Duc L. Trinh and Sally Y. Ly v. La Jolla Racquet Club Condominium Owners’ Association, Inc., et al.

— 1 — — 2 — — 3 — — 4 — — 5 — 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA — 8 — 9 DUC L. TRINH and SALLY Y. LY, Case No.: 3:25-cv-01829-RBM-MSB 10 Plaintiffs, ORDER: 11 v. (1) GRANTING MOTIONS TO 12 LA JOLLA RACQUET CLUB PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS CONDOMINIUM OWNERS’ 13 [Docs. 2, 3]; ASSOCIATION, INC., a California 14 nonprofit mutual benefit corporation, et (2) GRANTING MOTION FOR al., 15 LEAVE TO ELECTRONICALLY Defendants. FILE DOCUMENTS [Doc. 4]; AND — 16 — 17 (3) SCREENING AND DISMISSING IN PART THE COMPLAINT [Doc. 1] — 18 — — 19 — 20 On July 18, 2025, Plaintiffs Duc L. Trinh and Sally Y. Ly (collectively “Plaintiffs”), 21 proceeding pro se, filed a Complaint alleging housing-related discrimination managed by 22 Defendants La Jolla Racquet Club Condominium Owners’ Association, Inc., Bryan S. 23 Blank, Stephanie Walker Emerson, and Does 1–70 (collectively, “Defendants”). (Doc. 1.) 24 Along with the Complaint, Plaintiffs each filed an Application to Proceed in forma 25 pauperis (“IFP Application”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915 (a) (Docs. 2–3), as well as a 26 Motion for Leave to Electronically File Documents (“E-File Motion”) (Doc. 4). 27 For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs’ IFP Applications (Docs. 2–3) and the E28 file Motion (Doc. 4) are GRANTED. 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 Plaintiffs are tenants residing in a housing community located at 2600 Torrey Pines 3 Road, La Jolla, CA 92037 (the “Community”). (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 5, 9.) Plaintiff Ly is an 84-year4 old individual with “physical disabilities resulting from poliomyelitis, rendering her 5 wheelchair-bound and reliant on daily comprehensive care from Plaintiff Trinh.” (Id. ¶ 3.) 6 Plaintiff Trinh is Plaintiff Ly’s son and primary caregiver. (Id. ¶ 4.) Both Plaintiffs are of 7 Vietnamese descent. (Id. ¶¶ 3–4.) 8 On January 1, 2021, Plaintiffs leased a residential unit from their landlord (the 9 “Unit”) who provided a copy of Plaintiffs’ lease to the manager of the Community, 10 Defendant La Jolla Racquet Club Condominium Owners’ Association, Inc. (“Defendant 11 Owners’ Association”). (Id. ¶¶ 9–10.) “On March 8, 2024, Defendants declared the 12 parking garage unsafe, requiring immediate vehicle evacuation and prohibiting access due 13 to alleged structural concerns,” without providing alternative routes of access. (Id. ¶ 11.) 14 Given the Community’s configuration, “[t]he parking garage serves as the sole means for 15 [Plaintiff Ly] to reach her residential unit and the adjacent street.” (Id. ¶ 12.) Plaintiff 16 Trinh “is entirely reliant on the parking garage to safely transport [Plaintiff Ly] to and from 17 her unit for all essential activities, including medical appointments, grocery shopping, and 18 emergency evacuation.” (Id. ¶ 13.) The parking garage’s inaccessibility confined Plaintiff 19 Ly to her Unit and “impose[d] a severe and ongoing hardship on both Plaintiffs.” (Id.) 20 “On March 11 and 12, 2024, Plaintiffs requested reasonable accommodations for 21 reasonable and safe ingress/egress due to [Plaintiff Ly’s] disability.” (Id. ¶ 14.) Plaintiffs 22 allege that Defendants responded to their request on March 15, 2024 with “unreasonable 23 demands for verification of Plaintiff Ly’s residency and refused accommodation.” (Id. 24 ¶ 15.) Plaintiffs also allege that “Defendants subsequently conspired to promulgate new — 25 — — 26 — 27 1 The factual summary in this section reflects Plaintiffs’ allegations, not conclusions of fact or law by this Court. Well-pleaded factual allegations are accepted as true for purposes — 28 — 1 rules and regulations specifically targeting Plaintiffs, including the imposition of an 2 intrusive and invasive inspection requirement.” (Id. ¶ 16.) On information and belief, 3 Plaintiffs claim “this discriminatory demand was made on the basis of their race and 4 ethnicity, as Plaintiffs are the only Vietnamese residents in the [C]ommunity [and no] other 5 residents have been subjected to similar demands. (Id.) 6 On July 18, 2025, Plaintiffs filed the Complaint asserting the following nine causes 7 of action for: (1) violation of the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 24–32); (2) 8 violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (id. ¶¶ 33–46); (3) violation of the Fair Employment and 9 Housing Act (“FEHA”) (id. ¶¶ 47–52); (4) negligence (id. ¶¶ 53–55); (5) negligence per se 10 (id. ¶¶ 56–59); (6) intentional infliction of emotional distress (id. ¶¶ 60–64); (7) violations 11 of California’s Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act, Cal. Welf. & Inst. 12 Code § 15600 et seq. (“Elder Abuse Act) (id. ¶¶ 65–71); (8) injunctive relief (id. ¶¶ 72– 13 77); and (9) declaratory relief (id. ¶¶ 79–83). 