to have financial struggles until the time of the termination hearing. Doe notified the 3 Department that she lost her job, and she provided intermittent updates on her job search. The 4 fifth task required Doe to notify the Department of any changes in various circumstances. The 5 caseworker testified Doe was “pretty good” about keeping the Department up-to-date when she 6 lost her job and got evicted. The fourth task required Doe to demonstrate increased parenting skills 7 and, to that end, Doe was required to enroll in and complete a parenting class. Doe successfully 8 completed the class but because Doe did not retain the information and apply the parenting skills 9 and there were concerns about whether someone else had done the workbook assignments for her, 10 Doe was required to take the class a second time. Doe failed the class the second time. Doe was 11 required to complete a mental health assessment and engage in counseling. Doe completed the 12 assessment and attended some counseling, although she failed to make progress in counseling. In 13 terms of visitation, when Doe moved to Utah, the caseworker told Doe that visitation with Children 14 would be difficult, but Doe went ahead with the move. 15 Thus, the testimony demonstrates that Doe had knowledge of the tasks required by her case 16 plan because she was present when the tasks were initially ordered and she discussed the tasks 17 with her various caseworkers throughout the case. Doe’s compliance with various requirements, 18 like completing a parenting class and a mental health evaluation, informing the Department 19 regarding her change in circumstances, and declining to allow the Department to inspect her living 20 situations, demonstrate that Doe understood the relevant case plan tasks she was required to 21 complete in order to reunify with Children. The testimony regarding Doe’s actions undercuts her 22 argument that there was insufficient evidence presented that Doe did not know what tasks she 23 needed to complete to reunify with Children. There is clear and convincing evidence to support 24 the magistrate court’s conclusion that Doe had knowledge of the case plan. 25 2. Failing to meet the needs of Children 26 Next, Doe argues there is insufficient evidence to support the magistrate court’s finding 27 that Doe failed to protect Children, failed to feed Children, and failed to meet the needs of Children. 28 The magistrate court found that Doe did not or could not protect Children from the abusive actions 29 of her partner, Steven. 30 The testimony at trial established that the Department was aware of allegations of abuse by 31 Steven. Doe argues that no abuse was ever proven and, thus, there was no basis to find Doe [8] 1 neglected Children by failing to protect them from Steven. Doe misunderstands the quantum of 2 proof required to establish neglect. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that allegations of 3 abuse are sufficient for a finding of neglect. See In the Interest of the Doe Children v. John Doe 4 and Jane Doe, 163 Idaho 367 , 413 P.3d 767 (2018) (mother’s inability to protect her children 5 based on allegations of abuse was substantial and competent evidence that mother neglected 6 children); Castro v. Idaho Department of Health and Welfare, 102 Idaho 218 , 628 P.2d 1052 7 (1981) (father’s parental rights terminated based on allegations of abuse with substantiated 8 injuries); In the Interest of John Doe I and John Doe II v. State Department of Health and Welfare, [9] 122 Idaho 644 , 837 P.2d 319 (Ct. App. 1982) (rejecting argument that parental rights may only be 10 terminated upon finding, among other options, affirmative abuse with substantiated physical or 11 emotional harm to child). 12 Moreover, in addition to the allegations of abuse by Steven, the magistrate court found that 13 the testimony at the termination trial established that Steven “picked on” Doe’s son, was planning 14 to show Children pornography as a means to provide education on sexuality (as he had done with 15 his minor niece and nephew), and roughhoused inappropriately with Children. Steven also had a 16 clear hierarchy of favorites regarding Children. Doe did not identify any of these behaviors as 17 inappropriate or attempt to stop or change Steven’s behavior, instead relying on Steven to help 18 parent Children. Although Doe argues there is no evidence that Steven was physically violent 19 with Children, on appeal, she fails to address the other instances of Steven’s inappropriate behavior 20 from which Doe needed to demonstrate the ability to protect her children. Where a lower court 21 makes a ruling based on two alternative grounds and only one of those grounds is challenged on 22 appeal, the appellate court must affirm on the uncontested basis. Schmidt v. Huston, 167 Idaho 23 320, 325, 470 P.3d 1129 , 1134 (2016). Consequently, the factual finding that Steven bullied Doe’s 24 son, inappropriately roughhoused with Children, and planned to show Children pornography 25 established that the magistrate court’s factual finding that Doe failed to protect Children from 26 Steven is supported by clear and convincing evidence. 