Mark Anthony Reed v. Frank J. Bisignano, et al.

[3] 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 SAN JOSE DIVISION [7] 8 MARK ANTHONY REED, Case No. 5:22-cv-03942-EJD 9 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 10 v. JUDGMENT; DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR 11 FRANK J. BISIGNANO, ET AL., SUMMARY JUDGMENT Defendants. [12] Re: Dkt. No. 36 [13] Plaintiff Mark Anthony Reed (“Reed”) appeals the Commissioner of Social Security’s1 [14] final decision determining that Reed was not disabled and therefore ineligible for disability [15] benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. Mot. for Summ. J. (“MSJ”), ECF No. 14; [16] Cross-MSJ, ECF No. 18; Opp’n to Cross-MSJ, ECF No. 21. [17] Having considered the parties’ motions and the record in this matter, the Court GRANTS [18] Reed’s motion for summary judgment and DENIES the Commissioner’s cross-motion for [19] summary judgment. Accordingly, the Court REVERSES the Commissioner’s final decision and [20] REMANDS for calculation and award of benefits. [21] 22 I. BACKGROUND There are two periods of time relevant to this Order: (1) January 7, 2015, to July 27, 2017 [23] (“the 2015–2017 period”); and (2) July 27, 2017, to present (“the 2017–present period”). Reed [24] has been receiving Title XVI benefits during the 2017–present period, but he challenges the denial [26] 27 1 The Current Commissioner, Frank J. Bisignano, is automatically substituted as Defendant in place of his predecessor. Fed R. Civ. P. 25(d). 1 of his benefits during the 2015–2017 period. 2 Reed filed his first application for disability benefits on January 7, 2015. Administrative 3 Record (“AR”) 189–97, ECF No. 19. The application was denied, so Reed appealed and appeared 4 before Administrative Law Judge Evangelina P. Hernandez (“the ALJ”). AR 42–78. The ALJ 5 issued an unfavorable decision on July 27, 2017, finding Reed not disabled. AR 22–36. While the 6 ALJ found Reed had the severe impairments of obesity, glaucoma, osteoarthritis, depressive 7 disorder, joint disorder, bilateral peripheral neuropathy, and substance use disorder, she also found 8 that he did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled 9 one of the listed impairments. AR 24–26. After conducting a residual functional capacity 10 (“RFC”) assessment, the ALJ concluded that Reed could accomplish less than the full range of 11 “light work” with certain limitations and was not disabled because could perform jobs existing in 12 significant numbers in the national economy. AR 34–46. 13 Reed filed a request for review of this decision with the Appeals Council. The Council 14 issued a partially favorable decision. AR 1–10. It agreed with the ALJ that Reed was not disabled 15 during the 2015–2017 period under the framework in Medical-Vocational Rule 202.10; but it 16 found that at the time of the ALJ’s order, Reed was close to reaching the age required for the 17 “advanced age category” of vocational guidelines in Medical-Vocational Rule 201.01, and under 18 those guidelines, Reed would be considered disabled. AR 5. The Council therefore found Reed 19 disabled beginning on July 27, 2017, the date of the ALJ’s first order. AR 8. 20 Reed then filed his first case in the Northern District of California in 2019, seeking judicial 21 review of the finding that he was not disabled during the 2015–2017 period. Reed v. Saul, No. 1922 CV-01887-JSC, 2020 WL 553943 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2020). Judge Corely granted Reed’s request 23 for remand on February 4, 2020, finding that the ALJ failed to: (1) provide specific, clear and 24 convincing reasons supported by substantial evidence for discounting Reed's subjective testimony 25 regarding his pain and functional limitations; and (2) weigh the medical evidence regarding 26 Reed’s mental function capacity based on substantial evidence. Id. Judge Corely remanded for 27 further proceedings, rather than remand for calculation of benefits, because the record had not 1 been fully developed as to those issues. Id. 2 Pursuant to the remand, the same ALJ held two additional hearings on October 6, 2021, 3 and December 15, 2021, then issued another unfavorable decision on March 15, 2022. AR 866– 4 85. The ALJ found that Reed suffered from severe impairments of obesity; degenerative disc 5 disease; post-traumatic glaucoma; osteoarthritis; post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD); affective 6 disorder; severe, recurring major depressive disorder with psychotic features; and polysubstance 7 abuse in partial remission. But the ALJ also found that these impairments did not meet or 8 medically equal the severity of one of the listed impairments, and Reed had the residual functional 9 capacity to perform “light work.” AR 869–70. 