CHRISTOPHER PIKE v. MATTHEW DIVRIS & Another

SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT CHRISTOPHER PIKE vs. MATTHEW DIVRIS & another[1] Docket: SJC-13811 Dates: November 18, 2025 Present: County: Keywords: Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts. Habeas Corpus. The petitioner, Christopher Pike, appeals from the judgment of a single justice of this court denying without a hearing his petition pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, seeking extraordinary relief. We affirm. In October 2022, a jury convicted Pike of two counts of indecent assault and battery on a child under fourteen, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 13B; one count of assault with intent to rape a child, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 24B; one count of aggravated rape of a child, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 23A; two counts of furnishing alcohol to a minor, in violation of G. L. c. 138, § 34; and one count of accosting and annoying another person, in violation of G. L. c. 272, § 53.[2] See Commonwealth v. Pike, 104 Mass. App. Ct. 1102 (2024). As a result of his convictions, Pike was sentenced, inter alia, to from twelve to fourteen years in State prison. On direct appeal, the Appeals Court affirmed the judgments against Pike. See id. Pike subsequently petitioned the Superior Court for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging the validity of the judgments against him on the ground that the trial judge had erroneously dismissed a juror during deliberations without holding a required hearing. His petition was denied. Pike reports that he was advised by the Superior Court judge to seek the requested relief by way of Mass. R. Crim. P. 30, as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001). Instead, Pike brought a petition pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, asking a single justice of this court for relief from the order of the Superior Court denying habeas corpus relief. Concluding that the petition did not present exceptional circumstances sufficient to warrant extraordinary relief pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, the single justice denied the petition without a hearing. Presently before this court is Pike's appeal from the judgment of the single justice. Pike has filed a memorandum and appendix, purportedly pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 2:21, as amended, 434 Mass. 1301 (2001). Rule 2:21 does not apply here, however, because Pike does not challenge an interlocutory ruling of the trial court. See, e.g., Kyricopoulos v. Commonwealth, 484 Mass. 1008, 1008 (2020). Regardless,[3] it is nonetheless clear that he was not entitled to relief pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3. See Ardaneh v. Commonwealth, 493 Mass. 1008, 1008 (2023). "In cases such as this one, where the single justice exercises discretion not to reach the merits of a petition, . . . the full court asks only whether the single justice abused his or her discretion in making that decision" (quotation and citation omitted). Boone v. Commonwealth, 494 Mass. 1011, 1012-1013 (2024). "The single justice is not required to become involved if the petitioner has an adequate alternative remedy or if the single justice determines, in his or her discretion, that the subject of the petition is not sufficiently important and extraordinary as to require general superintendence intervention." Commonwealth v. Fontanez, 482 Mass. 22, 24-25 (2019). Pike was not entitled to relief pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, because adequate and effective relief was available to him in the ordinary appellate process. See Soriano v. Commonwealth, 496 Mass. 1027, 1027 (2025). In Pike's case, he filed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Superior Court under a separate civil docket number, and to the extent he asserted any error in the denial of that petition, he could have appealed directly from that judgment. See Doyle v. Commonwealth, 472 Mass. 1002, 1002 (2015). Cf. Babcock, petitioner, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 687, 687 (2008). As to the substance of his claim regarding the juror's dismissal, Pike does not establish why he could not properly have raised that issue in his direct appeal from the judgments against him in his criminal case, or else by way of a motion for a new trial pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b).[4] See Soriano, supra; Doyle, supra at 1003 ("the errors claimed in the petition either were or could have been raised in the petitioner's direct appeal, or in a motion for postconviction relief under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30"). Moreover, as the single justice concluded, Pike's petition pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, did not present a sufficiently important and extraordinary subject because a cursory review of his petition would have revealed that he was not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus on the ground he asserted. See Fontanez, 482 Mass. at 24 ("a cursory look at the merits might help the single justice decide whether the petition is suitable for review"). Habeas corpus is inappropriate "in circumstances where the nature of the challenge is an appeal from the underlying judgment, and where another avenue of relief exists." Sheriff of Suffolk County v. Pires, 438 Mass. 96, 101 (2002). Indeed, it is a "long-standing rule" that habeas corpus "cannot be employed as a substitute for ordinary appellate procedure" (citation omitted). Id. at 99, 101. Such a petition must instead "be based on grounds distinct from the issues at the indictment, trial, conviction, or sentencing stage" of the case (quotation and citation omitted). Aldrich, petitioner, 468 Mass. 1013, 1014 (2014). Pike argues that because jury deliberations occur after the close of evidence and argument but before a verdict, issues arising at that stage are distinct from issues at the trial and conviction stages. We do not agree. Cf. Betts, petitioner, 496 Mass. 1025, 1026 (2025) (holding alleged error in jury instructions was trial issue). Rather, it is clear that Pike's challenge goes to the merits of the underlying criminal judgments against him and, as described supra, that he had adequate alternative means for pursuing those challenges. Consequently, habeas corpus relief would have been inappropriate.[5] See Pires, 438 Mass. at 101. For the foregoing reasons, the single justice did not err or abuse her discretion in denying Pike's petition without a hearing. Judgment affirmed. The case was submitted on the papers filed, accompanied by a memorandum of law. Christopher Pike, pro se. footnotes [1] Superior Court in Plymouth County. [2] Two of these counts, one for indecent assault and battery on a child under fourteen and one for assault with intent to rape a child, were subsequently dismissed. [3] Even if rule 2:21 did apply here, it would require Pike to "set forth the reasons why review of the trial court decision cannot adequately be obtained on appeal from any final adverse judgment in the trial court or by other available means." S.J.C. Rule 2:21 (2). For the reasons discussed infra, Pike's memorandum failed to meet this requirement. See Snell v. Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Inst., Shirley, 484 Mass. 1053, 1053 (2020). [4] We take no position here on the merits of Pike's argument that the trial judge erred in dismissing the juror without sufficient process. While Pike contends that the loss of his trial counsel's case file prevents him from raising this argument in a motion pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b), the records before the single justice and before this court belie this representation, as they include affidavits from Pike and excerpts from trial transcripts related to the juror's dismissal. See Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (c) (3); Commonwealth v. Lopez, 426 Mass. 657, 660-661 (1998) (noting that record "may be reconstructed" or motion may proceed "on a basis extrinsic to the unavailable contemporaneous record" [citation omitted]). Moreover, the juror's dismissal and an explanation therefor are reflected in an entry dated October 28, 2022, on the electronic docket for Pike's criminal case, and the electronic docket for his direct appeal reflects the filing of trial transcripts with the Appeals Court. See Donald v. Commonwealth, 494 Mass. 1016, 1017 (2024), citing Mushwaalakbar v. Commonwealth, 487 Mass. 627, 631-632 (2021) (court may take judicial notice of docket entries). [5] For these same reasons, to the extent that Pike intended his petition pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, also to function as a direct request for habeas corpus relief from the single justice, the single justice did not err or abuse her discretion in denying the request. See Betts, petitioner, 496 Mass. at 1026.