Lattimer v. TDOC

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENN ESSEE AT NASHVILLE

BILLY LATTIMER ) ) Petitione r/App ellant, ) ) Appeal No. FILED 01A01-9804-CH-00200 vs. ) September 29, 1999 ) Davidson Chancery TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT ) No. 98-489-II Cecil Crowson, Jr. OF C ORR ECT ION , ET A L., ) Appellate Court Clerk ) Defendan ts/Appellees. ) ) APPEAL FROM THE CHANCERY COU RT FOR DAVIDSON COUNTY

THE HONORABLE CHANCELLOR McCOY PRESIDING

BILLY LATT IMER, #91238 Turney Center Industrial Prison Route 1, Only, Tennessee 37140-9709

ACTING PRO SE FOR PETITIONER/APPELLANT

JOHN KNOX WALKUP Attorney General and Reporter

MICHAEL E. MOORE Solicitor General

ELENA J. XOINIS Assistant Attorney General Civil Rights and Claims Division 425 5 th Aven ue No rth Nashville, Tennessee 37243-0488

ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENTS/APPELLEES

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART AND REMA NDED

PATRICIA J. COTTRELL, JUDGE

CONCUR:

CANTREL L, P.J., M.S. KOCH , J.

OPINION This is an appeal from the dismissal of a Petition for Declaratory Judgment

by the Ch ancer y Cou rt of Da vidson County. The petitione r, Billy Lattimer (“Petitioner”), is serving a sentence in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Corre ction. He argues that the trial court improperly dismissed his lawsuit for lack of jurisdiction. We agree.

During his incarceration at Northeast Correctional Center, Petitioner accrued a large collection of photographs (over 1,000 photos), which he kep t in two bound volumes. He alleged that many of the photos were Polaroid pictures of his family taken during their visits to him as part of a prison photo project and others were purchased from a vendor affiliated with the Department. In any event, Petitioner acquired or possessed the photographs with the knowledge and perm ission of the De partm ent.

In 1995 or 1996, the Department’s policy regarding photographs changed, and inmates were no longer permitted to acquire Polaroids. Petitioner alleges that the policy p rovide d that tho se pictures already in the po ssession of an in mate would not be confiscated so long as the inmate was not the subject of certain disciplinary actions or was not permanently transferred to another institution. The policy permitted inmates who were transferred to mail their collections elsewhere, but if this was not accomplished within thirty days, the collections were to be destroyed.

In Febru ary of 1 997, Petitioner was temporarily transferred from Northe ast Correctional Center for a court date. U pon his return, Petitioner discovered that his photos were confiscated. He filed a grievance with the Department. The Petitioner alleges that while this grievance was still pending, he learned that his *3 photos had been destroyed.

Mr Lattim er filed the above mentioned pro se petition in the Chancery Court o f Dav idson C ounty. He styled it a “Uniform Administrative Procedures Act Petition P ursuan t to Ten n. Cod e. Ann . § 4-5-1 01, et seq. for Declaratory Judgm ent.” Petitione r sough t, in addition to the declar atory ju dgme nt, $3,66 0 in actual damages, and $15,000 in punitive damages, as well as a man datory injunction that all seizures of prisoner Polaroid photographs cease.

The defen dants d id not re spond to the petition and filed no pleadings in the chancery court b efore th e trial co urt issued a sua spo nte order dismissing the claim. Finding that this was an action primarily for damages to property, the trial court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to hear Mr. La ttimer’s lawsuit because it involved unliquidated dam ages.

I.

The petition f iled her ein see ks relief , inter alia , under the Uniform Administrative Proce dures A ct, spec ifically a declar atory ju dgme nt pursu ant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-101, et seq. The defendants argue that the petition s hould be dism issed fo r failure to state a claim u nder th at statute .

Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-224 allows a party to seek a declaratory judgment to challen ge the “ legal va lidity or a pplicab ility of a statute, rule or order of an agency to specified circumstances.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-224 (a) (Supp. 1998). A prerequisite to such an action, howe ver, is tha t the par ty first seek a declaratory order f rom th e agen cy. Id.; Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-224(b).

In the petitio n filed h erein, th ere is no allegation that petitioner first sought a declaratory order from the De partm ent. Th e reco rd inclu des no such re quest. Therefore, the chancery court lacked jurisdiction to hear Petitioner’s declaratory *4 judgment action brought under the U.A.P .A. See Watson v. Tennessee Dep’t of Correction, 970 S.W .2d 494 , 497 (T enn. A pp. 199 8); Pearson v. Garrett Fin. Serv., In c., 849 S.W.2d 776, 780 (Tenn . App. 1992) (where a court has reached the correct result, it will not be reversed even if the result was predicated on an erroneous reason). Thus, to the extent the dismissal of the case was also a dismiss al of the Tenn . Code Ann. § 4-5-224 claim, we affirm.1

II.