10 Reed subsequently filed his current, and second, action for judicial review on July 6, 2022. 11 After the Court granted several continuances, briefing on this motion concluded on May 14, 2025. 12 II. LEGAL STANDARD 13 Courts review an ALJ’s decision to deny Social Security benefits for substantial evidence. 14 Glanden v. Kijakazi, 86 F.4th 838, 843 (9th Cir. 2023). There is substantial evidence when there 15 is “more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance” of evidence. Lingenfelter v. Astrue, [16] 504 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007). Put differently, substantial evidence is “such relevant 17 evidence [that] a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. If an 18 ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence, courts will reverse. Glanden, 86 F.4th at 19 843. Courts also review an ALJ’s decision for legal error. Id. If the decision contains a legal 20 error, courts will reverse that decision unless the legal error was harmless. Stout v. Comm’r, Soc. 21 Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 2006). An error is harmless only when it is 22 “inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination” or when “the agency’s path [to its 23 conclusion] may reasonably be discerned” despite the error. Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 24 487, 494 (9th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted). 25 III. DISCUSSION 26 The Court finds the ALJ erred by again rejecting Reed’s testimony without providing 27 specific, clear, convincing reasons. For this reason, the Court remands this case for calculation 1 and award of benefits. 2 A. Rejection of Claimant’s Testimony 3 In dealing with a claimant’s subjective testimony, when the claimant has medically 4 supported impairments that could cause her symptoms,2 the ALJ must provide “specific, clear, and 5 convincing reasons” for “reject[ing] the claimant’s testimony about the severity of those 6 symptoms.” Ferguson v. O’Malley, 95 F.4th 1194 , 1197–98 (9th Cir. 2024) (quoting Brown7 Hunter, 806 F.3d at 488–89). This requires the ALJ to “show [her] work” by providing an 8 explanation “clear enough that it has the power to convince.” Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489 , 9 499 (9th Cir. 2022). “A clear statement of the agency's reasoning is necessary because [the court] 10 can affirm the agency's decision to deny benefits only on the grounds invoked by the agency.” 11 Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 492 . 12 In Brown-Hunter, the ALJ made the conclusory declaration that “the claimant’s statements 13 concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not credible to the 14 extent they are inconsistent with the above residual functional capacity assessment.” Id. at 493. 15 Then, the ALJ merely summarized the medical evidence before paraphrasing her earlier 16 conclusion, stating again that “the functional limitations from the claimant’s impairments were 17 less serious than she has alleged.” Id. The Ninth Circuit held that the ALJ’s explanation failed to 18 satisfy the specific, clear, and convincing standard because it did not specifically identify portions 19 of the claimant’s testimony that were allegedly inconsistent with the record, and the explanation 20 did no more than summarize the medical evidence. Id. at 494. Although a court might have been 21 able to draw reasonable inferences from the summarized evidence, the Ninth Circuit explained that 22 doing so results in the court improperly making credibility determinations in place of the ALJ. Id. 23 (citing Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2003)). Rather than allowing a court to 24 infer the ALJ’s reasoning, the specific, clear, and convincing standard requires the ALJ to do the 25 work of linking specific testimony to specific evidence undermining that testimony. Id. The [27] 2 The ALJ found this first step satisfied. 