Dept. of Human Services v. J. G. O.

368 February 19, 2026 No. 130

This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON In the Matter of J. J. A. D., a Child. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Petitioner-Respondent, v. J. G. O., Appellant. Douglas County Circuit Court 25JU02033; A188331 (Control) In the Matter of M. A. D., a Child. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Petitioner-Respondent, v. J. G. O., Appellant. Douglas County Circuit Court 25JU02032; A188330

Ann Marie Simmons, Judge. Submitted January 22, 2026. George W. Kelly filed the brief for appellant. Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Deputy Attorney General, and Shannon T. Reel, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent. Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, Egan, Judge, and Jacquot, Judge. TOOKEY, P. J. Affirmed.

Nonprecedential Memo Op: 347 Or App 368 (2026) 369

TOOKEY, P. J. In this consolidated juvenile dependency case, father appeals judgments of the juvenile court asserting jurisdiction over his two-year-old twin children, J and M, pursuant to ORS 419B.100(1)(c). Father, J, and M are mem- bers of the Cow Creek Band of Umpqua Tribe of Indians, which makes the case subject to the provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 USC §§ 1901-1963, and the Oregon Indian Child Welfare Act (ORICWA), Or Laws 2020, ch. 14, §§ 1 - 66 (Spec Sess 1) (codifying new provisions at ORS chapter 419B.600 to 419B.665 and amending portions of ORS chapters 350, 418, 419A, and 419B). The juvenile court determined that mother and father’s substance abuse and their codependent, volatile relationship placed J and M at risk of serious loss or injury. Father raises three assignments of error: that the juvenile court erred in determining that “the parties’ substance use endangers the children”; “that neither parent can protect the children from the other parent’s substance use”; and “that the parties’ volatile relationship endangers the chil- dren.”1 For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the juvenile court. Father has not requested that we review de novo, and we decline to exercise our discretion to do so.2 Because this case is subject to ICWA and ORICWA, we therefore view the evidence in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s disposition and assess whether, when so viewed, the totality of the evidence in the record was legally sufficient to permit any rational juvenile court to determine that clear and convincing evidence supported the court’s determina- tions. Dept. of Human Services v. A. R. E., 340 Or App 73, 76, 571 P3d 211 (2025). 1 Also decided today is Dept. of Human Services v. C. D., 347 Or App 362 (2026) (nonprecedential memorandum decision), in which we address mother’s appeal of judgments asserting jurisdiction over the same two children. 2 See ORS 19.415(3)(b) (“Upon an appeal in an equitable action or proceeding other than an appeal from a judgment in a proceeding for the termination of parental rights, the Court of Appeals, acting in its sole discretion, may try the cause anew upon the record or make one or more factual findings anew upon the record.”); ORAP 5.40(8)(c) (providing for the exercise of that discretion only in “exceptional cases”); ORAP 5.40(8)(d) (identifying nonexclusive considerations that may be relevant to our decision whether to exercise de novo review).

370 Dept. of Human Services v. J. G. O.

“To establish jurisdiction, [ODHS] must present evi- dence sufficient to support a conclusion that the child’s con- dition or circumstances expose the child to a current threat of serious loss or injury that is likely to be realized.” Dept. of Human Services v. J. H., 292 Or App 733, 738, 425 P3d 791 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). “DHS must establish the type, degree, and duration, of the harm at issue and a nexus between the allegedly risk-causing conduct and the harm to the child.” Id. (internal quotation marks omit- ted). “The risk of harm must be nonspeculative; that is, there must be a reasonable likelihood that the threat will be real- ized.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “A parent’s sub- stance abuse alone is not sufficient to assert jurisdiction[.]” Id. at 740. “DHS must prove that the parent is abusing drugs or alcohol, or exposing a child to drugs or alcohol, in a way that puts the child at risk of serious harm.” Dept. of Human Services v. J. J. B., Jr., 291 Or App 226, 236, 418 P3d 56 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[W]e must evalu- ate whether the allegations in the petition are collectively suf- ficient, if proven, to establish jurisdiction,” Dept. of Human Services v. M. E., 255 Or App 296, 313, 297 P3d 17 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis in original). On this record, we agree with the determinations of the juvenile court. The juvenile court determined that father and mother’s “lack of supervision definitely has a nexus to [their] use of drugs.” Father’s testimony that his drug use “affect[s]” his “attention” with J and M supports that con- clusion. The juvenile court permissibly inferred that inat- tentiveness was a causal factor in J ingesting brake fluid, and mother admitted she had used methamphetamine that morning. The evidence in the record also shows that J and M were born prematurely at 27 weeks gestation, and drug affected, which caused them to need speech therapy and made them more susceptible to breathing problems. All of these facts, collectively, were sufficient to show that parents’ drug use put J and M at a nonspeculative, reasonable likeli- hood of harm. See Id. The juvenile court determined that father and mother “have had an ongoing substance abuse problem,” and “both [parents] have engaged in some behaviors that

Nonprecedential Memo Op: 347 Or App 368 (2026) 371

suggest that [they] continue to this day to struggle with sus- tained sobriety.” The juvenile court determined that both parents minimized how their substance use affects them- selves and the other parent which would prevent the par- ents from identifying problems that arise out of the use of substances. The record evidence shows that mother and father’s volatile relationship has placed the children at significant risk of serious injury. Mother and father have acknowledged that the other parent is a trigger for their own substance abuse. Mother and father also acknowledge that their fight- ing is worse when they are using drugs. Mother admit- ted that she had used methamphetamines the day that J ingested brake fluid and that she was upset with father over his marriage.3 Additionally, father is admittedly inatten- tive with J and M when he uses methamphetamine, and although he testified that he did not recall if he used meth- amphetamines the day J ingested brake fluid, the juvenile court determined that inattentiveness was a causal factor in that incident. In one instance, mother took J and M with her to confront father about his relationship with his wife. While mother was inside confronting father and his wife, she left J and M in her vehicle unattended. That evidence supports the juvenile court’s determination that parents’ relationship was a volatile, codependent relationship that endangered the children. Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the evidence was legally sufficient to prove that the bases for dependency jurisdiction exposed J and M to a nonspecula- tive threat of serious loss or injury. Affirmed.

3 Father and mother have lived together since 2019, although father married someone else who is not a party to this appeal in 2024. At the time of the hearing, that marriage had not been dissolved, and there is no record evidence that it ever was dissolved after the hearing. Father’s brief states that for “most purposes, that relationship ended about two weeks after the wedding.” That marriage not- withstanding, father and mother have continued their relationship.