27 The magistrate court also found Doe could not provide for Children’s needs. First, the 28 court noted that Doe could not provide for the financial needs of Children as she had lost her job 29 and been unemployed for quite some time up to and including the time of the termination trial. 30 Doe argues that she supported Children because, on one instance, on each child’s birthday, she [9] 1 provided a gift for that each child. To the extent Doe argues providing one birthday gift is evidence 2 of financial support over a two-year period, we disagree. 3 The magistrate court also noted that although Doe had food and housing at the beginning 4 of the case, the food was insufficient. Similarly, the magistrate court considered Doe’s inability 5 to meet Children’s housing needs. At the time of the termination trial, Doe had been evicted from 6 her home and after couch-surfing for a period of time, she was living in a trailer home behind 7 Steven’s mother’s house in Utah, which Doe admitted was unsuitable for Children. Based on 8 Doe’s testimony, she failed to provide a safe, stable, and sanitary home for Children. 9 Finally, the magistrate court addressed Doe’s inability to meet the emotional needs of her 10 children as evidenced by the lack of Doe’s successful completion of family therapy or showing 11 she could attentively engage with Children. This lack of appropriate interaction evidenced itself 12 in the numerous instances of unhealthy interactions with Children, as well as numerous instances 13 of unhealthy non-interaction with Children during visits. 14 Doe argues the Department did not sufficiently plead “actual neglect” as failing to provide 15 for the needs of Children because the term “needs” was not specified in the termination petition. 16 Doe filed an answer to the petition and raised the affirmative defenses of estoppel, quasi-estoppel, 17 impossibility, void for vagueness, violation of procedural due process rights, violation of 18 substantive due process rights, and violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Doe raised no 19 challenges that the petition to terminate her parental rights was insufficiently pled in the magistrate 20 court. Moreover, the defenses of impossibility, void for vagueness, violation of her due process 21 rights, and violation of the Equal Protection Clause all related to the case plan, not to the petition 22 to terminate parental rights. 23 Under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure for pleadings, “[e]ach allegation must be 24 simple, concise, and direct. No technical form is required.” I.R.C.P. 8(d)(1). These 25 rules comport with Idaho’s notice-pleading requirement, which requires a pleading 26 to put the adverse party “on notice of the claims brought against it.” Hodge for & 27 on behalf of Welch v. Waggoner, 164 Idaho 89 , 96, 425 P.3d 1232, 1239 (2018) 28 (citation omitted). Accordingly, notice pleading requires the complaint to provide 29 “some indication” of the basis for relief, but not always an exact statutory basis or 30 formal cause of action. Brown v. City of Pocatello, 148 Idaho 802, 807 , 229 P.3d 31 1164, 1169 (2010). 32 Fulfer v. Sorrento Lactalis, Inc., 171 Idaho 296 , 301, 520 P.3d 708 , 713 (2022). While there are 33 some exceptions when heightened pleading requirements are imposed by rule or statute, Doe cites 34 no such rule or statute in this case. Thus, we will assess whether the Department’s petition to [10] 1 terminate sufficiently notified Doe of neglect as a statutory basis for the termination of her parental 2 rights. 3 The motion and petition for termination of parental rights sought termination on the 4 grounds that Doe neglected Children by “not providing for the needs of the children and did not 5 protect the children from abuse by [Steven].” It also asserted that the neglect “continued in part 6 due to [Doe’s] failure to complete her case plan including completing parenting classes, mental 7 health treatment and family therapy with her children.” It further alleged that Doe had “not shown 8 that she can meet the needs of her children or provide[] for their support and necessities.” This 9 was sufficiently clear to identify to Doe that there were multiple bases upon which the Department 10 alleged Doe neglected her children. 