Juan Alberto Gallegos Rangel v. Jason Knight, et al.

[3] 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 6 * * * 7 JUAN ALBERTO GALLEGOS RANGEL, Case No. 2:25-cv-02161-RFB-BNW 8 Petitioner, ORDER 9 v. [10] JASON KNIGHT, et al., [11] Respondents. [13] 14 I. INTRODUCTION 15 This case is one of a rapidly growing number before this Court challenging the federal 16 government’s reading of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) to authorize mandatory 17 detention of all noncitizens charged with entering the United States without inspection.1 The [18] 19 1 This Court has already granted petitioners relief—both preliminary and on the merits— in thirty-seven similar challenges. See Escobar Salgado v. Mattos, No. 2:25-cv-01872-RFB20 EJY 2025 WL 3205356 (D. Nev. Nov. 17, 2025); see also Herrera v. Knight, No. 2:25-CV-0136621 RFB-DJA, 2025 WL 2581792 (D. Nev. Sept. 5, 2025); Vazquez v. Feeley, No. 2:25-CV-01542RFB-EJY, 2025 WL 2676082 (D. Nev. Sept. 17, 2025); Roman v. Noem, No. 2:25-CV-0168422 RFB-EJY, 2025 WL 2710211 (D. Nev. Sept. 23, 2025); Carlos v. Noem, No. 2:25-CV-01900RFB-EJY, 2025 WL 2896156 (D. Nev. Oct. 10, 2025); E.C. v. Noem, No. 2:25-CV-01789-RFB23 BNW, 2025 WL 2916264 (D. Nev. Oct. 14, 2025); Perez Sanchez v. Bernacke, No. 2:25-CV24 01921-RFB-MDC (D. Nev. Oct. 17, 2025); Aparicio v. Noem, No. 2:25-CV-01919-RFB-DJA, 2025 WL 2998098 (D. Nev. Oct. 23, 2025); Dominguez-Lara v. Noem, No. 2:25-CV-01553-RFB25 EJY, 2025 WL 2998094 (D. Nev. Oct. 24, 2025); Bautista-Avalos v. Bernacke, 2:25-CV-01987RFB-BNW (D. Nev. Oct 27, 2025); Arce-Cervera v. Noem, No. 2:25-CV-01895-RFB-NJK, 2025 26 WL 3017866 (D. Nev. Oct. 28, 2025); Alvarado Gonzalez v. Mattos, No. 2:25-CV-01599-RFB27 NJK (D. Nev. Oct. 30, 2025); Rodriguez Cabrera v. Mattos, No. 2:25-cv-01551-RFB-EJY, 2025 WL 3072687 (D. Nev. Nov. 3, 2025); Berto Mendez v. Noem, No. 2:25-cv-02602-RFB-MDC, [28] 2025 WL 3124285 (D. Nev. Nov. 7, 2025); Cornejo-Mejia v. Bernacke, No. 2:25-cv-02139-RFB1 executive branch now takes the position that the INA, specifically 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (b)(2)(A), 2 requires the detention of all undocumented individuals during the pendency of their removal 3 proceedings, which can take months or years. According to this interpretation, detention without 4 a hearing is mandatary, no matter how long a noncitizen has resided in the country, and without 5 any due process to ensure the government has a legitimate, individualized interest in detaining 6 them. 7 According to a leaked internal memo, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), in 8 conjunction with the Department of Justice (DOJ) adopted this new legal position on a nationwide 9 basis on July 8, 2025.2 It subjects millions of undocumented U.S. residents to prolonged detention 10 without the opportunity for release on bond, in contravention of decades of agency practice and [13] BNW, 2025 WL 3222482 (D. Nev. Nov. 18, 2025); Lucero Ortiz v. Bernacke, No. 2:25-cv-0183314 RFB-NJK, 2025 WL 3237291 (D. Nev. Nov. 19, 2025); Perez Sales v. Mattos, No. 2:25-cv-01819RFB-BNW, 2025 WL 3237366 (D. Nev. Nov. 19, 2025); Hernandez Duran v. Bernacke, No. 2:2515 cv-02105-RFB-EJY, 2025 WL 3237451 (D. Nev. Nov. 19, 2025); Cabrera-Cortes v. Knight, No. 2:25-cv-01976-RFB-MDC, 2025 WL 3240971 (D. Nev. Nov. 20, 2025); Jacobo Ramirez [16] v. Noem, No. 2:25-cv-02136-RFB-MDC, 2025 WL 3270137 (D. Nev. Nov. 24, 2025); Garcia17 Arauz v. Noem, No. 2:25-cv-02117-RFB-EJY, 2025 WL 3470902 (D. Nev. Dec. 3, 2025); Silva Hernandez v. Noem, No. 2:25-cv-02304-RFB-EJY, 2025 WL 3470903 (D. Nev. Dec. 3, 18 2025); Reyes Cristobal v. Bernacke, No. 2:25-cv-02231-RFB-EJY, 2025 WL 3485770 (D. Nev. Dec. 4, 2025); Carrillo Fernandez v. Knight, No. 2:25-cv-02221-RFB-BNW, 2025 WL 3485800 [19] (D. Nev. Dec. 4, 2025); Pilar Torres v. Bernacke, No. 2:25-cv-02270-RFB-EJY, 2025 WL 20 3514615 (D. Nev. Dec. 8, 2025); Nolasco-Gomez v. Noem, No. 2:25-cv-02217-RFB-DJA, 2025 WL 3514758 (D. Nev. Dec. 8, 2025); Ramirez-Contreras v. Noem, No. 2:25-cv-02218-RFB-EJY, [21] 2025 WL 3514681 (D. Nev. Dec. 8, 2025); Rodas v. Noem, No. 2:25-cv-02216-RFB-BNW, 2025 WL 3514680 (D. Nev. Dec. 8, 2025); Perdomo-Gonzalez v. Noem, No. 2:25-cv-02121-RFB-EJY, [22] 2025 WL 3514758 (D. Nev. Dec. 8, 2025); Hernandez Isidoro v. Bernacke, No. 2:25-cv-0231223 RFB-NJK (D. Nev. Dec. 8, 2025); Serrano Gonzalez v. Knight, No. 2:25-cv-02081-RFB-BNW, 2025 WL 3524774 (D. Nev. Dec. 9, 2025); Morales Rondon v. Bernacke, No. 2:25-cv-0197924 RFB-BNW, 2025 WL 3527246 (D. Nev. Dec. 9, 2025); Marquez v. Knight, No. 2:25-cv-02203RFB-NJK, 2025 WL 3527244 (D. Nev. Dec. 9, 2025); Flores-Garcia v. Bernacke, No. 3:25-cv25 00688-RFB-CSD, 2025 WL 3527247 (D. Nev. Dec. 9, 2025); Garcia Soto v. Knight, No. 2:25-cv26 02138-RFB-BNW (D. Nev. Dec. 10, 2025); Quinonez Orosco v. Lyons, No. 2:25-cv-02240-RFBEJY (D. Nev. Dec. 10, 2025); Salguero v. DHS, No. 2:25-cv-02328-RFB-NJK (D. Nev. Dec. 10, 27 2025). 28 2 See ICE Memo: Interim Guidance Regarding Detention Authority for Applications for Admission, AILA Doc. No. 25071607 (July 8, 2025), https://perma.cc/5GKM-JYGX. 1 robust due process protections hitherto afforded to such residents under 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (a).3 On 2 September 5, 2025, the Bureau of Immigration Appeals (BIA) issued a precedential decision 3 adopting this new interpretation of the government’s detention authority under the INA. See Matter 4 of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025) (“Hurtado”). After Hurtado, immigration judges 5 no longer have authority to hear bond requests or grant bond to noncitizens present in the U.S. 6 who entered without inspection. Id. 7 The overwhelming majority of district courts across the country, including this Court, that 8 have considered the government’s new statutory interpretation have found it incorrect and 9 unlawful. See Escobar Salgado v. Mattos, No. 2:25-CV-01872-RFB-EJY, 2025 WL 3205356 (D. 10 Nev. Nov. 17, 2025) (finding “that the plain meaning of the relevant statutory provisions, when 11 interpreted according to fundamental canons of statutory construction,” as well as the legislative 12 history and decades of consistent agency practice establish “that the government's new 13 interpretation and policy under [§ 1225(b)(2)(A)] is unlawful.”); see also Barco Mercado v. 14 Francis, No. 1:25-CV-06852, at *9-10 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2025) (collecting over 350 decisions by 15 over 160 different district judges finding the application of §1225(b)(2)(A) to noncitizens residing 16 in the United States unlawful). A nationwide class has also been certified, and declaratory relief 17 granted to all class members holding that they are being detained without a bond hearing 18 unlawfully. See Bautista v. Santacruz, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, 2025 WL 3289861 (C.D. 19 Cal. Nov. 20, 2025); Bautista v. Santacruz, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, 2025 WL 3288403 20 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025). 21 Petitioner is currently detained without the opportunity for release on bond in the custody 22 of Federal Respondents at Nevada Southern Detention Center (NSDC), pursuant to this new 23 detention “policy.” He asserts the application of § 1225(b)(2) to him is unlawful under the INA, 24 and his continued detention violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. He seeks a 25 writ of habeas corpus requiring that he be released unless Respondents provide him with a bond [26] 27 3 See Kyle Cheney & Myah Ward, Trump’s new detention policy targets millions of immigrants. Judges keep saying its illegal., Politico (Sept. 20, 2025 at 4:00 p.m. EDT), 28 https://www.politico.com/news/2025/09/20/ice-detention-immigration-policy-00573850, https://perma.cc/L686-E97L. 1 hearing under § 1226(a) within seven days of the Court’s Order. For the reasons set forth below, 2 the Petition is granted and the Court orders Respondents to provide Petitioner a constitutionally 3 adequate bond hearing by December 17, 2025, or release him. [4] 5 II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 6 On November 3, 2025, Petitioner filed his petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. ECF No. 7 1. On November 18, 2025, this case was transferred to the undersigned judge as related to three 8 pending putative class actions pending before the Court. ECF No. 3. On that same day, the Court 9 ordered Respondents to find a Return to show cause why the Court should not grant the Petition. 