Michael Riley v. Amazon.com Services LLC, et al.

— 1 — — 2 — 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 5 SAN JOSE DIVISION — 6 — 7 MICHAEL RILEY, Case No. 5:25-cv-07204-BLF 8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 9 v. MOTION TO REMAND 10 AMAZON.COM SERVICES LLC, et al., [Re: ECF No. 11] 11 Defendants. — 12 — 13 Before the Court is Plaintiff Michael Riley’s motion to remand for lack of diversity 14 jurisdiction. ECF No. 11 (“Mot.”); see also ECF No. 13 (“Reply”). Defendant Amazon.com 15 Services LLC (“Amazon”) opposes the motion. See ECF No. 12 (“Opp.”). The motion is suitable 16 for resolution without oral argument; the Court VACATES the hearing set for January 29, 2026. 17 See Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). 18 For the reasons below, the motion is GRANTED. 19 I. BACKGROUND 20 Mr. Riley filed a complaint in Santa Clara County Superior Court for product liability and 21 negligence on August 5, 2025. ECF No. 1-1 (“Compl.”). The complaint alleges damages 22 consisting of past and future medical expenses, wage loss, loss of earning capacity, household 23 services, incidental expenses, and pain and suffering. Id. ¶ 11. Amazon removed the case to the 24 U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California on August 26, 2025. See ECF No. 1. 25 II. LEGAL STANDARD 26 If a federal court has subject matter jurisdiction over a civil case filed in state court, the suit 27 may be removed to federal court by the defendant. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (a). “A defendant may 1 Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 2009). “Federal jurisdiction exists 2 only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded 3 complaint.” California ex rel. Sacramento Metro. Air Quality Mgmt. Dist. v. United States, — 4 — 215 F.3d 1005, 1014 (9th Cir. 2000). Diversity jurisdiction exists when the suit is between 5 “citizen of different States” and “where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of 6 $75,000, exclusive of interests or costs.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332 . “If at any time before final judgment 7 it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” Id. 8 § 1447(c). 9 The removal statute “is strictly construed against removal jurisdiction, and the burden of 10 establishing federal jurisdiction falls to the party invoking the statute.” Limon-Gonzalez v. Kia 11 Motors Am., Inc., No. 20-cv-4381-PA-JPRX, 2020 WL 3790838 , at *1 (C.D. Cal. July 7, 2020). 12 “Federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first 13 instance.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). For removals based on 14 diversity jurisdiction, the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the 15 amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Chavez v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 888 F.3d 413 , 416 16 (9th Cir. 2018). The Court may look to the complaint, notice of removal, “as well as summary17 judgment-type evidence relevant to the amount in controversy.” Id. The Court uses “judicial 18 experience and common sense” to evaluate whether Amazon has shown that it is more likely than 19 not that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Oh v. Navient Solutions, LLC, No. 25-cv20 6415-PA-SKX, 2025 WL 2495536 , at *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2025). 21 III. DISCUSSION 22 A. Procedural Defect 23 Mr. Riley first argues that remand is required under 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (c) because the 24 Notice of Removal “erroneously states that Plaintiff is seeking punitive damages,” which he 25 characterizes as a “material misstatement” of his complaint. Mot. at 4. 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (c) 26 provides that a motion to remand the case “on the basis of any defect other than lack of subject 27 matter jurisdiction must be made within 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal.” The 1 Inc., 456 F.3d 933, 935 (9th Cir. 2006). 2 Even assuming that Mr. Riley is correct that the Notice of Removal incorrectly represented 3 that he was seeking punitive damages, Mr. Riley has not provided any authority for the 4 proposition that such a mistake is the type of defect justifying remand. Relatedly, Mr. Riley 5 argues that the Notice of Removal is defective because it “improperly relies on legal authorities” 6 from the Central District of California and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Mot. at 4–5. 7 Citation to these cases as persuasive authority is not a defect warranting removal. 8 B. Amount in Controversy 9 Mr. Riley also argues that Amazon has failed to prove by a preponderance of evidence that 10 the amount in controversy in this case is likely to exceed $75,000. Mot. at 6. Amazon responds 11 that “Plaintiff offers no evidence whatsoever that his damages fall below that threshold.” Opp. 12 at 1. To the extent that Amazon suggests that it is Mr. Riley’s burden to demonstrate that the 13 damages in his own case are likely to be less than $75,000, it is mistaken. Guglielmino v. McKee 14 Foods Corp., 506 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 2007). The issue before the Court is whether Amazon, 15 not Mr. Riley, has demonstrated by preponderant evidence that the amount in controversy is more 16 likely than not to exceed $75,000. The Court agrees with Mr. Riley that Amazon has not met this 17 burden. 