14 II. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 15 All parties instituting any civil action, suit, or proceeding in a District Court of the 16 United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 17 $405.2 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914 (a). A court may authorize the commencement of a suit 18 without prepayment of the filing fee if the plaintiff submits a signed affidavit “that includes 19 a statement of all assets[,] which shows [an] inability to pay initial fees or give security.” 20 S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 3.2(a). The facts of an affidavit of poverty must be stated “with some 21 particularity, definiteness, and certainty.” Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226 , 1234 22 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. McQuade, 647 F.2d 938, 940 (9th Cir. 1981)). 23 The determination of indigency falls within the district court’s discretion. Cal. Men’s — 24 — — 25 — — 26 — 2 Civil litigants must pay an administrative fee of $55 in addition to the $350 filing fee. 27 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914 (a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2023)). The additional $55 administrative fee does not apply — 28 — 1 Colony v. Rowland, 939 F.2d 854, 858 (9th Cir. 1991), rev’d on other grounds, 506 U.S. 2 194 (1993) (“[§] 1915 typically requires the reviewing court to exercise its sound discretion 3 in determining whether the affiant has satisfied the statute’s requirement of indigency.”). 4 It is well-settled that a party need not be completely destitute to proceed IFP, but he 5 must adequately prove his indigence. Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 6 331, 339–40 (1948). To satisfy the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (a), “[a]n affidavit in 7 support of an IFP [motion] is sufficient where it alleges that the affiant cannot pay the court 8 costs and still afford the necessities of life.” Escobedo, 787 F.3d at 1234 (citing Adkins, 9 335 U.S. at 339); see also McQuade, 647 F.2d at 940 (an adequate affidavit should state 10 supporting facts “with some particularity, definiteness and certainty”). No exact formula 11 is “set forth by statute, regulation, or case law to determine when someone is poor enough 12 to earn IFP status.” Escobedo, 787 F.3d at 1235 . Consequently, courts must evaluate IFP 13 requests on a case-by-case basis. See id. at 1235–36 (declining to implement a general 14 benchmark of “twenty percent of monthly household income”); see also Cal. Men’s 15 Colony, 939 F.2d at 858 (requiring that district courts evaluate indigency based upon 16 available facts and by exercise of their “sound discretion”) (citation omitted). 17 First, in his IFP Application, Plaintiff Trinh declares that he is “currently serving as 18 a caregiver and live-in aide for [his] mother,” Plaintiff Ly, and his “sole source of income 19 is derived from providing care for her.” (Doc. 2 at 5.) He lists $1,775 as his monthly 20 income from employment as his mother’s caregiver and public assistance, and $1,505 as 21 his monthly expenses. (Id. at 1–2, 4–5.) Plaintiff Trinh has $300 in cash and $2,980.19 in 22 a checking account with Mission Federal Credit Union and does not anticipate any changes 23 to his income or expenses in the next twelve months. (Id. at 2, 5.) The filing fee represents 24 over 20 percent of his total monthly income before expenses, and he has no other sources 25 of income. See Escobedo, 787 F.3d at 1235 . The Court finds Plaintiff Trinh has satisfied 26 the indigency requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1915 . Accordingly, Plaintiff Trinh’s IFP 27 Application (Doc. 2) is GRANTED. 28 As to Plaintiff Ly, she lists $1,369.94 as her monthly income from disability and 1 public assistance benefits, and $1,181 as her monthly expenses. (Doc. 3 at 1–2, 4–5.) 2 Plaintiff Ly is not owed any money and does not have any dependents who rely on her for 3 financial support. (Id. at 3.) She has $70 in cash and $200 in a checking account with 4 Bank of America and does not anticipate any changes to her income or expenses in the next 5 twelve months. (Id. at 2, 5.) Based on her IFP Application, the Court finds that Plaintiff 6 Ly has sufficiently shown that she is unable to pay the costs of commencing this action. 7 Accordingly, Plaintiff Ly’s IFP Application (Doc. 3) is GRANTED. 