Robberson v. Board of County Commissioners

BLACKBIRD, Justice. The action, out of which this appeal arose, was instituted by plaintiffs in error, as plaintiffs, against defendants in error, as defendants; and our subsequent refer"ence to said litigants will be -by their trial court designations. .The controversy between the parties revolves around the defendant Board’s Resolution No. 376 amending Oklahoma County zoning regulations by changing the zoning of an area, in which'the defendant C. A. Henderson’s tract of land is located, frota “Á-2 General Agricultural” to “1-3 Heavy Industry.” Said amendment has the effect of allowing usé of said tract as a “sanitary land fill” operated" by Henderson and his ^defendants, 'Lonnie and Henry Payne. As owners of land comprising at least 20 per cent of the “frontage” within a thousand' feet to the right, and left, and directly opposite the “frontage” involved, plaintiffs, according to the allegations of their petition, protested such re-zoning, but,- notwithstanding this, the resolution was purportedly passed by twcr of the three members of the ‘defendant Board Voting for it, while the third member voted against it. After alleging these principal facts, plaintiffs’ petition asserted that said resolution was void and ineffective because it had not been passed - by “the -favorable vote' of all members” of the defendant •board, as they alleged'Tit. 19, O.S.1951 § 865.16 requires. ' ‘ " One ground of the demurrer, by’ which defendants asserted the insufficiency of plaintiffs’ petition to state a cause of action, was that under this Court’s recent decision in Fletcher v. Board of County Com’rs, Okl., 285 P.2d 183, the favorable vote of only a majority of the members' of such a board is sufficient for effective passage of such‘ a resolution. In herein urging error of. the trial court iii sustaining' defendants’ position, plaintiffs concede that, in the cited case, this court so interpreted the cited statute, but they urge us to reconsider that opinion and overrule it as incorrect. The only authority they cite, as directly supporting their position, is an opinion by the St. Louis Court of Appeals in the case of State ex rel. Town of Olivette v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 280 S.W.2d 134, 137. That case held that a body, known in Missouri as a County *786 Council, • could not, by motion, grant the telephone and telegraph company a special permit to operate a radio relay tower on certain described land, but- that, under the laws of Missouri then in effect, this could only be done by ordinance. The particular statement of said opinion, on which plaintiffs rely, was made in connection with that court’s discussion of the powers of a Missouri County Court when acting as a board of adjustment, as follows: ■ “All it -could do in relation to changing the use fixed by an adopted zoning order was to amend the order as provided by S.ection 64.140 [RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S.], and this section requires a unanimous vote. State ex rel. Barr v. Fleming, Mo.App., 259 S.W.2d 417.” (Emphasis ours.) Defense counsel say that the words in italics (which- comprise the only part of the sentence under consideration) was not a necessary,- or proper statement, and was therefore- dictum in that case. We are inclined to agree. Also, the only statement in the opinion1 in the Fleming case, which could conceivably pertain to the controf ver-sial statement in the American Telephone & Telegraph Case, referred to sec. 20 of the Zoning Order of Jackson County, Missouri, instead.of referring to such wording as it is used..in- the Missouri statute, Section 64.140 RSMo 1949, V.A..M.S. In view of the foregoing, we reject the cited Missouri cases as controlling or persuasive precedent for the interpretation of our statute. We think the term “all members”, in the hereinbefore quoted portion of sec. 865.16 refers to the number of. .county commissioners, who shall vote or participate in the voting, on a zoning amendment, and that it defines what shall be a quorum of board members for that ■purpose, rather than prescribing the number who must vote for the amendment to put it. into effect. Ip this connection, see Sesnovich v. Board of Appeals, 313 Mass. 393, 47 N.E.2d 943, 945; McQuillim Municipal Corporations, 3d Ed., Vol. 8, seq. 25.269; 58 Am.Jur., “Zoning”, • sec. 219. Any other interpretation, would have the effect of placing the power of veto in one member .of the board. In this connection, see Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Biermann, 187 Md. 514, 50 A.2d 804, 808. A part of plaintiffs’ argument is to the effect that unless the provision in 'question be interpreted' as a requirement that all members of the Board vote for such an amendment to accomplish its passage, it has no' meaning and is mere surplusage or a useless and unnecessary' insertion of words. :We do not agree, for if said provision had' not been-1 included in the statute in question, then, two of the Board’s members could, according to the common law rule, act on such measures without a third member being present or voting. See Borough of Oakland v. Board of Conservation, etc., 98 N.J.L. 806, 122 A. 311, 126 A. 534. It is conceivable, if not probable, that the .drafters of' the. law under consideration had that in - mind when - said pror vision ,-was -.written into our statute. ■ - As1 we are of the opinion'that none of the arguments presented on behalf of plaintiffs show good cause for overruling Fletcher v. Board of County Com’rs, supra, or for departing from the rule therein'announced, and -that they have not- otherwise demonstrated. error in the judgment of the- trial court, said judgment is hereby affirmed. JOHNSON, C: J.-, AYILLIAMS,. V. C. J„ and CORN, DAVISON,- HALLEY, JACKSON .and CARLILE, JJ., concur.