Sue Dale v. FCA US, LLC; and Does 1 through 10, inclusive

[8] UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT [9] EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA [10] ----oo0oo---- [12] SUE DALE, No. 2:25-cv-00868 WBS JDP [13] Plaintiff, [14] v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: 15 DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR FCA US, LLC; and DOES 1 through JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS 16 10, inclusive, 17 Defendants. [19] 20 ----oo0oo---- 21 Plaintiff Sue Dale brought this action alleging various 22 violations of California’s Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act 23 (the “Song-Beverly Act”) and fraudulent concealment against 24 defendant FCA US, LLC (“FCA”). (Docket No. 1-1 at 2-14.) 25 Plaintiff’s claims arise out of her purchase of an allegedly 26 defective vehicle manufactured by FCA, which she purchased from 27 co-defendant Autonation Chrysler Dodge Jeep Ram Roseville 28 (“Autonation”). (See id.) 1 Defendant FCA now moves for judgment on the pleadings [2] on plaintiff’s claims against it on the grounds that plaintiff’s [3] claims are barred by the applicable statutes of limitations, and [4] plaintiff has failed to adequately plead the merits of her [5] claims. (See Docket No. 10.) 1 [6] I. Factual Background [7] On or about September 5, 2016, plaintiff entered into a [8] warranty contract with FCA regarding her vehicle, a 2017 Chrysler [9] Pacifica equipped with a nine-speed transmission. (See Docket [10] No. 1-1 at 3, 5.) Plaintiff claims that 2017 Chrysler Pacifica [11] vehicles equipped with nine-speed transmissions have a defective [12] transmission that may cause symptoms such as loss of power, [13] jerking, difficulty merging, and difficulty upon acceleration. [14] (See id. at 5.) Notably, plaintiff does not describe the nature [15] or symptoms of the transmission defect she claims is present in [16] her vehicle. (See id.) [17] Plaintiff alleges four violations of the Song-Beverly [18] Act against FCA: (1) FCA failed to timely replace her vehicle or [19] make restitution to her; (2) FCA failed to commence repairs of [20] her vehicle within a reasonable time and failed to repair her [21] vehicle to conform with the applicable warranties within thirty [22] days; (3) FCA failed to make available to its repair facilities [23] sufficient service literature and replacement parts to effect [24] repairs during the express warranty period; and (4) FCA breached [25] the implied warranty of merchantability. (See id. at 8-12.) [26] 27 1 The motion is decided on the papers without oral argument pursuant to Local Rule 230. The scheduled October 27, 2025 28 hearing on the motion is hereby VACATED. 1 Plaintiff also alleges that FCA committed fraudulent concealment [2] by concealing the existence of the alleged transmission defect. [3] (See id. at 12-13.) [4] II. Legal Standard [5] “After the pleadings are closed – but early enough not [6] to delay trial – a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” [7] Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). “Judgment on the pleadings is proper when [8] the moving party clearly establishes on the face of the pleadings [9] that no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and that it [10] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Hal Roach Studios, [11] Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir. [12] 1989). “A motion brought under Rule 12(c) is functionally [13] identical to one brought pursuant to Rule 12(b), and the same [14] standard of review applicable to a Rule 12(b) motion applies to [15] its Rule 12(c) analog.” Stoutt v. Travis Credit Union, 512 16 F.Supp.3d 1048, 1050 (E.D. Cal. 2021) (citation modified). [17] “Therefore, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the [18] factual allegations of the non-moving party are taken as true.” [19] Gutierrez v. RWD Techs., Inc., 279 F.Supp.2d 1223, 1224 (E.D. 20 Cal. 2003 ). [21] III. Discussion [22] A. Statutes of Limitations [23] “The Song–Beverly Act does not include its own statute [24] of limitations.” Mexia v. Rinker Boat Co., Inc., 174 Cal. App. 25 4th 1297, 1305–06, 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 285 (2009). Accordingly, [26] “California courts have held that the statute of limitations for [27] an action for breach of warranty under the Song-Beverly Act is [28] 1 governed by . . . section 2725 of the Uniform Commercial Code.” [2] Id. Under Section 2725, Song-Beverly Act claims are “subject to [3] a four-year statute of limitations period that commences when the [4] action accrues.” Schick v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 801 F.App'x 519 , [5] 520 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing Cal. Com. Code § 2725 (1)). Under [6] California’s “discovery rule,” the “four-year statute of [7] limitations begins to run only ‘when the breach is or should have [8] been discovered.’” Id. (quoting Cal. Com. Code § 2725 (2)); see [9] also Tanner v. Ford Motor Co., 424 F.Supp.3d 666 , 671 (N.D. Cal. [10] 2019) (same). [11] Plaintiff’s fraudulent concealment claim is subject to [12] a three-year statute of limitations. