Brandon Lamont French v. State of Indiana

IN THE

Court of Appeals of Indiana Brandon Lamont French, FILED Appellant-Defendant Mar 11 2026, 9:46 am

CLERK Indiana Supreme Court v. Court of Appeals and Tax Court

State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff

March 11, 2026 Court of Appeals Case No. 25A-CR-1906 Appeal from the Marion Superior Court The Honorable Jennifer Prinz Harrison, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 49D20-2501-F6-846

Opinion by Judge May Judges Weissmann and Felix concur.

May, Judge. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1906 | March 11, 2026 Page 1 of 9 [1] Brandon Lamont French appeals his five convictions of Class A misdemeanor

Invasion of Privacy. 1 The parties raise four issues, but we find one issue

dispositive: whether the State presented sufficient evidence to sustain French’s

convictions. We reverse.

Facts and Procedural History 2 [2] On November 19, 2024, the State charged French with a variety of offenses

under cause number 49D20-2411-F1-033242 (“Cause 33242”), including Level

1 felony rape, 3 Level 3 felony kidnapping, 4 and Level 3 felony criminal

confinement. 5 The alleged victim in Cause 33242 was C.R., who was French’s

girlfriend. In connection with Cause 33242, the trial court entered a no contact

order. The title of the order stated: “NO CONTACT ORDER WHILE IN

JAIL, UPON RELEASE FROM CUSTODY, ON BAIL OR PERSONAL

RECOGNIZANCE[.]” (Ex. Vol. I at 18) (formatting in original). The body of

the order provided:

1 Ind. Code § 35-46-1-15.1(a)(5) (2023). 2 We held oral argument on this case on February 24, 2026, at Vincennes University in Vincennes, Indiana. We commend counsel on the quality of their advocacy, and we thank Vincennes University for its hospitality. 3 Ind. Code § 35-42-4-1(b) (2022). 4 Ind. Code § 35-42-3-2(b)(3) (2019). 5 Ind. Code § 35-42-3-3(b)(3) (2019).

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1. THE DEFENDANT IS ORDERED TO HAVE NO CONTACT WITH:

[C.R. and others], in person, by telephone or letter, through an intermediary, or in any other way, directly or indirectly, except through an attorney of record, while released from custody pending trial. This includes, but is not limited to, acts of harassment, stalking, intimidation, threats, and physical force of any kind.

(Id.) (formatting in original). French did not post bail in Cause 33242, and he

remained incarcerated in the Marion County Jail (“MCJ”) while that case was

pending. [3] French used his jail-provided tablet to exchange electronic messages and

pictures with C.R. In addition, French placed several phone calls to a friend,

who would initiate three-way calls with C.R. During these phone calls, French

talked with C.R. about her statements to the police and the allegations against

him in Cause 33242. He spent large portions of the calls insulting C.R. and

accusing her of lying. He also discussed the consequences for him if he was

found guilty in Cause 33242. When the jail restricted French’s calls, he utilized

the accounts of other inmates to place calls. French also used third parties to

indirectly convey messages to C.R.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1906 | March 11, 2026 Page 3 of 9 [4] On January 9, 2025, the State charged French with three counts of Level 6

felony attempted obstruction of justice 6 and five counts of Class A

misdemeanor invasion of privacy. The State later amended the charges to

include three counts of Level 5 felony attempted obstruction of justice 7 and an

allegation that French was a habitual offender. 8 The trial court held a jury trial

beginning on June 11, 2025, and the jury returned a verdict finding French

guilty of the five counts of Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy and not

guilty of the three counts of Level 6 felony attempted obstruction of justice.

The trial court sentenced French to one year on each count of invasion of

privacy and ordered four of the sentences to be served consecutively for an

aggregate term of four years.

Discussion and Decision [5] French asserts the State presented insufficient evidence to sustain his five

convictions. 9 Our standard of review regarding such claims is well-settled:

6 Ind. Code § 35-44.1-2-2(a)(1)(D) (2023) & Ind. Code § 35-41-5-1 (2014). 7 Ind. Code § 35-44.1-2-2(b) & Ind. Code § 35-41-5-1. 8 Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8. 9 The State contends French is estopped from challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his convictions. The State notes that during French’s closing argument, his counsel stated: Now, I believe in being perfectly candid. Some of them, [C.R.] was on the line, and in listening to the jail calls, to me, it’s pretty apparent that [French] did violate the no contact order. And as I’m standing here right now, I’m telling you that he, in fact, is guilty of Counts II, III, V, VII, and VIII. There are five Counts of Invasion of Privacy. Invasion of Privacy is the offense that’s charged if somebody violates a no contact order or a protective order. And it’s pretty apparent, listening to those jail calls, Brandon did that. He violated those. And I, as his attorney, it appalls me to say it, but it looks like you guys should convict him of those Five Counts.

