Kathleen Garcia v. Jade Health and Wellness LLC, et al.

[5] 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA [8] 9 Kathleen Garcia, No. CV-25-02010-PHX-MTM 10 Plaintiff, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 11 v. 12 Jade Health and Wellness LLC, et al., 13 Defendants. [14] 15 TO THE HONORABLE STEPHEN M. McNAMEE, SENIOR UNITED STATES 16 DISTRICT JUDGE: 17 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Entry of Default Judgment. (Doc. 18 13.) This Report and Recommendation is filed pursuant to General Order 21-25.1 The Court 19 will recommend that Plaintiff’s Motion be granted. [20] 1 General Order 21-25 states in relevant part: [21] When a United States Magistrate Judge to whom a civil action has been 22 assigned pursuant to Local Rule 3.7(a)(1) considers dismissal to be appropriate but lacks the jurisdiction to do so under 28 U.S.C. § 636 (c)(1) 23 due to incomplete status of election by the parties to consent or not consent to the full authority of the Magistrate Judge, [24] IT IS ORDERED that the Magistrate Judge will prepare a Report and 25 Recommendation for the Chief United States District Judge or designee. 26 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED designating the following District Court Judges to review and, if deemed suitable, to sign the order of dismissal on 27 my behalf: 28 Phoenix/Prescott: Senior United States District Judge Stephen M. McNamee. . . . 1 I. Background 2 On June 10, 2025, Plaintiff Kathleen Garcia filed a Complaint against Defendants 3 Jade Health and Wellness LLC, and Courtney Gaines Smith and Apollo Smith (husband 4 and wife) (collectively, “Defendants” or “Jade Health and Wellness”) seeking unpaid 5 overtime and minimum wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), and unpaid 6 minimum wages and unpaid wages under the Arizona Minimum Wage Act (“AMWA”) 7 and the Arizona Wage Act (“AWA”). (Doc. 1.) In her Complaint (Doc. 1), Plaintiff alleges 8 the following, in pertinent part: [9] • Defendant Jade Health and Wellness LLC is a limited liability company licensed to 10 transact business in the State of Arizona. Defendant Jade Health and Wellness LLC does business, has offices, and/or maintains agents for the transaction of its [11] customary business in Maricopa County, Arizona. Defendant Jade Health and 12 Wellness LLC owned and operated as “Jade Health and Wellness,” a mental health and drug rehabilitation services company doing business in Maricopa County, 13 Arizona. [14] • Defendants Courtney Gaines Smith and Apollo Smith are, upon information and 15 belief, husband and wife. They have caused events to take place giving rise to the claims in this Complaint as to which their marital community is fully liable. [16] Defendants Courtney Gaines Smith and Apollo Smith are owners of Jade Health 17 and Wellness. 18 • On or about January 31, 2025, Plaintiff began working for Defendants under the job 19 title of “house manager.” Plaintiff, in her work for Defendants, was compensated, or supposed to be compensated, at a regular rate of $500 per week, regardless of the 20 number of hours Plaintiff actually worked, and regardless of whether she worked in 21 excess of 40 hours in a given workweek. Plaintiff worked for Defendants through approximately March 22, 2025, when Defendants terminated her employment. [22] • Plaintiff conservatively estimates that she generally worked between 80 and 100 [23] hours or more per week. Plaintiff conservatively estimates that, in the eight 24 workweeks of her employment, she worked approximately between 560 and 700 hours or more for Defendants. On April 5, 2025, Defendants paid Plaintiff $300. On [25] April 8, 2025, Defendants paid Plaintiff $200. On April 26, 2025, Defendants paid 26 Plaintiff $100. Beyond the $600, Defendants did not compensate Plaintiff any wages whatsoever for the entire eight-week duration of her employment with Defendants. [27] 28 • As a result of Defendants’ failure to compensate Plaintiff at least the statutory minimum wage for such hours worked, Defendants violated 29 U.S.C. § 206 (a). As 1 a result of Defendants’ failure to compensate Plaintiff at least the statutory minimum wage for such hours worked, Defendants violated the AMWA, A.R.S. § 23-363. As [2] a result of Defendants’ failure to compensate Plaintiff all wages due and owing for 3 such hours worked, Defendants violated the AWA, A.R.S., § 23-351. 