10 ECF No. 4. 11 On November 20, 2025, Respondents’ counsel filed a notice of appearance and motion to 12 extend time to file a response to Order to Show Cause, stating that Respondents’ counsel will be 13 on medical leave the same day the response is due. ECF Nos. 5-6. Petitioner did not file an 14 opposition. Respondents filed their Return on November 25, 2025, and on November 28, 2025, 15 counsel for Respondent John Mattos appeared and filed a joinder to the return. ECF Nos. 8-10. 16 Petitioner has not filed a Traverse. 17 The Court’s Order follows. [18] 19 III. BACKGROUND 20 A. Legal Background 21 The Court fully incorporates by reference the legal background regarding the government’s 22 detention authority and removal proceedings under the INA, as well as the government’s new 23 statutory reading and mass detention “policy,” set forth in its ruling in Escobar Salgado, 2025 WL 24 3205356, at *2-6 (D. Nev. Nov. 17, 2025). 25 B. Petitioner Gallegos Rangel 26 The Court makes the following findings as to Petitioner. Mr. Gallegos Rangel is a citizen 27 of Mexico who has resided in the United States since 2001, when he entered without inspection. 28 ECF No. 1 at 4, 10. He resides in Idaho with his fiancée and his two minor children, all of whom 1 are U.S. citizens. Id. at 10-11. Petitioner has no criminal history nor any history of prior encounters 2 with immigration. Id. at 10. 3 Mr. Gallegos Rangel has been detained by DHS for over six weeks. Id. at 10. He was 4 arrested on October 19, 2025, as part of a law enforcement raid at a lawful horse race in Wilder, 5 Idaho. Id. DHS has since commenced removal proceedings against Petitioner charging Petitioner 6 with, inter alia, being inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(6)(A)(i) pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 7 1229a. Id. ICE issued a custody determination to continue Petitioner’s detention without an 8 opportunity to post bond or be released on other conditions. ECF No. 1 at 11. Petitioner is unable 9 to obtain a custody redetermination hearing (bond hearing) due to Hurtado. Id. [10] 11 IV. LEGAL STANDARDS 12 The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual 13 detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. 14 Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). “Its province, shaped to guarantee the most fundamental of all rights, is 15 to provide an effective and speedy instrument by which judicial inquiry may be had into the legality 16 of the detention of a person.” Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238 (1968). “The essence of 17 habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody, and . . . the 18 traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 19 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A writ of habeas corpus may be granted to a petitioner who demonstrates 20 that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (c)(3). 21 Historically, “the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of 22 Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. 23 Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). Accordingly, a district court's habeas jurisdiction includes 24 challenges to immigration-related detention. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see 25 also Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003); Trump v. J. G. G., 604 U.S. 670, 672 (2025) 26 (describing immigration detainees’ challenge to their confinement and removal as falling “within 27 the ‘core’ of the writ of habeas corpus.”) (per curiam) (citations omitted). “The application for the 28 writ usurps the attention and displaces the calendar of the judge or justice who entertains it and 1 receives prompt action from him within the four corners of the application.” Yong v. I.N.S., 208 2 F.3d 1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). [3] 4 V. DISCUSSION 5 As an initial matter, the Court grants Respondents’ Motion to Extend Time (ECF No. 6) to 6 file their Return, nunc pro tunc. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b), a court may “for good 7 cause,” extend a deadline so long as the request is made before the original deadline. Fed. R. Civ. 8 P. 6 (b)(1)(A). The Court finds that this request was made prior to the Respondents’ original 9 deadline of November 21, 2025, and that there was good cause sufficient to grant Respondents’ 10 extension to November 26, 2025, given counsel’s family medical emergency. 11 A. Jurisdiction 12 The Court has habeas jurisdiction to review Petitioner’s challenge to the lawfulness of his 13 detention, because the relevant jurisdiction stripping provisions of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1252 do 14 not apply. See Escobar Salgado, 2025 WL 3205356 , at *8-10; Hernandez Duran v. Bernacke, 2:2515 cv-2105-RFB-EJY, 2025 WL 3237451 , at *4 (Nov. 19, 2025). In evaluating the jurisdiction 16 stripping provisions of the INA, the Court is guided “by the general rule to resolve any ambiguities 17 in a jurisdiction-stripping statue in favor of the narrower interpretation and by the strong 18 presumption in favor of judicial review.” Arce v. United States, 899 F. F.3d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 19 2018) (per curiam) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Respondents do not challenge this 20 Court’s jurisdiction over the instant case. 21 B. Statutory Question 22 Petitioner Gallegos Rangel challenges the government’s new interpretation of the INA, and 23 his detention thereunder, as unlawful. While Respondents assert that § 1225(b)(2) applies to 24 Petitioner and mandates his detention without a bond hearing, Petitioner argues Respondents’ 25 interpretation of the statutory scheme of §§ 1225 and 1226 is flawed, contradicting both the 26 statutory framework and the decades of agency practice applying § 1226(a) to people like 27 Petitioner. This Court agrees with Petitioner and fully incorporates by reference its holding and 28 findings in Escobar Salgado v. Mattos. 2025 WL 3205356 , at *10-22. 1 Petitioner is a longtime U.S. resident, who entered the country without inspection decades 2 ago, and who was arrested and detained by ICE in Idaho, far from any port of entry. In addition, 3 Petitioner has no criminal convictions that would subject him to detention under § 1226(c). 4 Accordingly, the Court finds Petitioner is subject to detention under § 1226(a) and its 5 implementing regulations, not § 1225(b)(2)(A), and that the government’s new interpretation and 6 policy under that provision is unlawful. Escobar Salgado, 2025 WL 3205356 , at *10-22. 7 C. Due Process 8 Petitioner also challenges his ongoing detention without the opportunity for release on 9 bond under § 1225(b)(2) as unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 10 Amendment. Even if this Court were to accept the government’s new reading of § 1225(b)(2), it 11 would still have to contend with Petitioner’s due process challenge on this basis. Respondents 12 assert that Petitioner’s due process rights are not violated by detention without opportunity for 13 release on bond, citing to the Supreme Court’s upholding of detention without bond hearings under 14 § 1226(c) in Demore. See ECF No. 8 at 19 (citing Demore, 538 U.S. at 513, 522, 531 ). However, 15 Demore’s holding was based on the government establishing a particular interest in detaining a 16 limited class of noncitizens who had been convicted of certain crimes and were therefore 17 statistically more likely to abscond from removal proceedings. Demore, 538 U.S. at 526-27 . In 18 addition, the Court noted that detention without bond of noncitizens in that narrow class satisfied 19 due process because the convictions had been obtained with the “full procedural protections our 20 criminal justice system offer.” Id. at 513-14 . That interest is plainly not implicated in this case, 21 where Petitioner has no qualifying criminal convictions. Furthermore, the government has not 22 shown it has an individualized purpose in detaining Petitioner. 