8 III. SCREENING UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e) 9 A complaint filed by any person proceeding in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 10 § 1915(a) is subject to mandatory, sua sponte review and dismissal by the Court if the 11 action: “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be 12 granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” — 13 — 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B); see Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) 14 (“1915(e) not only permits but requires a district court to dismiss an [IFP] complaint that 15 fails to state a claim.”). 16 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain “a short and 17 plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” While a plaintiff 18 need not give “detailed factual allegations,” a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts that, if 19 true, “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 20 U.S. 544, 545 (2007). To state a claim upon which relief may be granted, “a complaint 21 must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is 22 plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 23 U.S. at 570). A claim is facially plausible when the factual allegations allow “the court to 24 draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. 25 “A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, 26 however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings 27 drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. 28 Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)) (cleaned up). Nevertheless, “[S]ection 1915(e) not only 1 permits but requires a district court to dismiss an [IFP] complaint that fails to state a claim.” 2 Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000). 3 After screening the Complaint, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have satisfied the “low 4 threshold” required to survive screening on their claims except for the Seventh Cause of 5 Action for alleged violations of the Elder Abuse Act.3 See Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 6 1113, 1123 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding a pro se litigant met the “low threshold for proceeding 7 past the screening stage”). This determination is without prejudice to any arguments 8 Defendants may make in a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9 12(b)(6) and Plaintiffs are cautioned that this Order is not to be construed as expressing an 10 opinion as to whether these claims would survive such a motion to dismiss. See Teahan v. 11 Wilhelm, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1119 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (“[T]he sua sponte screening and 12 dismissal procedure is cumulative of, and not a substitute for, any subsequent Rule 12(b)(6) 13 motion that [a defendant] may choose to bring.”). 14 However, for the reasons set forth below, the Seventh Cause of Action must be 15 dismissed because Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for violations of the Elder Abuse Act. 16 A. Elder Abuse Act 17 Plaintiffs allege that Defendants deprived Plaintiff Ly “of goods and services 18 necessary to avoid physical harm.” (Doc. 1 ¶ 67.) The Elder Abuse Act defines “abuse of 19 an elder or a dependent adult” as either: 20 (a) Physical abuse, neglect, financial abuse, abandonment, isolation, abduction, or other treatment with resulting physical harm or pain or mental — 21 — suffering [;or] — 22 — (b) The deprivation by a care custodian of goods or services that are necessary — 23 — to avoid physical harm or mental suffering. — 24 — — 25 — — 26 — 27 3 “Declaratory and injunctive relief are remedies, not causes of action.” Ajetunmobi v. Clarion Mortg. Capital, 595 F.App’x 680, 685 (9th Cir. 2014). The Court therefore notes — 28 — — 1 — Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 15610.07 (a)(1)–(2) (emphasis added). 2 In this case, Plaintiffs fail to allege that any of the named Defendants are Plaintiff 3 Ly’s “care custodian” as defined under the statute. See § 15610.07(2). Indeed, none of the 4 facts alleged in the Complaint show that any defendant in this action had a caretaking or 5 custodial relationship with Plaintiff Ly. Plaintiffs therefore fail to state an elder abuse 6 claim under § 15610.07(a)(2). 7 To the extent Plaintiffs allege that “Defendants’ conduct in failing to provide 8 accommodation[s]” constitutes neglect, their elder abuse claim fails for the same reason. 9 See § 15610.57(a) (defining “neglect” as “the negligent failure of any person having the 10 care or custody of an elder or a dependent adult to exercise that degree of care that a 11 reasonable person in a like position would exercise.”) (emphasis added). Defendants’ 12 alleged conduct also does not constitute “isolation” as defined under the Elder Abuse Act. 13 See § 15610.43(c). Plaintiffs therefore fail to state an elder abuse claim based on neglect 14 and isolation under § 15610.07(a)(1). As Plaintiffs fail to state a viable claim under the 15 Elder Abuse Act, the Seventh Cause of Action is DISMISSED. 