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 13 338(d); see Yetter v. Ford Motor Co., 428 F.Supp.3d 210 , 221 [14] (N.D. Cal. 2019). “Under California law, a fraud claim does not [15] accrue until the plaintiff's discovery of facts constituting the [16] fraud.” Sharaf v. Starbuzz Tobacco, Inc., 719 F.App'x 618 , 621 [17] (9th Cir. 2018). [18] Plaintiff does not specify exactly when she discovered [19] the alleged transmission defect or facts allegedly constituting [20] fraud. She states that she did not discover FCA’s alleged [21] “wrongful conduct . . . until shortly before the filing of the [22] complaint” because her vehicle “continued to exhibit symptoms of [23] defects following Defendant FCA’s unsuccessful attempts to repair [24] them.” (Docket No. 1-1 at 8, 12-14.) Based on these assertions, [25] the court cannot say that there is “no set of set of facts that [26] would establish the timeliness of [plaintiff’s] claim[s].” [27] Supermail Cargo, Inc. v. U.S., 68 F.3d 1204, 1206 (9th Cir. [28] 1 1995). Accordingly, plaintiff’s Song-Beverly Act and fraudulent [2] concealment claims are not barred by the statute of limitations. [3] B. Song-Beverly Act Claims [4] Plaintiff claims that FCA violated Sections 1793.2(d), [5] 1793.2(b), and 1793.2(a)(3) of the Song-Beverly Act. (See Docket [6] No. 1-1.) Plaintiff also claims that FCA breached the implied [7] warranty of merchantability under the Song-Beverly Act. (See [8] id.) [9] i. Section 1793.2(d) [10] For plaintiff to establish a violation of Section [11] 1793.2(d), she must show: “(1) the vehicle had a nonconformity [12] covered by the express warranty that substantially impaired the [13] use, value or safety of the vehicle (the nonconformity element); [14] (2) the vehicle was presented to an authorized representative of [15] the manufacturer of the vehicle for repair (the presentation [16] element); and (3) the manufacturer or his representative did not [17] repair the nonconformity after a reasonable number of repair [18] attempts (the failure to repair element).” Donlen v. Ford Motor [19] Co., 217 Cal.App.4th 138, 152 , 158 Cal.Rptr.3d 180 (2013). [20] Plaintiff states that “Defendant FCA and its [21] representatives in this state have been unable to service or [22] repair the Vehicle to conform to the applicable express [23] warranties after a reasonable number of opportunities” and that [24] “Defendant FCA failed to promptly replace the Vehicle or make [25] restitution to Plaintiff as required by Civil Code section [26] 1793.2, subdivision (d) and Civil Code section 1793.1, [27] subdivision (a)(2).” (Docket No. 1-1 at 8.) [28] 1 Considered under the liberal pleading requirements of [2] Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), these allegations are [3] sufficient to state a claim under Section 1793.2(d) of the Song4 Beverly Act. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Ford Motor Co., 680 5 F.Supp.3d 1177, 1188-89 (C.D. Cal. 2023) (finding plaintiff [6] adequately pled claim when plaintiff stated he presented the [7] alleged defect for repair multiple times). [8] ii. Section 1793.2(b) [9] Section 1793.2(b) requires manufacturers to “service[] [10] or repair[]” an alleged defect “so as to conform to the [11] applicable warranties within 30 days.” Cal. Civ. Code § 12 1793.2(b). [13] Plaintiff alleges that FCA failed to commence the [14] service or repair of her vehicle within a reasonable time and [15] failed to service or repair her vehicle to conform to the [16] applicable warranties within thirty days (See Docket No. 1-1 at [17] 9.) This is sufficient to state a violation of Section 1793.2(b) [18] of the Song-Beverly Act. Cf. Guzzetta v. Ford Motor Co., No. [19] 2:21-cv-09151 MEMF PVC, 2023 WL 5207429 , at *6-7 (finding [20] plaintiff had adequately stated a claim despite not indicating [21] when the alleged defects were serviced or repaired because, [22] “drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, the [23] [complaint] suggest[ed] that” the manufacturer “failed to service [24] or repair the [v]ehicle so as to conform with” FCA’s warranty [25] within thirty days). [26] iii. Section 1793.2(a)(3) [27] Under Section 1793.2(a)(3), manufacturers must “[m]ake [28] 1 available to authorized service and repair facilities sufficient [2] service literature and replacement parts to effect repairs during [3] the express warranty period.