Tiffany A. Becnel v. Walmart, Inc.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA TIFFANY A. BECNEL CIVIL ACTION VERSUS NUMBER: 25-983 WALMART, INC. SECTION: “P” (5) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION Before the Court is the Motion to Remand (rec. doc. 8) filed by Plaintiff Tiffany A. Becnel on June 12, 2025. Defendant opposes the motion (rec. doc. 9), and Plaintiff filed a reply. (Rec. doc. 10). On October 2, 2025, the District Court referred the motion to the undersigned. (Rec. doc. 11). Having reviewed the pleadings and the case law, the Court Ir.e commBeancdksg raos ufonldlows. On or about July 1, 2024, Plaintiff Tiffany A. Becnel was a customer at Walmart Store #961 located at 1616 W. Airline Highway in Laplace, Louisiana, when she allegedly slipped and fell in a puddle of water near a soft drink cooler at the front of the store. (Rec. doc. 11). On January 9, 2024, Plaintiff filed suit in the 40th Judicial District Court for the ParishId o.f St. John the Baptist, alleging negligence on the part of Defendant Walmart, Inc. ( ). Defendant was served with the Petition on January 28, 2025. (Rec. doc. 1-2). In her Petition, Plaintiff alleges that “[a]s a result of this accident, petitioner has sustained cervical and lumbar sprain and full disability.” (Rec. doc. 1-1). No other injuries were alleged. On April 24, 2025, Defendant received Plaintiff’s discovery responses which indicated that Plaintiff was diagnosed with various disc herniations and a Superior labral anterior posterior (“SLAP”) lesion which would necessitate future arthroscopic surgery. to federal court on a positive showing that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.00, and the parties are completely diverse. (Rec. doc. 1). On June 12, 2025, Plaintiff filed her IMI.o tionL taow R eamndan Adn. a (lRyescis. doc. 8). A defendant may remove Sae ceivil case from state court to this Court if this Court would have original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (a). Defendant removed the lawsuit to this Court on the ground of diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 . The Court has original jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship over civil cases between citizens of different states in which the amount in Sceoentroversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (a)(1). As the removing party here, Defendant “bMeaanrgs uthnoe bvu. Prdruedne onft isahlo Pwrionpg. t&h aCta fse. dInesr.a Cl jou.risdiction exists and that removal was proper.” , 276 F.3d 720, 723 (5th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). The Court “construe[s]” “[a]ny ambiguities . . . againIsdt. removal because the removal statute should be strictly construed in favor of remand.” (citation omitted). Here, it is undisputed that the requirements of Section 1332(a)(1) – complete diversity and over $75,000.00 in controversy – are met; the parties dispute only the timeliness of removal. In short, Plaintiff argues that Defendant failed to timely remove the lawsuit to this Court after it received service of her original Petition. See Section 1446(b) governs the timeliness of Defendants’ removal. See C2h8a pUm.Sa.Cn. v§. P1o4w46er(bm)a. t icT,h Ien ct.imeliness-of-removal analysis generally has two steps. , 969 F.2d 160, 161 (5th Cir. 1992). First, the Court decides if the “caSesee sidta. ted by” Plaintiff's “initial pleading” – here, the original Petition – was “removable.” See days after receiving Plaintiff's original Petition. 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (Sbe)e( 1C)h. a Ipf mnoatn, the Court turns to step two and Section 1446(b)(3)’s “other paper” provision. , 969 F.2d at 161 . At step two, the Court decides if Defendant removed this case within 30 days after receiving “a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (b)(3). If it did, the removal is timely; if it did not, the removal is untimely and remand is required. See ChaApsm foarn step one, the “case stated by” Plaintiff's original Petition was not “removable.” , 969 F.2d at 161 . To trigger the a3ff0ir-mdaayt ivreelmyoval period under Section 1446(b)(1), Plaintiff's original Petition had to “ reveal[ ] on its face that [Plsapinectiifffic] is seeking damages in excess of the minimum jurisdictional amount” by incluIddi. ng “a allegation that damages are in excess of theI dfe.deral jurisdictional amount.” at 163 (emphasis added). This is a “bright line rule.” And it is not met here: Plaintiff's original Petition lacks aI d“. specific allegation” that her damages exceed the federal jurisdictional minimum. So, the “case stated by” Plaintiff's original Petition was not “removable,” and the 30-day removal clock Iddi.d not start ticskeien agl suon Mdeurm Sfercetyi ovn. C1V4S4 P6h(bar)(m1.), Iunpco.n receipt of Plaintiff's original Petition. at 161, 163; , 719 F.3d 392, 400 (5th Cir. 2013) (reasoning that the removal clock was not triggered by the original complaint because it lacked a “specific allegation” that damages exceeded the federal jurisdictional minimum). Plaintiff argues that federal removal was untimely and remand is proper simply because she alleged “full disability” in her Petition, and, as a result, Defendant should have Chapman simply ignores ’s bright-line rule that “[s]eravfifcirem oaft iavnel yinitial petition does not trigger the first removal period unless ‘that pleading reveals on its face that the plaintiff is sBeierkdisnogn gd avm. Ba g&e sD iOnp eexracetisnsg oCfo .t hInec .minimum jurisdictional amount of the federal court.’” report and recommenda,t iNono . a2d5o-pCtVe-d661, 2025 WL 1742646 , at *3 (W.D. La. June 5, 2025), Chapman , No. 25-CV-661, 2025 WL 1742644 (W.D. La. June 23, 2025) (quoting , 969 F.2d at 163 ) (emphasis added). This “bright line rule” adopted by the Fifth Circuit “promotes certainty and judicial efficiency by not requirinIdg. courts to inquire into what a particular defendant may or may not subjectively know.” If a plaintiff “wishes the thirty-day time period to run from the defendant's receipt of the initial pleading, [she must] place in the initial pleadIidn.g a specific allegation that damages are in excess of the federal jurisdictional amount.” Plaintiff’s argument lacks merit, and this Court refuses to delve into the subjective knowledge of Defendant at the time it received Plaintiff’s initial Petition. Such speculation has never been required in this Circuit. ChapmaBnecause the “case stated by” Plaintiff's original petition was not “removable,” , 969 F.2d at 161 , the Court turns to step two and Section 1446(b)(3)’s “other paper” principle. As for step two, Defendant has sufficiently carried its burden to show that it timely removed this case within 30 days after receiving “other paper” from which it may first have ascertained the amount in controversy was met. 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (b)(3). The notice of removal posits that Plaintiff's production of medical records on April 24, 2025 is the “other paper” that allowed Defendant to first ascertain that the amount in controversy was met. (Rec. doc. 1 at 5). Those medical records revealed that an October 24, 2024 MRI S1 herniations. (Rec. doc. 1-3). An October 24, 20I2d4. MRI of Plaintiff’s left shoulder revealed a SLAP lesion and partial rotator cuff tear. ( ). On January 14, 2025, Plaintiff was diagnosed with cervical facet syndrome and four cervical dIidsc. herniations and was recommended medial branch blocks or radiofrequency ablation. ( ). On March 31, 2025, Plaintiff expressed interest inId u.ndergoing a left shoulder arthroscopy and was given an estimate for the procedure. ( ). Louisiana law demonstrates that the extent of Plaintiff’s injuries would put Defendant on notice thaSte Pe,l aei.gn.t,iRffa’sy bduarmna vg. ePso wntohuieldux then well exceed $75,000.00 exclusive of interests and costs. , 902 So. 2d 1136 (La. Ct. App. 2005) (affirmYinogu na c$e8 v5. ,P0a0c0. Ggeunlfe Mraal rdinaem, Iangce. award for an aggravation of a preexisting rotator cuff tear); , 817 So. 2d 255 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (awarding $75,000.00 in general damages for a shoulder arthroscopy performed on a rotator cuff tear). Id. Plaintiff served her responses to Defendant’s discovery requests on April 24, 2025. ( at 7). Defendant removed this lawsuit on May 16, 2025. (Rec. doc. 1). Defendant thus timely removed this lawsuit within 30 days after receiving “a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one wIIIh. ich iCso onrc hlauss iboencome removable.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (b)(3). FITo rI Sth ReE fCoOreMgoMinEgN rDeEasDons, DENIED NthOaTt ItChEe OMFo tRioIGn HtoT R TeOm OanBdJE (CreTc . doc. 8) be . A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and days after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district court, provided that the partDy ohuagsl abses evn. Usneirtveedd S wtaittehs Anouttioc.e A sths’ant such consequences will result from a failure to object. , 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996) (en ban2c3).r d October New Orleans, Louisiana, this day of , 2025. MICHAEL B. NORTH UNIT ED ST ATES M AGIST RATE JUDGE