23 This Court further incorporates by reference the legal authorities and standards set forth in 24 Escobar Salgado v. Mattos regarding the due process rights of noncitizens. 2025 WL 3205356 , at 25 *22-24. For the following reasons, the Court finds that Petitioner is currently being detained 26 without the opportunity for release on bond in violation of his procedural and substantive due 27 process rights. [28] 1 1. Procedural Due Process4 2 To determine whether detention violates procedural due process, courts apply the three3 part test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). See Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, [4] 53 F.4th 1189 , 1203-07 (9th Cir. 2022) (collecting cases and applying the Mathews test in a similar 5 immigration detention context and holding “[u]ltimately, Mathews remains a flexible test that can 6 and must account for the heightened governmental interest in the immigration detention context”). 7 Under Mathews, the courts weigh the following three factors: (1) “the private interest that 8 will be affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest 9 through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural 10 safeguards”; and (3) “the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and 11 administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” 12 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 . 13 The first Mathews factor considers the private interest affected by the government's 14 ongoing detention of Petitioner without the opportunity for release on bond. See Mathews, 424 15 U.S. at 335. Here, that is Petitioner’s interest in being free from imprisonment, “the most elemental 16 of liberty interests.” Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529 . In this country, liberty is the norm and detention “is 17 the carefully limited exception.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987); see also 18 Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th At 1207 (“An individual's private interest in freedom from prolonged 19 detention is unquestionably substantial.”) (citations omitted). 20 Additionally, Petitioner’s liberty interest is not diminished by any final order of removal, 21 or the availability of any existing process to challenge Respondents’ decision to detain him without 22 bond. Cf. id. at 1208 (holding the habeas petitioner's liberty interest was diminished by the fact 23 that he was subject to a final order of removal, had already been afforded an individualized bond 24 hearing, and had additional process available to him through a further bonding hearing before an 25 IJ upon a showing of materially changed circumstances). [26] 4 To the extent that Respondents base their arguments on the constitutionality of the 27 automatic stay, the Court disregards these arguments as irrelevant to the instant case, as the automatic stay has not been invoked against Petitioner. Furthermore, the Court has already found 28 the automatic stay unconstitutional and adopts and reasserts that finding here. Herrera v. Knight, No. 2:25-CV-01366-RFB-DJA, 2025 WL 2581792 , at *13 (D. Nev. Sept. 5, 2025). 1 Second, the Court considers “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of [Petitioner’s] interest 2 through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional procedures.” Mathews, [3] 424 U.S. at 335 . There are no existing procedures whatsoever for Petitioner to challenge his 4 detention pending the conclusion of his removal proceedings without the opportunity for release 5 on bond. The risk of erroneous deprivation is extraordinarily high where ICE and DHS agency 6 officials have sole, unguided, and unreviewable discretion to detain Petitioner without any 7 individualized showing of why his detention is warranted, nor any process for Petitioner to 8 challenge the exercise of that discretion. The likelihood of erroneous deprivation caused by this 9 lack of process is demonstrated by numerous prior cases before this Court where an IJ held a bond 10 hearing for a petitioner prior to Hurtado and found that the government had not established a 11 justification for detention. See, e.g., Escobar Salgado, 2025 WL 3205356 ; Aparicio v. Noem, No. 12 2:25-CV-01919-RFB-DJA, 2025 WL 2998098 (D. Nev. Oct. 23, 2025); Berto Mendez v. Noem, 13 No. 2:25-cv-02602-RFB-MDC, 2025 WL 3124285 (D. Nev. Nov. 7, 2025). Moreover, given that 14 Petitioner Gallegos Rangel has significant familial and financial ties in the country given his nearly 15 25 years of residency, and Respondents have not asserted he is dangerous or a flight risk, the Court 16 finds that he is being arbitrarily and unjustifiably deprived of his liberty. 