4 • During the time that Plaintiff worked for Defendants, Plaintiff worked in excess of 40 hours in a given workweek without receiving one and one-half times her regular 5 rate of pay, in violation of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 207 (a). At all relevant times, Plaintiff worked approximately between forty (40) and sixty (60) hours of overtime 6 per week. [7] On June 28, 2025, the summons and copies of the Complaint were personally served [8] on Defendant Courtney Gaines Smith, co-owner of Defendant Jade Health and Wellness [9] LLC, and wife to co-owner Defendant Apollo Smith.2 (Doc. 8); see Fed. R. Civ. P. [10] 4(e)(2)(A)-(C), 4(h)(1); Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4.1(d) and (i). The record also reflects on that same [11] date, the summons and copy of the Complaint were served on Defendant Apollo Smith by [12] leaving said documents at the Defendant’s individual residence or usual place of abode. [13] (Doc. 9.) Accordingly, Defendants were properly served. Defendants have not responded [14] to the Complaint. [15] On July 10, 2025, Plaintiff requested entry of default against Defendants pursuant [16] to Rule 55(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. 10.) Default was entered the [17] following day. (Doc. 11.) Plaintiff filed her Motion for Default Judgment on August 23, [18] 2025. (Doc. 13.)3 No response to the Motion has been filed. [19] II. Motion for Default Judgment [20] A. Legal Standard [21] Under Rule 55(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[w]hen a party against [22] whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, [23] and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the party’s default.” [25] 2 The record reflects that as an owner, Defendant Courtney Gaines Smith is designated by 26 law to accept service on behalf of Defendant Jade Health and Wellness LLC. (Doc. 7.) 27 3 Plaintiff certified that both her Application for Entry of Default (Doc. 10) and Motion for Entry of Default Judgment (Doc. 13) were served on Defendants by First Class Mail to: 28 Jade Health and Wellness LLC 11673 W. Parkway Ln. Avondale, AZ 85323 and Courtney Gaines Smith & Apollo Smith 11673 W. Parkway Ln. Avondale, AZ 85323. 1 Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). Once a party’s default has been entered, the district court has 2 discretion to grant default judgment against that party. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2); Aldabe 3 v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). 4 In assessing a motion for default judgment, the district court first “has an affirmative 5 duty to look into its jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties.” Tuli v. 6 Republic of Iraq, 172 F.3d 707, 712 (9th Cir. 1999) (“To avoid entering a default judgment 7 that can later be successfully attacked as void, a court should determine whether it has the 8 power, i.e., the jurisdiction, to enter judgment in the first place.”). Once jurisdiction is 9 satisfied, the court must determine whether default judgment is proper under the Eitel 10 factors. See Eitel v.McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986). Specifically, a court 11 should consider: 12 (1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff[;] 13 (2) the merits of plaintiff’s substantive claim[;] 14 (3) the sufficiency of the complaint[;] 15 (4) the sum of money at stake in the action; 16 (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts; 17 (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect[;] and 18 (7) the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 19 favoring decisions on the merits. [20] Id. at 1471-72 . In applying the Eitel factors, “the factual allegations of the complaint, 21 except those relating to damages, will be taken as true.” Geddes v. United Fin. Grp., 559 22 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977). 