Arciniega v. Freeman

404 U.S. 4 · Supreme Court of the United States · Oct 26, 1971

Full text

Arciniega v. Freeman, U. S. Marshal

Per Curiam. Petitioner’s parole was revoked by the Federal Parole Board because of association with other ex-convicts. In a petition for habeas corpus, petitioner contended that the record did not disclose any evidence in support of this conclusion. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit sustained the revocation on the sole ground that petitioner worked at a restaurant-nightclub that employed other ex-convicts. 439 F. 2d 776. The Parole Board has wide authority to set conditions, 18 U. S. C. § 4203 (a), and here petitioner was forbidden to “associate” with other ex-convicts. But the Board’s own regulations require “satisfactory evidence” of a parole violation to justify an arrest warrant. 28 CFR § 2.35. We do not believe that the parole condition restricting association was intended to apply to incidental contacts between ex-convicts in the course of work on a legitimate job for a common employer. Nor is such occupational association, standing alone, satisfactory evidence of non-business association violative of the parole restriction. To so assume would be to render a parolee vulnerable to imprisonment whenever his employer, willing to hire .ex-convicts, hires more than one. Absent a clear Parole 'Board directive to this effect, we cannot sustain the *5 judgment of the Court of Appeals that on-the-job contact with fellow employees with police records is sufficient evidence of parole violation. If there is in this record other evidence of forbidden association or evidence of other parole violations, neither the Court of Appeals nor the United States has identified it. The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted, the petition for a writ of certiorari is granted, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed.

Parentheticals

holding that pro se complaints “hovvever inartfully pleaded,” are held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers”
Riley v. United States
holding that defendant’s meetings with convicted felons were "more than 'incidental contacts’ ”
United States v. Lovelace
holding a parole condition restricting association with persons with criminal record was not intended to apply to incidental contacts between ex-convicts while working on a legitimate job for a common employer
State v. Allen
requiring that allegations contained in a pro se complaint be held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers"
Butts v. United States
interpreting supervised release condition prohibiting unsupervised contact with minors to exclude “casual or unavoidable contact with minors in public places”
Does v. Cooper
rejecting a nearly identical argument because “it is well established that associational conditions do not extend to casual or chance meetings.”
United States v. Bergendahl
rejecting a vagueness challenge to the same communication condition at issue here
United States v. Bryant
“association” in parole condition did not extend to “incidental contacts” on a legitimate job for a common employer
United States v. Salvatore Albanese
“association” in parole condition did not extend to “inciden tal contacts” on a legitimate job for a common employer
United States v. Bonanno
“Courts routinely hold that a probation or parole condition proscribing associating with a person or group refers to planned, prolonged contact as distinguished from chance or casual meetings.”
United States v. King
conditions of probation are proper so long as they are not illegal, unrelated to rehabilitative purpose, or impossible to perform
(1997)
“We do not believe that the parole condition restricting association was intended to apply to incidental contacts between ex-convicts in the course of work on a legitimate job for a common employer.”
Progeny v. Wichita, Kansas, City of