Lamont Jeremiah McCauley, Estate v. Candice L. Broce, Georgia Department of Human Services, and Gwinnett County DCSS

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA LAMONT JEREMIAH MCCAULEY, ) Estate, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) 1:25CV796 ) CANDICE L. BROCE, GEORGIA ) DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN ) SERVICES, and GWINNETT ) COUNTY DCSS, ) ) Defendants. ) ORDER, MEMORANDUM OPINION, AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE This matter is before the Court on pro The Court must dismiss a case filed in se Plaintiff Lamont Jeremiah forma pauperis if it fails to state a McCauley, Estate’s application to claim on which relief may be granted. proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B). To state a Docket Entry 1. For the reasons set claim, “a complaint must contain forth below, the Court will grant the sufficient factual matter, accepted as application for the limited purpose of true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is allowing the Court to consider a plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. recommendation of dismissal. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting and citing Bell Atlantic Corp. I. DISCUSSION v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). That is, a plaintiff must make Lamont Jeremiah McCauley, Estate factual allegations that are “enough to (“the Estate”) alleges that the raise a right to relief above the defendants violated the Fifth and speculative level.” See Bell Atlantic Tenth Amendments of the United Corp., 550 U.S. at 555 (citation States Constitution, the 1946 modified). “Thus, while a plaintiff Administrative Procedures Act, and does not need to demonstrate in a the Uniform Commercial Code. See complaint that the right to relief is generally Compl., Docket Entry 2. ‘probable,’ the complaint must advance the plaintiff’s claim ‘across the line from conceivable to defendant.” Public Law 79-404 is the plausible.’” Walters v. McMahen, 684 Administrative Procedure Act. F.3d 435, 439 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Indeed, “[a] person suffering legal Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 ). The wrong because of agency action . . . is Court “accepts all well-pled facts as entitled to judicial review” of that true and construes these facts in the action. 5 U.S.C. § 702 ; see also Corner light most favorable to the plaintiff, Post, Inc. v. Bd. of Govs. of Fed. but does not consider legal Reserve Sys., 603 U.S. 799 , 808 conclusions, elements of a cause of (2024) (“Section 702 authorizes action, and bare assertions devoid of persons injured by agency action to factual enhancement[,] . . . obtain judicial review by suing the unwarranted inferences, United States or one of its agencies, unreasonable conclusions, or officers, or employees.”). But arguments.” Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. McCauley has not alleged that any of Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d the defendants is a federal agency, 250, 255 (4th Cir. 2009) (citation officer, or employee. For this reason, modified). A pro se plaintiff’s among others, the Court should complaint must be construed liberally dismiss McCauley’s claim under the in his favor. See Jehovah v. Clarke, Administrative Procedure Act. 798 F.3d 169, 176 (4th Cir. 2015). McCauley appears to allege a The allegations in the Estate’s procedural due process violation Complaint do not plausibly allege any because the defendants “greatly claim against any defendant. ignored” his “request for a lawful account audit or the establishment of First, it is unclear why the Estate is the a court date to resolve any perceived plaintiff because there is a signature debt.” He alleges that he “sent a copy in the name of Lamont Jeremiah of a cease and desist collections order McCauley on the Complaint as the requiring [the defendants] to dismiss plaintiff and specified as the plaintiff’s any and all fraudulently-obtained, authorized representative. Nowhere unsubstantiated and inaccurate in the Complaint is the Estate itself contractual debt obligations of the defined. Because 28 U.S.C. § 1915 LAMONT JEREMIAH MCCAULEY, permits an individual to apply for in estate to their persons.” To the extent forma pauperis status, the Court will that McCauley’s procedural due assume McCauley himself brings process claim is a challenge to any these claims against the defendants. state-court judgment, the RookerFeldman doctrine bars the claim. See McCauley claims that he notified the Reed v. Goertz, 598 U.S. 230 , 234-35 defendants “of the estates’ (2023) (explaining that “the doctrine administrative status and its use of PL prohibits federal courts from 79-404 to resolve any prior or adjudicating cases brought by stateunsubstantiated debts owed to court losing parties challenging statecourt judgments” and citing Rooker v. SunTrust Bank v. Venable, 791 S.E.2d Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) 5, 7 (Ga. 2016) (“It is well established and D.C. Ct. of App. v. Feldman, 460 . . . that the provisions of Article 2 are U.S. 462 (1983)). applicable both to a contract that involves only the sale of goods and a To the extent McCauley brings his contract that contains a blend of sale claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 arguing and non-sale elements if the that the defendants, acting under dominant purpose behind the color of state law, deprived him of his contract reflects a sales transaction.”). procedural due process rights, he McCauley has not alleged any must sufficiently allege that the transaction in goods according to defendants deprived him of a which he was a seller or a purchaser. cognizable liberty or property interest The Court should dismiss McCauley’s and, if so, that “the procedures Uniform Commercial Code claim. followed by the State [to do so] were constitutionally [in]sufficient.” Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216 , 219 (2011). Here, McCauley does not provide facts to support his conclusory allegations that the defendants’ failure to pay heed to his cease-and-desist letters to absolve him of any contractual debt is a constitutional violation. For these reasons, the Court should dismiss McCauley’s due process claim. McCauley also asserts a violation of the Uniform Commercial Code. He does not identify which state’s Uniform Commercial Code or which provision of the Uniform Commercial Code he alleges that the defendants violated. It matters not because “‘[t]he Uniform Commercial Code was designed to apply to transactions between a seller and a purchaser.’” Johnson v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 3d 593 , 600 (W.D.N.C. 2022) (quoting Batiste v. Am. Home Prod. Corp., 231 S.E.2d 269 (N.C. Ct. App. 1977) (referring to North Carolina’s Uniform Commercial Code)); see also II. CONCLUSION of allowing the Court to consider a recommendation of dismissal. It is It is therefore ORDERED. that RECOMMENDED that this case be McCauley’s application to proceed in dismissed under 28 U.S.C. forma pauperis, Docket Entry 1, is § 1915(e)(2)(B) (ii) for failure to state a GRANTED for the limited purpose claim. J i Gibson McFadden United States Magistrate Judge March 2, 2026 Durham, North Carolina