Nancy Alonso v. New Orleans Aviation Board

NANCY ALONSO * NO. 2025-CA-0626

VERSUS * COURT OF APPEAL NEW ORLEANS AVIATION * BOARD FOURTH CIRCUIT * STATE OF LOUISIANA *******

APPEAL FROM CIVIL DISTRICT COURT, ORLEANS PARISH NO. 2025-00583, DIVISION “L-6” Honorable Kern A. Reese ****** Judge Nakisha Ervin-Knott ****** (Court composed of Judge Rosemary Ledet, Judge Dale N. Atkins, Judge Nakisha Ervin-Knott)

Eulis Simien, Jr. SIMIEN & SIMIEN, L.L.C. 7908 Wrenwood Blvd. Baton Rouge, LA 70809

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT

Lawrence G. Pugh, III Alexander J. Brewster PUGH ACCARDO, LLC 1100 Poydras Street, Suite 3600 New Orleans, LA 70163

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE

MOTION TO REMAND GRANTED; VACATED AND REMANDED

March 5, 2026

NEK RML DNA

Appellant, Nancy Alonso, appeals the district court’s July 23, 2025

judgment granting the Appellee’s Motion for Involuntary Dismissal and dismissing

her suit against Appellee without prejudice. During the pendency of this appeal,

the parties filed a Joint Motion to Remand, requesting the matter be remanded and

reconsidered by the district court. For the following reasons, we grant the Joint

Motion to Remand, vacate the district court’s judgment, and remand the case back

to the district court for reconsideration.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case arises from the district court’s granting of the Appellee’s Motion

for Involuntary Dismissal based on Appellant’s failure to pay the required service

fee and effectuate service within ninety days of filing her petition.

Appellant, Nancy Alonso (“Ms. Alonso”), filed her petition for damages

against Appellee, the City of New Orleans by and through the New Orleans

Aviation Board (the “City”), on January 23, 2025. At the conclusion of her

petition, she requested service on the City. However, because Ms. Alonso failed to

remit payment to the Orleans Parish Sheriff’s Office (the “Sheriff’s Office”) to

effectuate service, the Sheriff’s Office did not attempt service.

On May 13, 2025, over three months after the petition had been filed, Ms. Alonso’s counsel contacted the Orleans Clerk of Court’s Office to inquire about service and then learned that the Sheriff’s Office never attempted service due to the nonpayment of the service fee. As soon as Ms. Alonso’s counsel discovered this, her counsel requested that citation and service be reissued, and he remitted payment of the required fee. The City was finally served on May 28, 2025, 125 days after the petition was filed.

The next day, the City filed a Motion for Involuntary Dismissal on the basis that Ms. Alonso failed to properly request service within ninety days of the filing of the petition, as required under La. C.C.P. art. 1201(C), because she did not pay the required service fee when she made the request. Following a hearing on July 11, 2025, the district court granted the City’s motion and dismissed Ms. Alonso’s suit without prejudice. The district court issued its written judgment on July 23, 2025, and this timely devolutive appeal followed.

While this appeal was pending, the parties filed a Joint Motion to Remand, wherein the parties agreed that recent Supreme Court jurisprudence controls the outcome of this appeal. The motion to remand was deferred to the appellate panel, and we now rule as follows.

DISCUSSION

Both parties in their joint motion and appellate briefs direct this Court’s attention to the Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision in DaRouse v. P.J.’s Coffee of New Orleans, LLC, 2025-00078 (La. 10/24/25), 421 So. 3d 885. DaRouse is similar to the present case in that the plaintiff had requested service but failed to timely remit payment of the Sheriff’s Office fees. However, unlike the present case, the district court denied the defendant’s motion for involuntary dismissal, *3 finding that the payment of fees is not required under La. C.C.P. art. 1201(C). In reviewing the language of La. C.C.P. art. 1201(C) on appeal, the Louisiana Supreme Court determined, “A plain reading of the statutory provisions reveals that all that is required for compliance is that service be requested. . . . The pertinent statutory provisions do not provide that payment of any related filing fees and costs must be made within a stipulated time period.” DaRouse, 2025-00078, p. 4, 421 So. 3d at 887-88 (quoting Jenkins v. Larpenter, 2004-0318, pp. 1-2 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/24/05), 906 So. 2d 656, 659 (Guidry, J., dissenting)). Ultimately, the Louisiana Supreme Court upheld the lower court’s judgment and ruled that the payment of fees is not required by La. C.C.P. art. 1201(C). See id. at pp. 6-7, 421 So. 3d at 889-90.

At the time the district court ruled on the City’s Motion for Involuntary Dismissal, the Louisiana Supreme Court had not yet issued its opinion in DaRouse. In light of the Louisiana Supreme Court’s ruling and the parties’ Joint Motion to Remand, we vacate the district court’s July 23, 2025 judgment and remand this case for the district court to reconsider the motion in light of the DaRouse ruling.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we grant the parties Joint Motion to Remand, vacate the district court’s July 23, 2025 judgment granting the City’s Motion for Involuntary Dismissal, and remand this matter back to the district court for reconsideration.

MOTION TO REMAND GRANTED; VACATED AND REMANDED