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1793.2 (a)(3). [4] Plaintiff alleges FCA failed to make sufficient service [5] literature and replacement parts available to its authorized [6] service and repair facilities. (Docket No. 1-1 at 10.) It is [7] unclear what more plaintiff could allege to state a claim under [8] this section given that plaintiff is unlikely to be aware of the [9] specifics of the service literature and replacement parts at the [10] pleading stage. Accordingly, plaintiff has adequately pled a [11] claim for violation of Section 1793.2(a)(3) of the Song-Beverly [12] Act. [13] iv. Implied Warranty [14] “Pursuant to the Song–Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, [15] ‘every sale of consumer goods that are sold at retail in [16] [California] shall be accompanied by the manufacturer's and the [17] retail seller's implied warranty that the goods are [18] merchantable.’” Daniel v. Ford Motor Co., 806 F.3d 1217 , 1222 [19] (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Cal. Civ. Code § 1792 ). The implied [20] warranty of merchantability guarantees that goods: “(1) Pass [21] without objection in the trade under the contract description. [22] (2) Are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are [23] used. (3) Are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled. (4) [24] Conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the [25] container or label.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1791.1 . “Thus, a [26] plaintiff claiming breach of an implied warranty of [27] merchantability must show that the product did not possess even [28] 1 the most basic degree of fitness for ordinary use.” Keegan v. [2] Am. Honda Motor Co., 838 F.Supp.2d 929, 945 (C.D. Cal. 2012). [3] Plaintiff alleges that the implied warranty of [4] merchantability was breached because 2017 Chrysler Pacifica [5] vehicles with nine-speed transmissions possess a transmission [6] defect that may make them more difficult to operate. (See Docket [7] No. 1-1 at 5, 11.) She then alleges that the existence of this [8] defect “constitutes a breach of the implied warranty because [9] [her] [v]ehicle (1) does not pass without objection in the trade [10] under the contract description, (2) is not fit for the ordinary [11] purposes for which such goods are used, (3) is not adequately [12] contained, packaged, and labelled, and (4) does not conform to [13] the promises or affirmations made on the container or label.” [14] (Id. at 11.) [15] Plaintiff further states that defendant breached the [16] implied warranty of merchantability because her vehicle contained [17] a latent transmission defect that rendered it unfit for its [18] ordinary purpose. (Docket No. 1-1 at 5, 11.). Plaintiff alleges [19] that the transmission defect is a “safety concern because it [20] severely affects the driver’s ability to control the car’s speed, [21] acceleration, and deceleration.” (Id. at 5.) She claims that [22] “these conditions make it difficult to safely merge into traffic [23] or may cause a sudden loss of power while in motion” and that the [24] transmission defect “can [also] cause the vehicle to fail without [25] warning, while [it] is moving at highway speeds.” Id. [26] Defendant argues that plaintiff’s implied warranty [27] claim must fail because there is no privity of contract between [28] 1 plaintiff and FCA. (See Docket No. 10 at 16.) However, the [2] privity requirement defendant invokes by citing Burr v. Sherwin [3] Williams Co., 42 Cal. 2d 682, 695 (1954), applies to a provision [4] of California’s Civil Code not at issue here. (See Docket No. 10 [5] at 16.) That other California statutes require vertical privity [6] to bring an implied warranty of merchantability claim does not [7] alter the fact that “[t]he privity requirement is not required [8] for an implied warranty of merchantability claim brought under [9] California’s Song-Beverly Act.” Allen, 96 F. Supp. 3d at 1075. [10] “Vehicles subject to . . . failure cannot be said to be [11] merchantable.” Cholakyan v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 796 F. Supp. 12 2d 1220, 1244 (C.D. Cal. 2011). Accordingly, the court concludes [13] that plaintiff has adequately pled a claim for breach of the [14] implied warranty of merchantability under the Song-Beverly Act. [15] C. Fraudulent Concealment [16] The elements of a claim for fraudulent concealment [17] under California law are: “(1) the defendant must have concealed [18] or suppressed a material fact; (2) the defendant must have been [19] under a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff; (3) the [20] defendant must have intentionally concealed or suppressed the [21] fact with the intent to defraud the plaintiff; (4) the plaintiff [22] must have been unaware of the fact and would not have acted as he [23] did if he had known of the concealed or suppressed fact, and (5) [24] as a result of the concealment or suppression of the fact, the [25] plaintiff must have sustained damage.” Shanmugam v. Mercedes26 Benz USA, LLC, No. 2:20-cv-01647 WBS KJN, 2021 WL 2227876 , at *3 [27] (E.D. Cal. June 2, 2021). [28] 1 “It is well-settled that the Federal Rules of Civil [2] Procedure apply in federal court, irrespective of the source of [3] the subject matter jurisdiction, and irrespective of whether the [4] substantive law at issue is state or federal.” Kearns v. Ford [5] Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 1125 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation [6] modified). The court therefore evaluates plaintiff’s fraud claim [7] pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)’s requirement [8] that a party who alleges fraud state the circumstances of the [9] alleged fraud with “particularity.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b); Vess [10] v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097 , 1103 (9th Cir. 2003). [11] Plaintiff’s fraud claim falls short of what Rule 9(b) [12] requires. Critically, plaintiff does not adequately plead that [13] her vehicle possessed a defect FCA failed to disclose. See, [14] e.g., Stewart v. Electrolux Home Prods., Inc., 304 F.Supp.3d 894 , [15] 907 (E.D. Cal. 2018) (O’Neill, C.J.); DeCoteau v. FCA US LLC, No. [16] 2:15-cv-00020 MCE EFB, 2015 WL 6951296 , at *3 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 10, [17] 2015) (To satisfy federal pleading requirements, “[p]laintiff[] [18] must go further than a conclusory allegation that the [19] [t]ransmission [d]efect exists and is responsible for the [20] injuries outlined in the [complaint] because automatic [21] transmissions . . . are complicated systems that demand more [22] detailed factual allegations in order to identify a plausible [23] defect.”). [24] Plaintiff alleges only that “Defendant FCA knowingly [25] and intentionally concealed material facts” regarding a purported [26] transmission defect present in 2017 Chrysler Pacifica vehicles [27] generally. (Docket No. 1-1 at 5-6, 13-14.). She does not state [28] eee I EIR EEE cm IOI IO RO III ISIN OS IEE III ED eee 1 . what material facts were concealed or suppressed, how she would [2] have acted differently if such facts had been disclosed to her, [3] or how she was damaged by such nondisclosure. See Stewart, 304 [4] F.Supop.3d at 907; see also Eisen v. Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc., [5] No. cv-11-9405 CAS FEMX, 2012 WL 841019 , at *3 (C.D. Cal. Feb. [6] 22, 2012) (noting that plaintiff did not explain how defective [7] aspect of vehicle actually failed). [8] Accordingly, because plaintiff has failed to plead her [9] fraudulent concealment claim with particularity, defendant’s [10] motion for judgment on the pleadings must be granted on that [11] claim. [12] IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant’s motion for [13] judgment on the pleadings be, and the same is, hereby DENIED on [14] plaintiff’s claims under the Song-Beverly Act, and GRANTED on [15] plaintiff’s claim for fraudulent concealment. Plaintiff is given [16] 14 days from the date of this Order to file an amended complaint [17] if she can do so consistent with this Order.? 18 , . Dated: October 14, 2025 rb them. hd. bE—~ 19 WILLIAM B. SHUBB 50 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE [25] 26 2 See Special Dist. Risk Mgmt. Auth. v. Munich Reinsurance Am., Inc., 562 F.Supp.3d 989 , 994 (E.D. Cal. 2021) (“Courts have 27 discretion in appropriate cases to grant a Rule 12(c) motion with leave to amend, or to simply grant dismissal of the action 28 | instead of entry of judgment .4,