16 B. Leave to Amend 17 “A district court should not dismiss a pro se complaint without leave to amend unless 18 it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by 19 amendment.” Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (cleaned up). 20 For the reasons previously discussed, Plaintiffs failed to allege that Defendants 21 maintain a caretaking or custodial relationship with Plaintiff Ly, or that Defendants’ 22 alleged conduct constituted “isolation” within the meaning of the Elder Abuse Act. 23 Because the “allegation of other facts . . . could not possibly cure” these deficiencies, 24 Plaintiffs’ elder abuse claim is beyond repair and correspondingly DISMISSED 25 WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. See Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture 26 Co., 806 F.2d 1393 , 1401 (9th Cir. 1986). 27 // 28 // 1 IV. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO ELECTRONICALLY FILE DOCUMENTS 2 In their E-File Motion, Plaintiffs affirm that they have “reviewed and agree[s] to 3 follow all rules and policies included in the Court’s Electronic Case Filing Administrative 4 Policies and Procedures Manual” (the “CM/ECF Manual”) and that they have regular 5 access to the technical requirements necessary to e-file successfully. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 5). Plaintiffs 6 also affirm that they understand they will receive notices and documents only by e-mail 7 and that their e-filing privileges may be revoked if their use of the Court’s e-filing system 8 is unsatisfactory. (Id. ¶¶ 2–3.) 9 “Unless otherwise authorized by the [C]ourt, all documents submitted for filing to 10 the Clerk’s Office by parties appearing without an attorney must be in legible, paper form.” 11 CM/ECF Manual, § 2(b) (S.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2025). “A pro se party seeking leave to 12 electronically file documents must file a motion and demonstrate the means to do so 13 properly by stating their equipment and software capabilities in addition to agreeing to 14 follow all rules and policies in the [CM/ECF Manual].” Id. The CM/ECF Manual refers 15 readers to the Court’s official website (www.casd.uscourts.gov) for the current CM/ECF 16 technical specifications and requirements, see id. at § 1(i), which include a computer; 17 software to convert documents from word processor to portable document format; internet 18 access; a compatible internet browser; a scanner; and a PACER account. See United States 19 District Court for the Southern District of California, CM/ECF Information, 20 https://www.casd.uscourts.gov/cmecf.aspx#undefined1 (last visited Nov. 7, 2025). 21 By reviewing the CM/ECF Manual and affirming that they have regular access to 22 the required equipment and software capabilities, Plaintiffs have demonstrated they have 23 the means to electronically file documents. (See Doc. 4 ¶¶ 1, 5.). Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ 24 E-File Motion (Doc. 4) is GRANTED. 25 V. CONCLUSION 26 Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs’ IFP Applications (Docs. 2–3) are GRANTED. 27 The Court further ORDERS as follows: 28 1. The Seventh Cause of Action for violations of the Elder Abuse Act is l DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. 2 2. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to issue a summons as to Plaintiffs’ 3 Complaint (Doc. 1) upon Defendants and to forward it to Plaintiffs along with a 4 blank U.S. Marshals Form 285 for the named Defendants. The Clerk of Court is 5 also DIRECTED to provide Plaintiffs with certified copies of this Order, the 6 Complaint, and the summons (collectively, the “IFP Package’) so that Plaintiffs 7 may serve Defendants. 8 3. Upon receipt of these materials, Plaintiff is DIRECTED to complete Form 285 9 as completely and accurately as possible, include an address where Defendants 10 may be found and/or subject to service pursuant to S.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 4.1(c), and 11 forward the materials to the United States Marshals Service according to the 12 instructions provided. 13 4. Upon receipt, the United States Marshals Service is ORDERED to serve a copy 14 of the Complaint and summons upon the named Defendants as directed by 15 Plaintiff on the completed Form 285 and to promptly file proof of service, or 16 proof of all attempts at service unable to be executed, with the Clerk of the Court. 17 See 8.D. Cal. Civ. LR 5.2. The United States will advance all costs of service. 18 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (d); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3). 19 IT IS SO ORDERED. 20 || DATE: December 3, 2025 FR Barri, Margy 9 HON. RUTH BERMUDEZ MONTENEGRO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE — 23 — — 24 — — 25 — — 26 — — 27 — — 28 —