The Chancery Court premised the dismissal of this case on Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-11 -102 (1980). Th at statute states:

(a) The chancery court has concurrent jurisdiction, with the circuit court, of all civil causes of action, triable in the circuit court, except for unliquidated damages for injuries to person or character, and except for unliquidated damages for injuries to property not resulting from a breach of oral or written contract; and no demurrer for want of jurisdiction of the c ause o f action shall be sustaine d in the cha ncery court, e xcept in the cas es exc epted.

(b) Any suit in the nature of the cases excep ted abo ve bro ught in the chanc ery co urt, wh ere ob jection h as not b een tak en by a plea to the jurisdiction, may be transferred to the circuit court of the county, or heard and determined by the chancery court upon the principles of a co urt of law .

Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-11-102.

The Chancery Court herein determined that Petitioner’s lawsuit was “prim arily an action for damages for loss of property”,2 and that such damages were unliquidated and did n ot arise from a breach of contract. The court then

1 Although defendants did not raise this issue below, we are not precluded from considering it on appeal. Because it is an issue of jurisdiction, it may be raised at any time. “Subject matter jurisdiction may never be waived and the lack thereof may be challenged at any stage of the proceedings.” Wunderlich v. Fortas, 776 S.W.2d 953 (Tenn. App. 1989).

2 We note that Petitioner seeks injunctive and declaratory relief, in addition to monetary damages, for alleged deprivation of his constitutional rights. Regardless of the caption of Petitioner’s pleading, its substance must be examined. See Norton v. Everhart, 895 S.W.2d 317, 319 (Tenn. 1995); see also Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 596, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972).

determined that it had no jurisdiction over such cases, relying on Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-11-102. Howeve r, the court’s holding fails to recognize the effect of subsection (b) of the statute. T hat sub section clearly provid es that in the absence of an objection, chancery court has jurisdiction over such cases. Where, as here, no objection to jurisdiction is interposed, the chancery court may either hear the case o r transfe r it to circu it court.

The Supreme C ourt of Tennessee has interpreted Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-11-102 to require transfer, rather than dismissa l, even in situations where the chancery court has no subject matter jurisdiction. In Flowe rs v. Dy er Cou nty, 830 S.W.2d 51 (Tenn . 1992) , the Co urt held that Te nn. Co de An n. § 16-11-102(b) mandated transfer from the chancery court to the circuit court, rather than dismiss al, of a case brought under the Governmental Tort Liability Act, which provided that circuit courts have exclusive jurisdiction over any action brought pursua nt to the A ct.

The Court recently addressed a similar situation in Woods v. MTC Management, 967 S.W.2d 800 (Tenn . 1998) . Woo ds filed h is com plaint, which alleged numerous violations of the Uniform Residential Landlord Tenant Act (“URLTA ”), Tenn . Code Ann. § 66-26 -501, et seq., in chancery court. URLTA specifies that general sessions courts and circuit courts have original jurisdiction over cases brought under it. Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-28-105(a) (1993). The chancery court dismissed the suit and denied W oods’ motion to transfe r the case to circuit court. Relying on Tenn. Code Ann. §16-11 -102 (b), the Court affirmed the chanc ery co urt’s find ing that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, but determined that the denial of the mo tion to transfer was reversible error. In so doing, the Court made clear that “§ 16-11-102 required the chanc ery co urt to *6 transfer the lawsuit . . . to circuit court for further proceedings.” Woods, 967 S.W.2d at 802. Thus, even if the defendants herein had objected to the court’s jurisdiction, dismiss al of M r. Lattim er’s cla im wo uld have b een im prope r. See Pauley v. Madison Coun ty, No. 02A01-9607-CH-00161, 1997 WL 110019 at *2-3 (Tenn. App. 1997) (no Tenn. R. App. P.11 application filed).

Unlike the cases cited above, no objection to jurisdic tion wa s filed in th is case. This leaves the chancery co urt with one m ore op tion than the cou rts in those cases. The case “may be transferred to the circuit court of the county, or heard and determined by the chancery court upon the principles of a court of law.” Tenn. Code Ann § 16-11-102.

IV.

On appeal, Petitioner suggests that the chancery court has proper jurisdiction because his claim is based on an implied contract with the state. In view o f our ho lding, this argum ent is no w mo ot.

V.

Accordin gly, the dismissal by the trial court on the basis of lack of jurisdiction is affirmed as to the claim brought under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, bu t is reversed as to any other claims, and this case is remanded for furth er proc eeding s. Costs o f this app eal are taxed to Appe llees.

_________________________________ PATRICIA J. COTTRELL, JUDGE CONCUR:

___________________________________ BEN H. CA NTR ELL , P. J., M .S.

___________________________________ WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE