Christopher Scott Dangim v. CCDC, et al.

[3] 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 6 * * * 7 CHRISTOPHER SCOTT DANGIM, 8 Plaintiff, Case No. 2:24-cv-02028-RFB-MDC 9 v. ORDER 10 CCDC, et al., 11 Defendants. [12] 13 I. INTRODUCTION 14 Plaintiff Christopher Scott Dangim brings this civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 15 to redress constitutional violations that he claims he suffered at Clark County Detention Center 16 and Lakes Crossing Center. See ECF No. 1-1. On September 15, 2025, this Court ordered Dangim 17 to file an application to proceed in forma pauperis for non-prisoners, or pay the full $405 filing 18 fee, and file a single, complete complaint on or before September 15, 2025. See ECF No. 16. The 19 Court warned Dangim that the action could be dismissed if he failed to file an application to 20 proceed in forma pauperis for non-prisoners, or pay the full $405 filing fee, and file a single, 21 complete complaint by that deadline. That deadline expired and Dangim did not file an application 22 to proceed in forma pauperis for non-prisoners, pay the full $405 filing fee, file a single, complete 23 complaint, or otherwise respond. [24] 25 II. DISCUSSION 26 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the exercise of 27 that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . dismissal” of a case. See 28 Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of L.A., 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). A court may dismiss an 1 action based on a party’s failure to obey a court order or comply with local rules. See Carey v. 2 King, 856 F.2d 1439 , 1440–41 (9th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply with local 3 rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to keep court apprised of address); Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv., 833 4 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In determining 5 whether to dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the Court must consider: (1) the public’s 6 interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the 7 risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their 8 merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. See In re Phenylpropanolamine Prods. 9 Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone, 833 F.2d at 130). 10 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation and the 11 Court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of Dangim’s claims. The third 12 factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal because a presumption of 13 injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing a pleading ordered by the court 14 or prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air W., Inc., 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). The 15 fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits—is greatly 16 outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal. 17 The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic alternatives can be used 18 to correct the party’s failure that brought about the Court’s need to consider dismissal. See Yourish 19 v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983 , 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that considering less drastic 20 alternatives before the party has disobeyed a court order does not satisfy this factor); accord 21 Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639 , 643 & 643 n.4 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that “the persuasive 22 force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that “implicitly accepted pursuit of less drastic alternatives 23 prior to disobedience of the court’s order as satisfying this element[,]” i.e., like the “initial granting 24 of leave to amend coupled with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have been 25 “eroded” by Yourish). Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally 26 dismissing a case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v. Duncan, [27] 779 F.2d 1421 , 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). 28 This action cannot realistically proceed unless and until Dangim either files an application 1 | to proceed in forma pauperis for non-prisoners, or pays the $405 filing fee for a civil action, and 2| files a single, complete complaint. The only alternative to dismissal is to enter a second order 3 | setting another deadline. But the reality of repeating an ignored order is that it often only delays the inevitable and squanders the Court’s finite resources. The circumstances here do not indicate 5 | that this case will be an exception: there is no hint that Dangim needs additional time or evidence 6 | or that he did not receive the Court’s order. Setting another deadline is not a meaningful alternative 7 | given these circumstances. So the fifth factor favors dismissal. [8] 9 IH. CONCLUSION 10 Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, the Court finds that they weigh in 11 | favor of dismissal. 12 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED without prejudice based 13 | on Dangim’s failure to file an application to proceed in forma pauperis for non-prisoners, or pay the full $405 filing fee, and file a single, complete complaint in compliance with the Court’s 15 | August 15, 2025, Order. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and close 16 | this case. No other documents may be filed in this now-closed case. If Dangim wishes to pursue 17 | his claims, he must file a complaint in a new case. 18 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Dangim may move to reopen this case and vacate the 19 | judgment by filing a motion for reconsideration of this Order. In this motion, Dangim is required 20 | to explain what circumstances led to his failure to file an application to proceed in forma pauperis 21 for non-prisoner, pay the $405 filing fee, file a single, complete complaint, or otherwise respond 22) to the Court. If the Court finds there to be good cause or a reasonable explanation therein, the 23 | Court will reopen the case and vacate the judgment. 24 ane 25 DATED: December 22, 2025. 7 RICHARD F. BOULWARE, II UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE [28] -3-