11 In addition to Doe’s failure to allege any pleading deficiencies in the petition to terminate 12 in the magistrate court, Doe provides no authority to support her distinction and definition of 13 “actual neglect” as something different than neglect by failing to meet the emotional needs of 14 Children. This Court generally does not address issues not supported by cogent argument and 15 citation to legal authority, even in a case terminating parental rights. Idaho Dep’t of Health & 16 Welfare v. Doe (2018-24), 164 Idaho 143 , 147, 426 P.3d 1243, 1247 (2018). Thus, we decline to 17 consider Doe’s argument as it relates to a definition of “actual” neglect. But even if addressed on 18 the merits, clear and convincing evidence supports each of the magistrate court’s findings. 19 3. Failing to successfully complete the case plan 20 The magistrate court found that Doe neglected Children by failing to complete the case 21 plan and reunify with Children in the statutory time period. The magistrate court’s findings are 22 supported by clear and convincing evidence. 23 Doe makes several preliminary challenges to the case plan. First, she challenges two tasks 24 as unconstitutionally vague. After the petition was filed, Doe filed a motion to modify the case 25 plan pursuant to Idaho Juvenile Rule 47, alleging Task 1F should be amended “to make it less 26 subjective, vague, and ambiguous.” Task 1F required: “[Doe] will participate in and complete a 27 DHW approved parenting course to learn alternative disciplinary practices and become more 28 educated regarding appropriate parenting practices. [Doe] will demonstrate increased parenting 29 skills in her interactions and overall relationship with her children.” Doe also asked that task 1N 30 be modified to “clarify that she only need to obtain a drug and alcohol assessment if she were to 31 test positive.” Doe asserted Task 1F was vague or subjective because, according to Doe, she [11] 1 successfully completed a parenting class before failing the same class. Doe asserted that in order 2 to remedy what she believes is too vague is to remove the requirement that “[Doe] will demonstrate 3 increased parenting skills in her interactions and overall relationship with her children.” She 4 further argued that a finding that she failed to comply with a “vague” order violates her Fifth and 5 Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights. As the magistrate court found that Doe 6 completed those tasks, her argument is moot. 7 The general rule of the mootness doctrine is that, to be justiciable, an issue must 8 present a real and substantial controversy that is capable of resolution by a judicial 9 decree of specific relief. In the context of an appeal, if the issues presented are no 10 longer live at the time the appellate court hears oral argument and the parties lack 11 a legally cognizable interest in the outcome, mootness precludes appellate review. 12 A party lacks a legally cognizable interest in the outcome when even a favorable 13 judicial decision would not result in relief. 14 State v. John Doe (2022-04), 172 Idaho 386 , 389, 533 P.3d 295 , 298 (Ct. App. 2023) (internal 15 citations omitted). Because the magistrate court found that Doe completed the tasks, there is no 16 ruling of this Court that would provide different relief, and we need not address this argument any 17 further. 18 Second, Doe asserts that her parental rights cannot be terminated for minor case plan 19 violations because the Idaho Legislature cannot define neglect in any way other than the way the 20 federal government has defined “unfitness.” This is because, according to Doe, “the legislature 21 has no right to re-define neglect to include things that would not meet the plain language definition 22 of neglect, and thus be justified for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Doe argues that the 23 only basis for terminating parental rights under the federal constitution is a finding that the parent 24 is “unfit,” and that any state definition of neglect must comport with what the United States 25 Supreme Court would consider unfit. Further, Doe argues, “the Idaho Legislature has no right to 26 define ‘unfitness’ in a manner that is inconsistent with the common understanding of the term as 27 utilized by federal courts.” 