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Sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims . . . warrant a deferential standard, in which we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility. Rather, we consider only the evidence supporting the judgment and any reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence. We will affirm a conviction if there is substantial evidence of probative value that would lead a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

Powell v. State, 151 N.E.3d 256, 262-63 (Ind. 2020) (internal citations omitted). [6] The State charged French with violating Indiana Code section 35-46-1-

15.1(a)(5). Indiana Code section 35-46-1-15.1(a)(5) states: “A person who

knowingly or intentionally violates . . . a no contact order issued as a condition

of pretrial release, including release on bail or personal recognizance, or pretrial

diversion, and including a no contact order issued under IC 35-33-8-3.6[,]”

which specifies that a no contact order is automatically a condition of bail if a

(Tr. Vol. II at 239.) Therefore, the State argues French cannot now argue the State failed to present sufficient evidence to sustain his convictions. We disagree. French’s counsel couched his statement as his personal opinion of French’s guilt. (See, e.g., Tr. Vol. 2 at 239) (“to me, it’s pretty apparent”) & (“it looks like you guys should”). French did not personally admit guilt after a colloquy ensuring that such an admission was knowing and voluntary. See Davis v. State, 675 N.E.2d 1097, 1102 (Ind. 1996) (“A guilty plea constitutes a waiver of constitutional rights and this waiver requires a trial court to evaluate the validity of every plea before accepting it. For the plea to be valid, the defendant’s decision to plead guilty must be knowing, voluntary and intelligent.”) (internal citation omitted). Nor did the trial court remove the question of French’s guilt on the invasion of privacy counts from the jury. Before sending the jury to deliberate, the trial court instructed the jury that “[s]tatements made by attorneys are not evidence” and “[y]our verdict should be based on the law and the facts as you find them.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 247-48.) See Collins v. State, 366 N.E.2d 229, 232 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977) (noting “‘counsel for the defendant in a criminal case may, in the course of the proceedings, make an admission of fact voluntarily and purposely to avoid the necessity of proving it,’” but “‘[s]uch admission . . . is properly made to the court and a record is made of it as such. Then the court conveys to the jury such admission, through its instructions, and it becomes a judicial admission.’”) (quoting State v. Thomas, 15 P.2d 723, 725-26 (Kan. 1932)). Therefore, we hold that French’s counsel’s comments do not estop French from challenging the sufficiency of the evidence the State presented to sustain his conviction.

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defendant is charged with a violent crime that resulted in a bodily injury and

the defendant is released from custody without a bail hearing. [7] French contends that, although the State charged him with violating the no

contact order entered in Cause 33242 by calling C.R. from jail, “the no contact

order, by its explicit terms, only prohibited French from contacting C.R. ‘while

released from custody pending trial.’” (Appellant’s Br. at 27) (quoting Ex. Vol.

1 at 18). Because all his alleged contact with C.R. occurred while he was in the

MCJ, French argues, the State failed to prove he violated the no contact order.

We recently found French’s argument persuasive in another case that also

originated in Marion County. [8] In Cruz v. State, we reversed Cruz’s conviction of Class A misdemeanor

invasion of privacy because Cruz contacted his son while incarcerated but the

no contact order in effect at the time prohibited Cruz from contacting his son

only when released from custody. Cruz v. State, 25A-CR-1308, 2025 WL

3764745 at *4 (Ind. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2025) (mem.). 10 The no contact order

entered against Cruz used substantially the same language as the no contact

order entered in Cause 33242. It stated:

[A]s a condition of the Defendant’s release from custody pending trial[,] . . . the Defendant is ordered to have no contact with . . . [Cruz’s son] . . ., in person, by telephone or letter, through an

10 While Cruz is an unpublished, memorandum decision, we may consider it for its persuasive value because it was issued after January 1, 2023. See Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D) (“a memorandum decision issued on or after January 1, 2023, may be cited for persuasive value to any court by any litigant”).

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intermediary, or in any other way, directly or indirectly, except through an attorney of record, while released from custody pending trial.

Id. (emphasis and all but third pair of brackets in Cruz). We explained that even

though Cruz had spoken with his son in at least a dozen calls from jail, “Cruz

was not ‘released from custody’ when any of those contacts occurred.

Therefore, the contacts did not violate the express terms of the order.” Id.

(internal citation omitted). While the no contact order in Cruz, like the no

contact order entered in Cause 33242, was entitled “No Contact Order While in

Jail Upon Release From Custody on Bail or Personal Recognizance,” id. (italics

in Cruz), we noted that “the substance of the order, not its caption, is

controlling.” Id. (citing Hunter v. State, 60 N.E.3d 284, 288 (Ind. Ct. App.

2016) (holding document constituted a plea agreement even though it was titled

“Recommendation of Plea”), trans. denied). [9] The State notes that Indiana Code section 35-33-8-3.2(a)(4) allows a trial court

to “require the defendant to refrain from any direct or indirect contact with an

individual . . . including if the defendant has not been released from lawful

detention.” Thus, the trial court in Cause 33242 could have ordered French not

to have contact with C.R. while in custody, and Indiana Code section 35-46-1-

15.1(a)(11) provides that a person who knowingly violates an order issued

under Indiana Code section 35-33-8-3.2 commits Class A misdemeanor

invasion of privacy. However, the no contact order issued in Cause 33242 did

not include the language prohibiting French from contacting C.R. while in

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custody, and we therefore hold the State presented insufficient evidence to

sustain his convictions. 11 See, e.g., McNary v. State, 269 N.E.3d 1245, 1252 (Ind.

Ct. App. 2025) (reversing convictions because the State failed to present

sufficient evidence), trans. denied.

Conclusion [10] The State presented insufficient evidence to sustain French’s convictions for

invasion of privacy because even though French contacted C.R. several times

while incarcerated, the no contact order the State alleged he violated only

prohibited him from contacting C.R. while released from custody pending trial.

We reverse and vacate French’s convictions. [11] Reversed.

Weissmann, J., and Felix, J., concur.

11 This opinion has no effect on the proceedings in Cause 33242.

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ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Peter Laramore Marion County Public Defender Agency Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

Kathy Bradley Steven Hosler Deputy Attorneys General Indianapolis, Indiana

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