Najee M. Lundy v. Patrol Officer Rodriguez, Burlington Township Police Department

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY CAMDEN VICINAGE HONORABLE KAREN M. WILLIAMS NAJEE M. LUNDY, Plaintiff, Civil Action v. No. 25-2151 (SMW-SAK) PATROL OFFICER RODRIGUEZ, BURLINGTON TOWNSHIP POLICE MEMORANDUM OPINION DEPARTMENT, AND ORDER Defendants. THIS MATTER comes before the Court by way of Defendants Patrol Officer Rodriguez, (“Officer Rodriguez”) and the Burlington Township Police Department’s (“BTPD,” collectively with Rodriguez, “Defendants”) unopposed Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 6) pro se Plaintiff Natee M. Lundy’s (“Plaintiff’?) Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). WHEREAS, Plaintiff's Complaint’ alleges that while driving his motor vehicle in Burlington Township, Officer Rodriguez of the BTPD “stopped his private mode of conveyance without reasonable, articulable suspicion or probable cause.” (Compl., Dkt. No. 1 at 4}; and WHEREAS, Piaintiff further alleges that, without justification, Officer Rodriguez shattered his driver’s side window, broke his driver’s side door, and caused significant property damage (7d.); and For purposes of this motion, the Court accepts the factual allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint as true and draws all inferences in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, See Phillips vy. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 232 (3d Cir, WHEREAS, Plaintiff alleges that Officer Rodriguez and unidentified “assisting officers” used excessive force to remove him from his vehicle and that the BTPD failed to train and supervise its officers (id.); and WHEREAS, Plaintiff claims that Officer Rodriguez and other officers violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , and the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Ud.) Plaintiff also asserts claims for failure to train and/or supervise and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress (/d.); and WHEREAS, a complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations” (o survive a motion to dismiss, but must contain “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmedme accusation,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), A complaint “that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do,’” and a complaint will not “suffice” if it provides only “naked assertion[s}’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.” fd. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” fd. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” □□□ (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556), A complaint that provides facts “merely consistent with” the defendant’s liability “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility” and will not survive review under Rule 12(b)(6). □□□ (quoting Twombly, 555 U.S. at 557); and WHEREAS, to establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 a plaintiff must first show the defendant’s conduct deprived them of their “rights, prtvileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Pertit vy. New Jersey, No. 09-3735, 2011 WL 1325614 , at *4 (D.N.J. Mar. 30, 2011). A plaintiff must “identify the exact contours of the underlying right said to have been violated,” Downey v. The Coalition Against Rape and Abuse, Inc., 143 F, Supp. 2d 423, 437 (D.N.J. 2001); and WHEREAS, “‘[iJn Section 1983 actions, police departments cannot be sued in conjunction with municipalities, because the police department is merely an administrative arm of the local municipality, and is not a separate judicial entity.” Padilla v. Twp. of Cherry Hill, 110 App’x 272, 278 (3d Cir. 2004); and WHEREAS, a municipality may be liable under § 1983 “if the plaintiff identifies a municipal ‘policy’ or ‘custom’ that was the ‘moving force’ behind the injury.” Jewell ». Ridley Township, 497 F. App’x 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Monell vy. Dept of Soc. Serv of NYC, 463 U.S. 658 , 694 (1978)). A complaint against a municipality cannot simply assert an entitlement - to relief, it must identify a custom or policy and link that custom or policy to the facts contained in the complaint. McTernan v. City of York, 564 F. 3d 636 , 658 Gd. Cir. 2009); and WHEREAS, to state a claim against the Township under Monell, Plaintiff must allege that it had a “policy or custom” which served as the “proximate cause of the injuries suffered.” G.S. v, Penn-Trafford Sch. Dist., 813 Fed, App’x 799, 803 (3d Cir, 2020) (quoting Bielevicz vy. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845 , 850 (3d Cir. 1990)). An official policy is made when a “decisionmaker possess[ing] final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action issues an official proclamation, policy, or edict.” Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469 , 1480 (3d Cir. 1990); and WHEREAS, Plaintiffs’ Complaint fails to assert any fact that suggests an unconstitutional municipal policy, practice, or custom of Burlington Township, (See generally Compl.) Plaintiff's Complaint does not allege any policy of the Township regarding traffic stops or the use of force that caused a violation of his constitutional rights. Plaintiff’s Complaint likewise fails to assert that a Township custom existed regarding traffic stops and the use of force that caused a violation of his constitutional rights (Gd.); and WHEREAS, the Supreme Court has held that the failure to train “serve]s| as [a] basis for § 1983 liability only where [it] .. . amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). A plaintiff sufficiently pleads deliberate indifference by showing that ‘(1) municipal policymakers know that employees will confront a particular situation[,] (2) the situation involves a difficult choice or a history of employees mishandling[,] and (3) the wrong choice by an employee will frequently cause deprivation of constitutional rights.” Doe vy Luzerne County, 660 F.3d 169 , 180 Gd Cir, 2011) Gnternal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Carter v. City of Philadelphia, 181 F.3d 339, 357 (3d Cir, 1999)); and WHEREAS, here, the Court finds that Plaintiff's Complaint does not sufficiently plead the elements of deliberate indifference; and THE COURT NO'TING that Plaintiff's Complaint asserts a § 1983 cause of action against the BTPD-—-not Burlington Township—for alleged failure to train and supervise Officer Rodriguez (Compl., Dkt. No. 1 at 4); see Padilla, 110 F. App’x at 278; CONSEQUENTLY, Plaintiff’s Monel/ claim is dismissed for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff will be afforded an opportunity to amend his Complaint to correct the deficiencies identified herein; and WHEREAS, Plaintiff alleges a violation of his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment (Compl., Dkt. No. 1 at 3); and WHEREAS, the Fifth Amendment applies only to violations of constitutional rights by the United States or federal actors, and not to state actors. See, e.g., Bergdoll v. City of York, 515 F. App’x 165 , 170 Gd Cir. 2013) (“Bergdoll's Fifth Amendment claim fails because the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment only applies to federal officials, and [defendant] is a state official.”); Caldwell v. Beard, 324 F. App’x 186, 189 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[T]he due process clause under the Fifth Amendment only protects against federal governmental action and does not limit the actions of state officials.”); and WHEREAS, all of the Defendants identified in Plaintiff’s Complaint are state actors; CONSEQUENTLY, the Court finds that Plaintiffs Complaint fails to state a claim for violation of the Fifth Amendment with respect to Defendants. Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment claims against Defendants with prejudice; and WHEREAS, excessive force claims arising in the context of an arrest or investigatory stop are properly characterized as invoking the protections of the Fourth Amendment, which guarantees citizens the right “to be secure in their persons .. . against unreasonable .. . seizures” of the person. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989). “[B]Jecause the Fourth Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against this sort of physically intrusive governmental conduct, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of ‘substantive due process,’ must be the guide for analyzing these claims.” /d. at 395; CONSEQUENTLY, the Court finds that Plamtiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claims must be dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiff will be granted leave to amend his Complaint to assert a cause of action for violation of the Fourth, rather than Fourteenth, Amendment based on the alleged use of excessive force. For ali the foregoing reasons, and for good cause shown; ITIS thie? tay of January, 2026, hereby: ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 6) is GRANTED; and further ORDERED that Plaintiff's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment claims are DISMISSED with prejudice; and further ORDERED that Plaintiff's § 1983 claim against the BTPD is DISMISSED with prejudice; and further ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Monell claim is DISMISSED without prejudice; and ORDERED that Plaintiff is granted leave to amend his Complaint to correct the deficiencies identified herein by no later than February 20, 2026. Plaintiff is cautioned that if he fails to timely file an Amended Complaint, the Court may deem Plaintiff to have abandoned his claims and dismiss this action with prejudice. Hes M.WILLIAMS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE