Juan Moreno v. Kilolo Kijakazi

— 1 — — 2 — — 3 — 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA — 6 — 7 JUAN MORENO, Case No. 23-cv-04263-HSG 8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES 9 v. Re: Dkt. No. 16 10 KILOLO KIJAKAZI, 11 Defendant. — 12 — 13 After Plaintiff Juan Moreno brought this action for review of the Commissioner of Social 14 Security’s decision to deny benefits, the Court remanded the case, and after further proceedings, 15 the Commissioner issued a favorable decision. Plaintiff’s attorney, Katherine Siegfried, now 16 seeks $12,688.25 in attorney fees under section 206(b) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 17 406(b). ECF No. 16. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the motion. 18 I. BACKGROUND 19 After receiving disability benefits since 2019, Mr. Moreno was determined to be no longer 20 disabled as of April 2021 and, therefore, no longer entitled to disability benefits. Administrative 21 Record (“AR”) 167-168. This determination was upheld on reconsideration, after an initial 22 administrative hearing, and before the Appeals Council. AR 1. Mr. Moreno then brought this 23 action for judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g). ECF No. 1. This Court granted the 24 parties’ stipulation to a remand for further administrative proceedings. ECF No. 12. The Court 25 subsequently granted the parties’ stipulation for attorney fees under the Equal Access to Justice 26 Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412 , in the amount of $7,436. ECF No. 15. 27 On remand, the Commissioner granted Plaintiff’s application and awarded $50,753 in past1 contingency fee agreement, Plaintiff agreed to pay counsel up to 25% of any past-due benefits 2 resulting from a favorable disability decision. ECF No. 16, Ex. 4. 3 In the Notice of Award, Plaintiff was informed that 25% of the past-due disability benefits 4 amounted to $12,688.25 (excluding the benefits due to him for his child) and that this amount was 5 set aside to pay his attorney fees. ECF No. 16, Ex. 3. 6 II. LEGAL STANDARD 7 Attorneys handling Social Security proceedings may seek fees for their work under both 8 the EAJA and the Social Security Act. While the government pays an award pursuant to the 9 EAJA, an award under the Social Security Act is paid out of a successful claimant’s past-due 10 benefits. See 42 U.S.C. § 406 (b)(1)(A); Russell v. Sullivan, 930 F.2d 1443, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991), 11 abrogated on other grounds by Sorensen v. Mink, 239 F.3d 1140 , 1149 (9th Cir. 2001). Section 12 406(b)(1) provides that a federal court that “renders a judgment favorable to a claimant . . . who 13 was represented before the court by an attorney” may grant the attorney “a reasonable fee for such 14 representation, not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to which the 15 claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment.” In passing § 406, Congress sought to protect 16 attorneys from the nonpayment of fees, while also shielding clients from unfairly large fees. See 17 Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 805 (2002). 18 The Supreme Court in Gisbrecht explained that § 406(b) is meant “to control, not to 19 displace, [contingency] fee agreements between Social Security benefits claimants and their 20 counsel.” 535 U.S. at 793 . Even if a fee request under § 406(b) is within the 25 percent statutory 21 limit, the attorney bears the burden of showing that the fee sought is reasonable, and the court is 22 responsible for serving as an “independent check” to ensure the reasonableness of the fee. Id. at 23 807. Following Gisbrecht, the Ninth Circuit has instructed that a § 406(b) fee request should be 24 assessed by “looking first to the contingent-fee agreement, then testing it for reasonableness.” 25 Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (quoting Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 26 808). The court should consider “the character of the representation and the results the 27 representative achieved,” and determine “whether the amount [of fees specified in the contingency 1 that are not in proportion to the time spent on the case.” Id. at 1151. The reasonableness 2 determination is not governed by the lodestar method, because “[t]he lodestar method under3 compensates attorneys for the risk they assume in representing [social security] claimants and 4 ordinarily produces remarkably smaller fees than would be produced by starting with the 5 contingent-fee agreement.” Id. at 1149. 6 III. DISCUSSION 7 The Court finds counsel has met her burden to demonstrate that the requested fees are 8 reasonable. As noted above, Plaintiff entered into a contingent fee agreement providing for a 25% 9 fee, which is consistent with the statutory cap. There is no evidence that Siegfried’s performance 10 was substandard: to the contrary, counsel’s representation resulted in Plaintiff receiving $53,741 11 in past-due benefits for himself and his child. See Matos v. Saul, 2021 WL 1405467 , at *2 (N.D. 12 Cal. Apr. 14, 2021) (awarding 25% under contingent fee agreement where plaintiff received 13 $109,899.60 in benefits upon remand); Khlopoff v. Saul, 2020 WL 7043878 , at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 14 1, 2020) (awarding 25% under contingent fee agreement where plaintiff received $73,209.00 in 15 benefits upon remand). 16 Plaintiff’s counsel states her non-contingency based hourly rate for appellate cases (not 17 related to Social Security) is currently $500 per hour. ECF No. 16, Ex. 1. She also states she 18 spent 30.6 hours working on this case, leading to an effective hourly rate of $415 per hour. As the 19 Ninth Circuit has observed, “lawyers are not likely to spend unnecessary time on contingency fee 20 cases in the hope of inflating their fees” because “[t]he payoff is too uncertain.” Moreno v. City of 21 Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1112 (9th Cir. 2008). “As a result, courts should generally defer to 22 the ‘winning lawyer’s professional judgment as to how much time he was required to spend on the 23 case.’” Costa v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 690 F.3d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting 24 Moreno, 534 F.3d at 1112 ); see also Hearn v. Barnhart, 262 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1037 (N.D. Cal. 25 2003) (“The courts recognize that basing a reasonableness determination on a simple hourly rate 26 basis is inappropriate when an attorney is working pursuant to a reasonable contingency contract 27 for which there runs a substantial risk of loss.”). As such, the requested fee is reasonable because 1 $519, $875, and $902); McCullough v. Berryhill, 2018 WL 6002324 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2018) 2 || (approving effectively hourly rate of $874.72); Harrell v. Berryhill, 2018 WL 4616735 , at *4 3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2018) (finding de facto hourly rate of $1,213 reasonable under Gisbrecht); 4 || Lopez v. Colvin, 2017 WL 168060 , at * 2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2017) (approving effective hourly 5 || rate of $1,131); Palos v. Colvin, 2016 WL 5110243 , at * 2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2016) (approving 6 effective hourly rate of $1,546.39). The Court therefore finds the requested fees are reasonable. 7 Once the Court determines that the fee sought under § 406(b) is reasonable, it must 8 || account for the attorney’s fees paid by the Commissioner under the EAJA. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 9 || 796. “Congress harmonized fees payable by the Government under EAJA with fees payable under 10 § 406(b) out of the claimant’s past-due Social Security benefits” by requiring the claimant’s 11 attorney to refund to the claimant the amount of the smaller fee up to the point where the claimant 12 receives 100% of the past-due benefits. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796 . Here, the Court finds 5 13 counsel’s § 406(b) request reasonable, and therefore counsel shall refund to Plaintiff the $7,436 in 14 || EAJA fees previously awarded. See Khlopoff, 2020 WL 7043878 , at *2 (finding § 406(b) request 3 15 reasonable and directing counsel to refund to client fees previously awarded under the EAJA). 16 || Iv. CONCLUSION 3 17 The Court GRANTS counsel’s motion for attorney’s fees. The Commissioner is directed 18 to certify fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406 (b) in the amount of $12,688.25, payable to Katherine 19 Siegfried. The Court ORDERS the award of attorney fees pursuant to 406(b) to be paid out of 20 || Plaintiffs past-due benefits in accordance with agency policy, to the extent that such past-due 21 benefits are available and not used to pay an attorney fee under 406(a). Counsel is ORDERED to 22 || reimburse Plaintiff the $7,436.00 in EAJA fees to offset the payment of 406(b) fees. 23 IT IS SO ORDERED. 94 Dated: 1/13/2026 25 Appel 8 Nhl). HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR. 26 United States District Judge — 27 — — 28 —