Kolstad v. Baillargeon

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 12 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

TODD KOLSTAD, No. 25-2106 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 4:24-cv-00085-SPW v. MEMORANDUM* CYNDI BAILLARGEON; CRYSTAL WHITMORE,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Montana Susan P. Watters, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted November 6, 2025 Portland, Oregon

Before: M. SMITH, NGUYEN, and H.A. THOMAS, Circuit Judges.

Todd Kolstad appeals the district court’s dismissal of his Fourteenth Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims as barred by collateral estoppel. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “We review de novo the dismissal of a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), as well as the district court’s issue preclusion ruling.” Bridge Aina Le‘a, LLC v. Land Use Comm’n, 950 F.3d

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

610, 624 (9th Cir. 2020) (citations omitted). We affirm.

1. The district court did not err in determining that there was a final judgment on the merits in the state court proceedings. See Denturist Ass’n of Mont. v. Mont. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 372 P.3d 466, 469 (Mont. 2016) (discussing the elements of collateral estoppel under Montana law). Under Montana Code § 41-3-437, a state court “may make an adjudication on a petition under 41-3-422 if the court determines by a preponderance of the evidence . . . that the child is a youth in need of care.” Mont. Code Ann. § 41-3-437(2). “If a child is found to be a youth in need of care under 41-3-437, the court may enter its judgment” and make various “dispositions to protect the welfare of the child” under Montana Code § 41-3-438 including “order[ing] the placement of the child with the noncustodial parent, superseding any existing custodial order, and dismiss[ing] the proceeding with no further obligation on the part of the department to provide services.” Id. § 41-3-438(3)(d).

Here, after finding the child to be a youth in need of care, the state court dismissed the case pursuant to Montana Code § 41-3-438(3)(d). That section explicitly contemplates dismissal as a final disposition. See Mont. Code Ann. § 41-3-438(3)(d); see also In re M.J., 296 P.3d 1197, 1201 (Mont. 2013) (“A [state] court has several dispositional options once a child is found to be a youth in need of care. Those options are set forth in § 41-3-438[.]”). Hence, there was no error in the district court’s determination.

². The district court did not err in determining that the issue of whether the child was a youth in need of care was actually litigated in the state court and that Kolstad had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue. The state court adjudicated the child as a youth in need of care “based on the evidence set forth at the hearing and in the record,” and concluded that there was “sufficient evidence presented to establish, by a preponderance of evidence, that” the child met the statutory definition of a youth in need of care. Kolstad neither objected to these findings nor appealed the state court’s decision. That Kolstad stipulated his child was a youth in need of care does not mean the issue was not actually litigated. See Mont. Code Ann. § 41-3-434(1)(a) (“Subject to approval by the court, the parties may stipulate [that] . . . the child meets the definition of a youth in need of care by the preponderance of the evidence[.]”); cf. In re Marriage of Kolczak, 97 P.3d 1091, 1094 (Mont. 2004) (“A party should not be able to litigate a matter that the party already had the opportunity to litigate.”).

AFFIRMED.1

Footnotes

[2] 25-2106 1 The motion for judicial notice (Dkt. No. 19) is DENIED. The motion to strike (Dkt. No. 21) is DENIED.

[3] 25-2106