17 The additional procedures afforded under § 1226(a), including an individualized custody 18 redetermination by an immigration judge, i.e., a bond hearing, substantially mitigate the risk of 19 erroneous deprivation of Petitioner’s liberty, because those procedures require the government to 20 establish that Petitioner presents a flight risk or danger to the community. This would account for 21 the constitutional requirement that “once the flight risk justification evaporates, the only special 22 circumstance [ ] present is the alien's removable status itself, which bears no relation to a detainee's 23 dangerousness.” Zadvydas, 553 U.S. at 691-92. An adverse decision by an immigration judge in a 24 bond hearing can further be appealed, and Petitioner could seek additional custody 25 redeterminations based on changed circumstances, such that the outcome of a bond hearing would 26 be subject to “numerous levels of review, each offering [Petitioner] the opportunity to be heard by 27 a neutral decisionmaker.” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1210 (finding the bond hearing procedures 28 available through the implementing regulations of § 1226(a) would render “the risk of erroneous 1 deprivation . . . relatively small.”) (citation omitted). As such, the second Mathews factor also 2 weighs heavily in favor of granting Petitioner the procedural protections under § 1226(a). 3 The third and final Mathews factor considers the “Government's interest, including the 4 function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute 5 procedural requirement would entail.” 424 U.S. at 335 . The Court acknowledges that the 6 government's interests in enforcing immigration laws, including “protecting the public from 7 dangerous criminal aliens” and “securing an alien's ultimate removal,” are “interests of the highest 8 order.” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1188-89. These interests are in fact served by the 9 individualized determination by an immigration judge, based on a review of evidence presented 10 by the government and the noncitizen, as to whether an individual is dangerous or at risk of fleeing 11 removal proceedings, under existing, well-established procedures. In failing to articulate any 12 individualized reason why detaining Petitioner is necessary to enforce immigration law, the 13 question arises “whether the detention is not to facilitate deportation, or to protect against risk of 14 flight or dangerousness, but to incarcerate for other reasons.” Demore, 538 U.S. at 532 -33 15 (Kennedy, J. concurring). And the government has no interest in the unjustified deprivation of a 16 person's liberty. 17 Further, the Court finds that limiting the use of detention to only those noncitizens who are 18 dangerous or a flight risk through existing bond procedures serves the government and public's 19 interest by reducing the fiscal and administrative burdens attendant to immigration detention. 20 Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 996 (9th Cir. 2017) (Noting in 2017 that “the costs to the 21 public of immigration detention are staggering: $158 each day per detainee, amounting to a total 22 daily cost of $6.5 million. Supervised release programs cost much less by comparison: between 17 23 cents and 17 dollars each day per person.”). 24 In sum, the Court finds the Mathews factors weigh heavily in factor of Petitioner, and 25 therefore, his detention without the opportunity for release on bond violates his procedural due 26 process rights. 