18 Amazon first argues that the complaint alleges damages that “plainly exceed” the amount19 in-controversy requirement because Mr. Riley checked each category of damages in his state court 20 complaint. Opp. at 4. According to Amazon, “[t]hese categories of damages, which include both 21 past and future losses, by themselves establish that the amount in controversy more likely than not 22 exceeds $75,000.” The Court disagrees. Amazon does not discharge its burden of satisfying the 23 amount-in-controversy requirement merely by identifying that Mr. Riley’s damages belong to the 24 same category as the damages pleaded in other cases. Amazon’s references to cases such as 25 Hammarlund v. C.R. Bard, Inc., No. 15-5506-SVW-JEM, 2015 WL 5826780 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 26 2015), and Black v. Monster Beverage Corp., No. 15-cv-2203-MWF-DTB, 2016 WL 81474 27 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2016), see Opp. at 4, are inapposite. In those cases, the district court found that 1 damage, required surgery, permanent scarring, a four-day hospital stay, [and] ‘severe and 2 permanent bodily injuries,’” Hammarlund, 2015 WL 5826780 , at *2, and “serious and permanent 3 physical injury” Black, 2016 WL 81474 , at *2 (internal quotation marks omitted) arising from 4 cardiac arrest made it more likely than not than the amount-in-controversy requirement was 5 satisfied. In contrast, the complaint here merely alleges that Mr. Riley was seriously injured. See 6 Compl. at 4. 7 Amazon next argues that Mr. Riley’s counsel’s characterization of Mr. Riley’s injuries as 8 “life-altering” and his references to Mr. Riley’s deep lacerations to both arms and significant 9 medical treatment in pre-suit letter demonstrates that the amount in controversy is likely to exceed 10 $75,000. Opp. at 5. The Court disagrees. The Court does not find it surprising that Mr. Riley’s 11 counsel would characterize his client’s injuries as “life-altering” in a letter to Defendants and does 12 not find that creates a sufficient probability that the amount-in-controversy requirement has been 13 satisfied. Amazon’s citation to Cohn v. PetSmart, Inc., 281 F.3d 837, 840 (9th Cir. 2002), is 14 unavailing because in that case, the plaintiff made a specific settlement demand of $100,000.00 15 and did not disavow it. Moreover, as Mr. Riley points out that, while the images in the pre-suit 16 letter depicted him in a graphic state and in a neck brace, his medical bill for hospitalization 17 amounted to only $12,201.53. Declaration of Neer Lerner (“Lerner Decl.”) ¶ 4, ECF No. 13-1; 18 see also id. Ex. A.1 Mr. Riley’s medical bill also confirms that he was admitted to and discharged 19 from the hospital on the same day. See id. The evidence in the record does not suggest that it is 20 more likely than not that the amount-in-controversy requirement has been met, regardless of how 21 Mr. Riley’s counsel described his client’s injuries to Amazon. 22 Finally, Amazon argues that, after learning of Mr. Riley’s intent to seek remand, Amazon 23 offered to stipulate to remand if he was willing to stipulate to a $75,000 cap on damages, exclusive — 24 — — 25 — 1 Amazon filed an objection to Mr. Riley’s reply brief, requesting that the Court strike his medical bill as untimely. ECF No. 14. The Court instead authorized Amazon to file a sur-reply by — 26 — November 20, 2025, advising them that “the Court will deem failure to file a sur-reply as a withdrawal of the objection.” ECF No. 15. Amazon having failed to file a sur-reply, the Court — 27 — deems the objection withdrawn. The objection is moot in any case, since the Court’s conclusion 1 of interest and costs, which he declined. Declaration of Aaron R. Goldstein (“Goldstein Decl.”) 2 || 94, Ex. B, ECF No. 12-1. Amazon suggests that Mr. Riley’s response shows that the amount in 3 controversy exceeds $75,000. Opp. at 6. As an initial matter, Mr. Riley disputes that he refused 4 || to sign a stipulation. Lerner Decl. {2 (“I have not refused or declined to sign a stipulation, but 5 advised Amazon’s counsel . . . that because Plaintiff's medical bills for hospitalization were 6 || minimal... did not yet have an answer on his request to stipulate.”). In any event, even if 7 Mr. Riley did refuse to stipulate, this would not conclusively establish that the actual amount in 8 controversy exceeds $75,000. See, e.g., Conrad Assocs. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 994 F. 9 Supp. 1196, 1199 (N.D. Cal. 1998). 10 || IV. ORDER 11 For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 12 (1) Mr. Riley’s motion to remand is GRANTED. 13 (2) The case is REMANDED to the Santa Clara County Superior Court. 2 15 Dated: November 21, 2025 fecuinfhacncan — 16 — BETH LABSON FREEMAN 17 United States District Judge — 18 — — 19 — — 20 — — 21 — — 22 — — 23 — — 24 — — 25 — — 26 — — 27 — — 28 —