Legal Sense, Done With The Intent To Commit a Crime.'" State v. Smith, 119 Tenn. 521

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE FILED JANUARY 1998 SESSION March 25, 1998 Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appe llate Court C lerk NELSON B. GRAVES, ) ) Appellant, ) No. 01C01-9705-CR-00171 ) ) Johnson County v. ) ) Honorable Lynn W. Brown, Judge ) HOWARD CARLTON, WARDEN,) (Habeas Corpus) and STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) ) Appellees. ) CONCURRING OPINION I concur in the results and most of the reasoning in the majority opinion. I would hold, though, that the indictments sufficiently contain any necessary mens rea by allegations that the offenses were “feloniously” committed. Historically, the word “feloniously” has meant “[p]roceeding from an evil heart or purpose; done with a deliberate intention of committing a crime.” Black’s Law Dictionary 617 (6th ed. 1990). As our supreme court has previously noted, “one meaning attached to the word is: ‘In a legal sense, done with the intent to commit a crime.’” State v. Smith, 119 Tenn. 521, 526 , 105 S.W. 68 , 70 (1907). Thus, I believe that the indictments include any required mens rea. ____________________________ Joseph M. Tipton, Judge