27 2. Substantive Due Process 28 Immigration detention violates the Due Process Clause unless it is ordered in a criminal 1 proceeding with adequate procedural protections, or in non-punitive circumstances “where a 2 special justification . . . outweighs the individual's constitutionally protected interest in avoiding 3 physical restraint.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 . 4 Respondents have asserted no individualized justification—let alone a special or 5 compelling justification—to continue to deprive Petitioner of his physical liberty. Accordingly, 6 in addition to finding that the challenged regulation violates procedural due process, this Court 7 further finds that Petitioner is currently detained in violation of his substantive due process rights. 8 See Escobar Salgado, 2025 WL 3205356 , at *25. 9 D. Scope of Relief 10 The federal habeas corpus statute “does not limit the relief that may be granted to discharge 11 of the applicant from physical custody.” Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238 (1968). “Its 12 mandate is broad with respect to the relief that may be granted.” Id. “It provides that ‘[t]he court 13 shall . . . dispose of the matter as law and justice require.’” Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2243 ). 14 Here, Petitioner faces the specific harm of being detained for months without a bond 15 hearing pursuant to § 1226(a). The Court finds that harm is remedied by ordering a bond hearing 16 by December 17, 2025. Given the due process rights at stake, if a bond hearing is not provided 17 promptly within that time frame, Petitioner shall be immediately released until it is determined 18 that his detention is warranted under 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (a). 19 E. Attorneys’ Fees 20 The Court defers on ruling on the matter of attorneys’ fees and costs. Should Petitioner’s 21 counsel wish to pursue a claim for attorneys’ fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act 22 (EAJA), they are instructed to file a separate motion on the issue in accordance with LR 54-14. [23] 24 VI. CONCLUSION 25 Based on the foregoing IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition (ECF No. 1) is 26 GRANTED. 27 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondents must provide Petitioner with a bond 28 hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (a) no later than December 17, 2025. ] IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondents are enjoined from denying Petitioner 2 | release on bond on the basis that he is subject to mandatory detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (b)(2). Thus, in the event that bond is granted, the Court ORDERS that Respondents are 4| enjoined from invoking the automatic stay to continue Petitioners’ detention, as the Court has 5 | already found the automatic stay unconstitutional and adopts that finding here. Herrera v. Knight, 6| No. 2:25-CV-01366-RFB-DJA, 2025 WL 2581792 , at *13 (D. Nev. Sept. 5, 2025). 7 In the event that bond is granted, Respondents are ORDERED to immediately release 8 | Petitioner. The Court has received notice of the hardship other petitioners have incurred in their 9 | efforts to satisfy bond, and therefore, the Court FURTHER ORDERS that Petitioner be afforded 10 | 45 days from the date of release to satisfy any monetary bond conditions. 11 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if the individualized bond hearing is not conducted by 12 | December 17, 2025, Petitioner shall be immediately released until it is determined that his 13 | detention is warranted under 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (a). 14 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall file a status report on the status of 15 | Petitioner’s bond hearing by December 18, 2025. The status report shall detail if and when the 16 | bond hearing occurred, if bond was granted or denied, and if denied, the reasons for that denial. 17 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondents’ Motion to Extend Time (ECF No. 6) is 18 | GRANTED, nunc pro tunc. 19 DATED: December 10, 2025. A 2 RICHARD F. BOCTWARE, II UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE [28] -12-