1 purpose is to allow courts to review the ALJ’s actual reasoning instead of speculating on what that 2 reasoning may have been. Id. 3 The Court finds the ALJ failed to meet this standard. The ALJ began her RFC analysis by 4 reciting the following: 5 After careful consideration of the evidence, I find that the claimant’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to 6 cause the alleged symptoms; however, the claimant’s statements about the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms 7 are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record for the reasons explained in this decision. [8] AR 872. [9] She then proceeded to summarize Reed’s medical records, similar to the ALJ in Brown10 Hunter. There are only two instances where the ALJ linked specific testimony to any other [11] evidence in the record. First, the ALJ noted that Reed testified during the December 2021 hearing [12] that his girlfriend assists him with personal care and household chores, but he reported elsewhere [13] that he has “independence in activities of daily living and denies needing help with dressing, [14] bathing, eating, ambulating, toileting, and hygiene.” AR 873. Second, the ALJ noted that Reed [15] testified during the December 2021 hearing that “he can read and understand only simple words [16] such as ‘see Tom run,’ and that his sister assists him with forms and application,” but he was able [17] to read and complete a history form in September 2015, as well as study his AA book in October [18] 2015. AR 878. The ALJ did not cite to any other part of Reed’s testimony—and notably, did not [19] explicitly reference any of his testimony from the April 2017 hearing3—thus it appears the ALJ [20] found Reed’s entire testimony uncredible based on these two claimed inconsistencies. See [21] Treichler v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1103 (9th Cir. 2014) (“An ALJ's vague [22] allegation that a claimant's testimony is not consistent with the objective medical evidence, [23] without any specific findings in support of that conclusion is insufficient for our review.”) [24] (internal quotations omitted). [26] 3 It is particularly noteworthy that the ALJ did not identify any testimony from the 2017 hearing 27 given that this hearing occurred during the relevant 2015–2017 period, rather than the 2021 hearing, which occurred several years after the relevant period. 1 As an initial matter, Reed’s testimony that he experiences limitations in personal care and 2 household chores is not contradicted by evidence that he does not need help “dressing, bathing, 3 eating, ambulating, toileting, and hygiene,” and it is not dispositive of disability. As Judge Corely 4 stated in the prior order remanding this case, “[t]hat Plaintiff is able to perform his own hygiene, 5 can dress himself, can do simple food preparation, can do dishes, can do his laundry, and can use 6 the phone and public transportation does not mean he does not suffer from mental and physical 7 health issues which would preclude him from working.” Reed, 2020 WL 553943 , at *6 (internal 8 citations and punctuation omitted). Similarly, the ability to study the twelve steps of his AA plan 9 and complete a history form in 2015 is not contradicted by his testimony that he can only 10 understand simple words and uses his sister’s help with forms in 2021.4 11 But more importantly, the ability to read more than simple words, or accomplish basic 12 hygiene and food preparation, does not touch on one of the key issues of dispute—Reed’s ability 13 to stand and walk. The ALJ found Reed capable of “light work” during the 2015–2017 period, 14 which requires “standing or walking, off and on, for approximately 6 hours of an 8-hour 15 workday.” But Reed argues this finding is not supported by substantial evidence in part because 16 the records reflects that he could not stand or walk for the period required for “light work.” On 17 this subject, Reed testified at the April 2017 hearing: 18 I can’t stand right now too long . . . . I’ve got to say my knees and my – there’s something wrong with me – it’s my knees and my lower 19 back, right. I can’t stand too long . . . . [I can walk] about a minute, or as soon as I can spot a seat, that’s what I’m going for, or something 20 to lean on as soon as I spot something to stop and grab hold to so I don’t fall . . . . It’s the lower back, and the knees now [bothering me]. 21 Something happened to where I got a lower back and knee problem. The knee problem has been there a while. It’s got worser. But, now 22 I’ve got this lower back issue with the nerves running down my legs, right, well, it make me – sometimes I stumble and fall . . . . I’ll fall 23 quite frequently. 24 AR 49–52. [26] 4 Reed’s testimony discusses these issues in the present tense, not as occurring during the 2015– 27 2017 period. AR 919–20. Although he was asked if he experienced these issues for his entire life, his answer does not address that question. AR 920. 