28 Doe uses the above statements as the foundation for her generalized argument that failing 29 to complete certain case plan tasks, like the failure to report a housing change within twenty-four 30 hours, have no bearing on the safety and well-being of Children; thus, such failures cannot be a 31 basis on which to find neglect and ultimately, terminate parental rights. Doe then applies both the 32 foundation and analysis to her case to argue that, for example, her failure to engage in counseling [12] 1 is not indicative of unfitness because there was no evidence showing how the failure to engage in 2 counseling rendered Doe unfit. 3 We decline to address Doe’s constitutional claims for several reasons, not the least of which 4 is Doe’s failure to provide a standard of review by which a constitutional challenge is to be 5 reviewed or explain why the magistrate court’s constitutional analysis was erroneous. Failing to 6 provide and apply the relevant standard of review is fatal to Doe’s claim. We do not generally 7 address issues not supported by cogent argument and citation to legal authority, even in a case 8 terminating parental rights. Doe (2018-24), 164 Idaho at 147, 426 P.3d at 1247 . Doe similarly 9 fails to provide any authority supporting her proposition that the Idaho Legislature is without 10 authority to define neglect or that the definition set forth in I.C. § 16-2002(3)(a) and (b) is 11 inconsistent with the relevant federal statutes2 governing the termination of parental rights. Doe’s 12 citation to cases that are prior to the implementation of the federal statutes governing proceedings 13 relating to the termination of parental rights is similarly unhelpful. Doe’s statement that “it is 14 problematic to permit magistrate courts to define neglect in whatever manner they wish in any 15 given Child Protective Act case,” is irrelevant and unsupported by the record. The record in this 16 case clearly demonstrates that the magistrate court applied the statutory definition of neglect and 17 did not engage in some kind of ad hoc subjective determination of what should or should not 18 constitute neglect. 19 Finally, The Idaho Supreme Court has held: 20 The standard for termination of parental rights is not parental fitness per se, but 21 whether the evidence shows that one of the statutory grounds for termination has 22 been met and that termination of parental rights would be in the child’s best 23 interests. See I.C. § 16-2005(1). This statute allows for termination of parental 24 rights not only when a parent is unable to provide a minimum level of care (see, 25 e.g., section 16-2005(1)(d)), but also when a parent is able to provide a minimum 26 level of care but, for whatever reason, fails to do so (see, e.g., section 1627 2005(1)(b)). [2] In the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Congress established conditions for states to comply with in order to receive federal funding relating to foster parenting programs and adoptions. For example, 42 U.S.C.A. § 675E provides: “in the case of a child who has been in foster care under the responsibility of the State for 15 of the most recent 22 months . . . the State shall file a petition to terminate the parental rights of the child’s parents.” [13] 1 Matter of Doe I, 166 Idaho 86 , 90, 454 P.3d 1169 , 1173 (2019). 2 Doe next argues two of the tasks--financial support and adequate housing--were impossible 3 to complete. Doe argues it is impossible for her to maintain a legal form of income or support 4 because she was terminated from employment and since March of 2023, she has been unable to 5 find employment. The magistrate court found that Doe was employed at the beginning of the CPA 6 case but was fired from that job and never obtained employment thereafter. The court concluded 7 that because Doe was capable of work and had worked during the CPA case, it was not impossible 8 for Doe to work. The magistrate court’s conclusion that Doe’s unwillingness or inability to obtain 9 employment or some other source of sufficient financial support for Children was not impossible 10 and is supported by clear and convincing evidence. 11 Doe next argues that it was impossible for her to provide adequate housing because, 12 according to her caseworker, the waiting list for access to public housing is more than two years. 13 The magistrate court rejected this argument, providing a detailed list of all the places Doe lived 14 once she was evicted from her initial housing, including couch-surfing with friends and strangers 15 for months, staying at a motel, moving to Utah to live with a male even though she acknowledged 16 she did not know him well, and ultimately living in a trailer behind Steven’s mother’s house. The 17 district court also noted that the case manager, the GAL, and the caseworker all testified that they 18 offered to assist Doe in seeking subsidized housing in Twin Falls, but Doe declined to apply. The 19 magistrate specifically noted that, regardless of the length of time a person must wait to access 20 subsidized housing, Doe had not utilized other options to obtain housing. 