23 B. Discussion 24 1. Jurisdiction 25 “When entry of default is sought against a party who has failed to plead or otherwise 26 defend, a district court has an affirmative duty to look into its jurisdiction over both the 27 subject matter and the parties.” Tuli, 172 F.3d at 712 . Plaintiff asserts claims arising under 28 the FLSA, AMWA, and AWA. (Doc. 1.) The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over 1 claims arising out of federal law, including the FLSA, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and [2] 29 U.S.C. § 201 , et seq. The Court also has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant 28 U.S.C. 3 § 1367 because Plaintiff’s state law claims, under both the AMWA and AWA, are “so 4 related” to her FLSA claim that the Court has supplemental jurisdiction over them. Venue 5 and personal jurisdiction requirements are also satisfied because Defendants were properly 6 served and Defendants own and operate a mental health and drug rehabilitation services 7 company doing business in Maricopa County, Arizona. Defendants regularly conduct 8 business, have offices, and maintain business agents in Arizona, and Plaintiff is a resident 9 of the State of Arizona. Accordingly, the Court has jurisdiction over the parties. (Doc. 1.) 10 2. Eitel Factors 11 Having determined that this Court has both subject matter and personal jurisdiction 12 in this action, the Court will examine whether entry of default judgment is proper under 13 the Eitel factors. 14 a. The First, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Eitel Factors 15 When Defendants have not responded or participated in any litigation, the “first, 16 fifth, sixth, and seventh [Eitel] factors are easily addressed.” Zekelman Industries Inc. v. 17 Marker, No. CV-19-02109-PHX-DWL, 2020 WL 1495210 , at *3 (D. Ariz. March 27, 18 2020). 19 The first factor weighs in favor of default judgment because denying Plaintiff’s 20 Motion will leave her “without other recourse for recovery,” PepsiCo, Inc. v. California 21 Security Cans., 238 F.Supp.2d 1172, 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2002), and prejudice would exist if 22 Plaintiff’s Motion were denied because she would lose the right to a “judicial resolution” 23 of her claims. Elektra Entertainment Group, Inc. v. Crawford, 226 F.R.D. 388, 392 (C.D. 24 Cal. 2005 ). The fifth factor weighs in favor of default judgment because the well-pleaded 25 factual allegations in the Complaint are taken as true, and there is no “genuine dispute of 26 material facts” that would preclude granting the Motion. PepsiCo, 238 F.Supp.2d at 1177 . 27 The sixth factor considers whether the default was due to excusable neglect. Here, 28 Defendants’ failure to participate after being personally served does not indicate that 1 default was due to excusable neglect. See Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Streeter, [2] 438 F.Supp.2d 1065, 1071-1072 (D. Ariz. 2006). The seventh factor -- favoring decisions 3 on the merits -- generally weighs against default judgment; however, “the mere existence 4 of Rule 55(b) indicates that ‘this preference, standing alone, is not dispositive,’” PepsiCo, [5] 238 F.Supp.2d at 1177 , and is not sufficient to preclude the entry of default judgment in 6 this case. Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc. v. Caridi, 346 F.Supp.2d 1068, 1073 (C.D. Cal. 7 2004) (explaining that the seventh Eitel factor “standing alone, cannot suffice to prevent 8 entry of default judgment for otherwise default judgment could never be entered” and 9 courts have concluded that “this factor does not weigh very heavily”). Here, a decision on 10 the merits is impossible, given that Defendants failed to appear. 11 In sum, the first, fifth, sixth, and seventh factors weigh in favor of default judgment. 12 b. The Second and Third Eitel Factors 13 The second and third Eitel factors -- the merits of the claim and the sufficiency of 14 the complaint -- are “often analyzed together and require courts to consider whether a 15 plaintiff has state[d] a claim on which [she] may recover.” Vietnam Reform Party v. Viet 16 Tan-Vietnam Reform Party, 416 F.Supp.3d 948 , 962 (N.D. Cal. 2019). Here, the Court 17 must first examine Plaintiff’s employee status within the FLSA, AMWA, and AWA. 18 The FLSA defines an “employee” as “any individual employed by an employer.” [19] 29 U.S.C. § 203 (e)(1). It defines an “employer” as “any person acting directly or indirectly 20 in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee.” Id. § 203(d). 21 The Court finds that Plaintiff was classified as an employee of Defendants and 22 Defendants were classified as employers pursuant to the FLSA. Defendants had the 23 authority to hire and fire employees, supervised and controlled work schedules and the 24 conditions of employment, determined the rate and method of payment, and maintained 25 employment records in connection with Plaintiff’s employment with Defendants. 26 Defendants also directed and exercised control over Plaintiff’s work and wages. (Doc. 1.) 27 These allegations, taken as true, support that Defendants are employers and Plaintiff was 28 an employee of Defendants under the FLSA. 1 Like the FLSA, the AMWA defines an “employee” as “any person who is or was 2 employed by an employer.” A.R.S. § 23-362(A). It defines an “employer” as “any 3 corporation proprietorship, partnership, joint venture, limited liability company, trust, 4 association, political subdivision of the state, individual or other entity acting directly or 5 indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee.” A.R.S. § 23-362(B). 6 Since the definition of employee is the same under both the FLSA and AMWA, the Court’s 7 analysis as to Plaintiff’s employee status under the FLSA applies to the AMWA as well. 8 Lastly, similar to the FLSA and AMWA, the AWA defines an “employee” as “any 9 person who performs services for an employer under a contract of employment either made 10 in this state or to be performed wholly or partly within this state.” A.R.S. § 23-350(2). The 11 AWA defines “employer” as “any individual, partnership, association, joint stock 12 company, trust or corporation, the administrator or executor of the estate of a deceased 13 individual or the receiver, trustee or successor of any of such persons employing any 14 person.” A.R.S. § 23-350(3). Thus, the Court’s reasoning as to Plaintiff’s employee status 15 under the FLSA also applies under the AWA. 16 As noted above, in her Complaint, Plaintiff argues that she is entitled to unpaid 17 wages, including minimum and overtime wages under the FLSA, AMWA, and AWA. 18 Because the Court takes these allegations as true, Geddes, 559 F.2d at 560, and additionally 19 has found that Defendants are employers and Plaintiff was an employee of Defendants, 20 Plaintiff “has stated a claim on which [she] may recover.” Vietnam Reform Party, 416 21 F.Supp.3d at 962. 22 Thus, the second and third Eitel factors support an entry of default judgment. 23 c. The Fourth Eitel Factor 24 The fourth Eitel factor considers “the amount of money at stake in relation to the 25 seriousness of Defendant’s conduct.” PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F.Supp.2d at 1177 . “If the sum of 26 money at stake is completely disproportionate or inappropriate, default judgment is 27 disfavored.” Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 438 F.Supp.2d at 1071 . 28 Here, Plaintiff seeks unpaid wages, including minimum and overtime wages she is 1 owed under the FLSA, AMWA, and AWA along with liquidated damages.4 Plaintiff is 2 requesting $42,912 plus post-judgment interest, and to later request attorneys’ fees and 3 costs following the entry of default judgment. Of this $42,912 total, Plaintiff is requesting 4 that $31,752, less the $600 in late payments, in trebled unpaid minimum wages and 5 $11,760 in doubled unpaid overtime wages be awarded against all Defendants – 6 Defendants Jade Health and Wellness LLC and Courtney Gaines Smith and Apollo Smith, 7 jointly and severally. 8 Accordingly, taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true, the Court finds that the amount 9 requested is reasonable and not disproportionate or inappropriate. Thus, the fourth Eitel 10 factor weighs in favor of default judgment. 11 Overall, the Court finds that the Eitel factors weigh in favor of entering default 12 judgment against Defendants. 13 3. Damages 14 Having found that entry of default judgment is proper under the Eitel factors, the 15 Court will turn to the issue of damages. Unlike the allegations in the Complaint, the Court 16 does not take allegations relating to damages as true. Geddes, 559 F.2d at 560; see also 17 TeleVideo Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917-18 (9th Cir. 1987). Indeed, plaintiffs 18 have the burden of “proving up” damages, and “if the facts necessary to determine damages 19 are not contained in the complaint, or are legally insufficient, they will not be established 20 by default.” Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Castworld Prods., Inc., 219 F.R.D. 494, 498 (C.D. 21 Cal. 2003 ). Courts may rely on declarations submitted by the plaintiff in determining 22 appropriate damages. Tolano v. El Rio Bakery, No. CV-18-00125-TUC-RM, 2019 WL 23 6464748, at *6 (D. Ariz. Dec. 2, 2019) (citing Philip Morris USA, Inc., 219 F.R.D. at 498 ). [24] 4 When an employer is found liable under the FLSA for failure to pay minimum and 25 overtime wages, the employee is entitled to “unpaid minimum wages, [ ] unpaid overtime compensation ... and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages.” 29 U.S.C. § 26 216(b). Similarly, when an employer is found liable under the AMWA for failure to pay minimum wages, the employee is entitled to “the balance of the wages ... including interest 27 thereon, and an additional amount equal to twice the underpaid wages ....” A.R.S. § 23364(G). Likewise, when an employer is found liable under the AWA for failure to pay 28 wages, “the employee may recover ... an amount that is treble the amount of the unpaid wages.” Id. § 23-355(A). 1 According to her Motion and accompanying Declaration, the total compensatory 2 damages of $42,912 is comprised of $31,752, less the $600 in late payments, in trebled 3 unpaid minimum wages under the AMWA5 and $11,760 in doubled federal overtime 4 damages under the FLSA. (Docs. 13, 13-1); see 29 U.S.C. § 216 (b); A.R.S. § 23-364(G); 5 A.R.S. § 23-355. 6 Plaintiff is requesting that this entire amount be awarded against all Defendants – 7 Defendants Jade Health and Wellness LLC and Courtney Gaines Smith and Apollo Smith, 8 jointly and severally.6 Plaintiff further requests post-judgment interest pursuant to 28 9 U.S.C. § 1961 and that the Court allow her to file a motion for attorneys’ fees and costs 10 should the Court grant default judgment. 11 The Court finds that Plaintiff’s requested relief accurately calculates the damages 12 she is statutorily entitled to and supported by Plaintiff’s Declaration. Therefore, the Court 13 finds it appropriate to award Plaintiff $42,912 in liquidated damages. Additionally, the 14 Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to her attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 29 U.S.C § 15 216(b). 16 III. Conclusion and Recommendation 17 Having reviewed Plaintiff’s Motion and the underlying documents in the record, the 18 Court finds that the Eitel factors weigh in favor of granting default judgment in favor of 19 Plaintiff for the requested amount. 20 Accordingly, 21 IT IS RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Entry of Default Judgment 22 (Doc. 13) be GRANTED; [23] 5 This amount engulfs Plaintiff’s federal minimum wage damages and regular wage 24 damages under the FLSA and AWA. 25 6 The Ninth Circuit has held employers individually liable under the FLSA. See, e.g., Walsh v. Wellfleet Commc’ns, 2021 WL 4796537 , at *2 (9th Cir. Oct. 14, 2021). Likewise, the 26 District of Arizona has held that employers may be individually liable under both the FLSA and the AMWA. See, e.g., Rosen v. Fasttrak Foods LLC, No. CV-19-05292-PHX-DWL, [27] 2021 WL 2981590 , at *5 (D. Ariz. July 15, 2021). In contrast, the AWA states individual liability is not authorized “against the owners, officers, and directors of a corporate 28 employer in a case where the claim is for the employer’s wholesale failure to pay wages.” Id. 1 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff be awarded $42,912 plus post2|| judgment interest at the applicable statutory rate, against all Defendants, jointly and || severally; 4 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff have no later than 21 days 5 || after entry of Judgment to file an application for attorneys’ fees and costs. 6 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 7\| Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 8 || Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The 9|| parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this Report and 10 || Recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 || U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days 12 || within which to file a response to the objections. 13 Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 15 || district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the 17 || Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the 18 || findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s Report || and Recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 20 Dated this 29th day of October, 2025. [21] 22 Wr tek Marcis □□ 23 United States Macistrate □□□□□□ [28] -10-