1 Reed also testified at the December 2021 hearing: 2 I have a electric power chair I can get around . . . . Sometimes I use a – walker if I can’t get the power chair there and other kinds things 3 you – you sit down on and get off, you know, just to have to get up and walk a little bit and sit down . . . In 2015, I was using a shopping 4 cart [to lean on] . . . You know, that if I hurting too bad have somebody pushing you while I get in. [5] AR 920–21. [6] The ALJ found Reed has severe degenerative disc disease and osteoarthritis, yet [7] discredited Reed’s account of the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these conditions [8] without examining any of Reed’s testimony on the topic, let alone providing clear reasons for [9] rejecting it. Accepting these statements as true, this evidence directly contradicts the ALJ’s [10] finding that Reed could stand or walk, off and on, for approximately 6 hours of an 8-hour [11] workday. Therefore, the ALJ’s determination was not supported by substantial evidence, and [12] remand is required on this basis alone.5 [13] B. Remedy [14] When an ALJ’s decision is premised on legal error or unsupported by substantial evidence, [15] the Court has the discretion to remand for award of benefits or further administrative proceedings. [16] 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g); Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 593 (9th Cir. 2004); see Garrison v. [17] Colvin, 759 F.3d 995 , 1020–21 (9th Cir. 2014). Courts remand with instructions to calculate and [18] award benefits when: “(1) the record has been fully developed and further administrative [19] proceedings would serve no useful purpose; (2) the ALJ has failed to provide legally sufficient [20] reasons for rejecting evidence . . . ; and (3) if the improperly discredited evidence were credited as [21] true, the ALJ would be required to find the claimant disabled on remand.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 22 1020. The plaintiff must further show that “an evaluation of the record as a whole [does not] [23] create[] serious doubt that a claimant is, in fact, disabled.” Id. at 1021 . It is also appropriate under [24] “Ninth Circuit precedent . . . for the Court to consider the length of time a claimant has been [26] 5 Because the ALJ improperly discounted Reed’s testimony, her resulting RFC finding also did not 27 account for all of Reed’s limitations. The Court need not review Reed’s remaining arguments regarding the weight assigned to medical opinions. 1 delayed by administrative proceedings.” Norris vy. Colvin, 160 F. Supp. 3d 1251, 1284 (E.D. 2 || Wash. 2016) (collecting cases); see also Benecke, 379 F.3d at 595 (“Remanding a disability claim 3 || for further proceedings can delay much needed income for claimants who are unable to work and 4 are entitled to benefits, often subjecting them to tremendous financial difficulties while awaiting 5 || the outcome of their appeals and proceedings on remand.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 6 Here, the Court finds remand with instructions to calculate and award benefits appropriate. 7 First, the record is fully developed. The ALJ has now conducted three separate hearings over the 8 || course of two years. Second, the ALJ’s rejection of Reed’s testimony was legally insufficient for 9 the reasons discussed above. And third, the ALJ would be required to find Reed disabled on 10 || remand if the improperly discredited evidence were credited as true, and the record does not cast 11 serious doubt on Reed’s allegations of disability. The Court also finds calculation of benefits 12 || particularly appropriate considering the significant delay Reed has faced in pursuit of his benefits. 5 13 Over ten years have passed since Reed first applied for his benefits in 2015. Reed has now 14 || undergone three hearings before the ALJ, a partially successful request for review with the 3 15 Appeals Council, a successful petition for remand in in the district court, and now, a second a 16 || successful petition for remand here. Under these circumstances, the Court finds that “[a]llowing 3 17 || the Commissioner to decide the issue again would create an unfair ‘heads we win; tails, let's play S 18 || again’ system of disability benefits adjudication.” Benecke, 379 F.3d at 595 . 19 || IV. CONCLUSION 20 Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Reed’s motion for summary judgment, 21 DENIES the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment, and REMANDS for calculation and 22 || award of benefits. 23 IT IS SO ORDERED. 24 Dated: December 23, 2025 [26] EDWARD J. DAVILA 27 United States District Judge 28 || Case No.: 5:22-cv-03942-EJD ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY J UDGMENT