21 On appeal, Doe takes issue with this reasoning, arguing that even if she had accepted the 22 offers of assistance, she still would have had to wait approximately two years to obtain housing. 23 The record does not support this assertion. While the caseworker testified the average wait for 24 public housing in Twin Falls is two years, Doe does not provide any evidence that she applied for 25 public housing and that she, specifically, had a two-year wait. Doe’s failure to provide any 26 evidence that she specifically, as opposed to people generally, had to wait two years for housing, 27 means she has not established it was impossible for her to provide safe and stable housing for 28 Children. As a result, clear and convincing evidence supports the magistrate court’s factual 29 findings and legal conclusions regarding Doe’s failure to provide financial support and adequate 30 housing pursuant to her case plan. [14] 1 Given the above, we now turn to whether the magistrate court’s finding that Doe neglected 2 Children by failing to complete her case plan is supported by clear and convincing evidence. It is. 3 The court found that Doe failed to complete several tasks on her case plan. The magistrate court 4 listed each task in the case plan and identified, with detailed reference to evidence from the 5 termination trial, whether Doe completed the task. The court found that Doe failed to obtain safe, 6 stable, sanitary, and drug-free housing; failed to allow random and scheduled home visits 7 consistently throughout the case; did not ensure that all individuals in the home were approved by 8 the Department prior to moving in; did not demonstrate the ability to financially provide for 9 Children’s needs through legal forms of income/support; partially complied with notifying the 10 Department of changes in various life circumstances; completed a Department approved parenting 11 class but completion of the class did not resolve all the concerns related to the task; failed to 12 complete family therapy; completed a mental health assessment and engaged in counseling, 13 although the counseling did not accomplish much; completed the necessary releases of information 14 and other forms; partially completed the task requiring her to maintain contact with the Department 15 to ensure all of Children’s needs are met; and the magistrate court found other tasks either met or 16 moot. The court declined to assess Doe’s attendance (or lack thereof) at various appointments 17 against Doe. 18 The magistrate court’s factual findings are supported by clear and convincing evidence. 19 The evidence at trial established that Doe missed twenty-four of sixty-five scheduled visits with 20 Children. One of the caseworkers testified, and the magistrate court found, that although the case 21 worker “prompted and prodded” Doe to apply lessons from the parenting classes to interactions 22 with Children, tried to encourage interaction, and tried to provide individual suggestions, after 23 working with Doe for a year, the caseworker saw no progression in Doe’s ability to parent. As 24 another example, the magistrate court referenced the visitation notes in Exhibit B to conclude that, 25 although Doe had weekly visits of two hours, she rarely engaged for the full two hours with 26 Children. Instead, Doe would sit and watch Children for an hour or more without engaging with 27 them. Doe had so little interaction with Children that the Department required her to greet Children 28 when they arrived for visits and to say goodbye to them when they left. Despite that specific 29 instruction, Doe did not do so consistently. 30 As additional evidence that Doe could not appropriately parent her children, a therapist 31 provided parent-child interaction therapy for Doe and her son. The therapy required daily visits [15] 1 and daily homework. At the first visit, the therapist testified she would obtain a baseline 2 assessment of the parent-child interaction and then identify areas to work on together. The 3 therapist then coached Doe during visits with the child via an earbud and a one-way mirror. 