Derek Steven McCauley v. Newrez LLC D/B/A Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing

IN THE

Court of Appeals of Indiana FILED Derek Steven McCauley, Jan 27 2026, 9:11 am

CLERK Appellant-Defendant Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court

v.

Newrez LLC d/b/a Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing, Appellee-Plaintiff

January 27, 2026 Court of Appeals Case No. 25A-MF-973 Appeal from the Marion Superior Court The Honorable Katie R. Melnick, Magistrate The Honorable Andrew J. Borland, Magistrate Trial Court Cause No. 49D11-2212-MF-43771

Opinion by Judge DeBoer Judges Bradford and Weissmann concur.

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DeBoer, Judge.

Case Summary [1] In this mortgage foreclosure action, Derek McCauley appeals the trial court’s

decision to deny his motion to vacate its judgment in favor of Newrez LLC

d/b/a Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing (Shellpoint). Because McCauley failed to

present any coherent, let alone cogent, arguments on appeal, he has waived

appellate review of the trial court’s decision. Accordingly, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History [2] Shellpoint filed a complaint to foreclose a mortgage against real estate owned

by McCauley, alleging that McCauley had defaulted on the underlying

promissory note. In response to that complaint, McCauley filed a litany of

documents advancing a series of incoherent assertions commonly made by

acolytes of the “sovereign citizen” movement. 1 For example, in one filing

McCauley wrote that Shellpoint had “received payment as PAY TO THE

ORDER OF NEWREZ LLC on Allonge to Promissory Note from the credit

derived from the Plaintiff’s signature on the Note thus discharging the

mortgage.” Appellant’s Appendix Vol. 3 at 22. This nonsensical claim is a

textbook example of the kind of arguments commonly made by sovereign

1 “Sovereign citizens” are “‘a loosely-formed group of citizens who believe that they are sovereign individuals’ beyond the reach of the courts.” Flowers v. Jugg, 24A-CT-1131, at *1 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. Oct. 4, 2024) (mem.) (quoting Lewis v. State, 532 S.W.3d 423, 430 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016)), trans denied. This Court “and our sister courts have repeatedly rejected such arguments as baseless.” Id.

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citizens in an attempt to “avoid[] mortgage payments by denying the legitimacy

of bank claims based on a variety of pseudo-historical/legal propositions[.]”

Jessica K. Phillips, Not All Pro Se Litigants Are Created Equally: Examining the Need

for New Pro Se Litigant Classifications Through the Lens of the Sovereign Citizen

Movement, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1221, 1225 (2016). [3] Shellpoint moved to strike McCauley’s filings, and McCauley repeatedly

refused to identify himself at the hearing on that motion. When the trial court

asked McCauley what his name was, he replied,

I’m here by special appearance. Upon proof of claim, I will conditionally accept your offer to move forward in this case upon proof that this is a court of record and that this is a land court that has jurisdiction and venue under the constitution to litigate cases on land. 2 I’m an authorized representative and a beneficiary.

Transcript at 5. When the court directly asked McCauley if he was “Derek

Steven McCauley[,]” he answered that he was “the attorney-in-fact” 3 and

“authorized representative.” Id. at 9. The trial court proceeded with the

hearing “under the assumption that [he was] Derek Steven McCauley

2 A common pseudo-argument made by sovereign citizens attempting to challenge a court’s jurisdiction is that the court only has authority to hear cases under “maritime or admiralty law[.]” Marissa Bryan, Sovereign Citizens: A Response in Absence of Direction, 17 CHARLESTON L. REV. 247, 256 (2022). 3 It is also common for sovereign citizens to purport to have given themselves “power of attorney—over themselves—and subsequently declare[] [that they are] ‘sovereign’ and exempt from all laws.” Julia Melle, Illogical Extremes: The Sovereign Citizens Movement and the First Amendment, 22 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 554 (2013).

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appearing pro se” and ultimately granted Shellpoint’s motion to strike. Id. at

24. [4] Shellpoint later filed a motion for summary judgment and a motion for default

judgment. In support of the motion for summary judgment, Shellpoint

designated, among other things, a Shellpoint employee’s affidavit which

affirmed that Shellpoint was the holder of a promissory note secured by a

mortgage against McCauley’s property and that McCauley had defaulted on the

note. McCauley did not respond to that motion or designate any evidence in

opposition to it in accordance with Trial Rule 56(C). [5] At the hearing on the motions for summary judgment and default judgment,

McCauley again repeatedly refused to identify himself and merely declared that

he was “the implied surety and the subrogee for Derek McCauley.” Id. at 48.

As it had done previously, the trial court proceeded with the hearing, reasoning

that McCauley had either failed to appear or was handling the hearing pro se,

and heard argument from Shellpoint. When the court asked McCauley for his

response, he declared, in part:

If it’s implied that I am the surety, then I’m a subrogee and you [are] a subrogor. Since equity sees me as the beneficiary and sees you as the trustee, now you have the duty to transfer the collateral securities to me, the beneficiary, and bring the account balance to zero constituting merger and settlement.

Id. at 53. The court aptly observed that “it [was] unclear . . . what relief [was]

being requested by” McCauley, determined that McCauley had failed to

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properly respond to Shellpoint’s motion for summary judgment, and indicated

that it would grant both the motion for summary judgment and the motion for

default judgment. Id. at 54. [6] After the hearing, the trial court entered judgment in Shellpoint’s favor,

foreclosing Shellpoint’s mortgage against McCauley’s property. Over a month

later, McCauley filed a motion asking the court to vacate the judgment, which

the court denied. McCauley now appeals.

Discussion and Decision [7] Though McCauley proceeds in this appeal pro se, we hold such litigants to the

same standard as trained counsel and require them to follow procedural rules.

Martin v. Hunt, 130 N.E.3d 135, 136 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). Moreover, this

Court has repeatedly recognized that it “will not become an advocate for a

party, or address arguments that are . . . too poorly developed or expressed to

be understood.” Spainhower v. Smart & Kessler, LLC, 176 N.E.3d 258, 263 (Ind.

Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 984 (Ind. Ct. App.

2016), reh’g denied), reh’g denied, trans. denied. A party—even one proceeding pro

se—may waive appellate review when they “fail[] to present cogent argument

on appeal.” Basic, 58 N.E.3d 984. [8] McCauley’s appellate brief fails to present any coherent, let alone cogent,

argument as required by the Appellate Rules. See Ind. Appellate Rule

46(A)(8)(a) (providing that an appellant’s “argument must contain the

contentions of the appellant on the issues presented, supported by cogent

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reasoning”). Instead, McCauley’s brief repeats many of the same sovereign

citizen pseudo-arguments made to the trial court. We take the approach

modeled by the Seventh Circuit when addressing similar arguments and

summarily reject them as having no basis in law or fact. See U.S. v. Benabe, 654

F.3d 753, 767 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Regardless of an individual’s claimed status of

descent, be it as a ‘sovereign citizen,’ a ‘secured-party creditor,’ or a ‘flesh-and-

blood human being,’ that person is not beyond the jurisdiction of the courts.

These theories should be rejected summarily, however they are presented.”),

reh’g denied, cert. denied. [9] In short, by failing to present any cogent argument based in law or fact,

McCauley has waived appellate review of the trial court’s decision.

Conclusion [10] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

[11] Affirmed.

Bradford, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.

APPELLANT PRO SE Derek Steven McCauley Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Shannon O’Connell Egan Nathan H. Blaske Dinsmore & Shohl LLP Cincinnati, Ohio

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