4 Initially, the therapist noticed Doe had “real difficulties” interacting with her son. On the first 5 meeting, Doe had no reaction to her son’s greeting, chose to sit in a chair, dozed off, and then 6 moved away from her son and just watched as he played alone. The next visit, Doe was 7 “ambivalent” towards her son and did not try to interact with him. The therapist modeled 8 appropriate play interaction for Doe and tried to talk Doe through how to interact with her son. 9 Doe’s affect was flat and when her son tried to engage with her by rolling a car toward her, Doe 10 indicated she was too tired to pick up the car, and the son ended up retrieving the car. Doe 11 cancelled the next two visits and, noticing no improvement in Doe’s parenting and because of the 12 cancellations, the therapist terminated the therapy. 13 The magistrate court also found the Department tried a different kind of therapy through 14 another therapist. This therapy was designed to build a bond between Doe and her son. This 15 therapy was also unsuccessful as Doe again was unwilling to incorporate therapist’s specific 16 suggestions. After five months, the therapist contacted the Department and recommended 17 terminating the therapy as Doe had shown no improvement in establishing a healthy bond with her 18 son. The therapist testified that she never saw Doe hug or express love for her son. 19 Finally, the magistrate court referenced the GAL’s testimony that Doe consistently ignored 20 the needs of Children, including Children’s request to use the restroom, to focus on her own needs. 21 The GAL testified that she would encourage Doe to focus on one specific parenting skill during 22 the two-hour visit, but Doe was unable to do so, and Doe’s attention level waned over each visit. 23 The magistrate court also found that, at times, Doe did things well, like providing nutritious 24 food when Children went on home visits. She also made some minor parenting improvements, 25 like yelling at the kids in a lower volume. However, despite some small improvements, Doe was 26 unable to complete all the case plan tasks necessary for reunification within the statutory time 27 period. As evidenced by Doe’s decision to move out of state during the pendency of the case, even 28 after her caseworker told her it would be difficult to complete the case plan tasks, Doe was more 29 focused on her own needs than those of Children. At the time of the termination trial, Doe could 30 not financially support Children, had no suitable housing for Children, and had failed to complete [16] 1 the necessary therapy to establish healthy bonds with Children. As such, there is clear and 2 convincing evidence that Doe neglected Children by failing to complete the case plan. 3 B. Best Interests of the Children 4 Once a statutory ground for termination has been established, the trial court must next 5 determine whether it is in the best interests of Children to terminate the parent-child relationship. 6 Tanner v. State, Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 120 Idaho 606, 611 , 818 P.2d 310, 315 (1991). When 7 determining whether termination is in Children’s best interests, the trial court may consider the 8 parent’s history with substance abuse, the stability and permanency of the home, the 9 unemployment of the parent, the financial contribution of the parent to Children’s care after 10 Children are placed in protective custody, the improvement of Children while in foster care, the 11 parent’s efforts to improve his or her situation, and the parent’s continuing problems with the law. 12 Doe (2015-03) v. Doe, 159 Idaho 192, 198 , 358 P.3d 77, 83 (2015); Idaho Dep’t of Health & 13 Welfare v. Doe, 156 Idaho 103, 111 , 320 P.3d 1262, 1270 (2014). A finding that it is in the best 14 interests of Children to terminate parental rights must still be made upon objective grounds. Idaho 15 Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 152 Idaho 953, 956-57 , 277 P.3d 400 , 403-04 (Ct. App. 2012). 16 The magistrate court found that terminating Doe’s parental rights is in the best interests of 17 Children because, at the time of the termination trial, Doe could not provide safe and stable 18 housing, was unemployed, and could not meet Children’s needs. Doe does not challenge the legal 19 conclusion regarding the best interests of Children. As a result, we affirm the magistrate court’s 20 finding that termination of Doe’s parental rights is in the best interests of Children. 21 IV. 22 CONCLUSION 23 Clear and convincing evidence supports the magistrate court’s conclusion that Doe 24 neglected Children and that termination of Doe’s parental rights is in the best interests of Children. 25 The judgment terminating Doe’s parental rights is affirmed. 26 Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge LORELLO, CONCUR.