Revis v. Orr

Johnson, J. The single question presented here is whether the court erred in allowing defendant’s motion for judgment of nonsuit. As a general rule, a dance hall proprietor, like the occupant of any building used for ordinary business purposes, who directly or by implication invites others to enter his place of business, is under the legal duty to his patrons to exercise ordinary care to keep his premises, and all parts thereof to which persons lawfully present may go, in a safe condition for the use for which they are designed and intended, and to give warning of hidden dangers or unsafe conditions in so far as can be ascertained by reasonable inspection and supervision. See Drumwright v. Theatres, 228 N.C. 325, 45 S.E. 2d 379; Ross v. Drug Store, 225 N.C. 226, 34 S.E. 2d 64; Anderson v. Amusement Co., 213 N.C. 130, 195 S.E. 386. However, such occupant is not an insurer of the safety of patrons and invitees who may enter the premises. See Pratt v. Tea Co., 218 N.C. 732, 12 S.E. 2d 242; Fox v. Tea Co., 209 N.C. 115, 182 S.E. 662; Cooke v. Tea Co., 204 N.C. 495, 168 S.E. 679; 38 Am. Jur., Negligence, Sec. 96, pp.. 754 and 755. ' The liability of an occupant to an invitee for negligence in failing to keep the premises in reasonably safe condition for the invitee, or in failing to warn him of dangers thereon, must be predicated upon the-occupant’s superior knowledge, over that of the invitee or patron, concerning the dangers of the premises. And, ordinarily, it is only when the dangerous condition or instrumentality is known to the occupant, or in the exercise of due care should have been known to him, and not known. *161 to tbe person injured, that a recovery may be permitted. Pratt v. Tea Co., supra (218 N.C. 732). See also 38 Am. Jur., Negligence, See. 97, p. 757. In Pratt v. Tea Co., supra, Barnhill, J., speaking for tbe Court, said: “When claim is made on account of injuries caused by some substance on tbe floor along and upon wbicb customers will be expected to walk, in order to justify recovery, it must be made to appear that tbe proprietor either placed or permitted tbe barmful substance to be there, or that be knew, or by tbe exercise of due care should have known, of its presence in time to have removed tbe danger or given proper warning of its presence.” Here, tbe evidence tends to show that when tbe plaintiff came out of tbe rest room a table was sitting out on or near tbe edge of tbe dance floor, some five or six steps from tbe rest room door; that tbe chair over wbicb tbe plaintiff stumbled was lying between tbe table and tbe door,— only about a step and a half from tbe door. Tbe evidence is silent on when or by whom tbe chair was knocked or placed there. Hence there is no evidence upon wbicb to predicate a finding that tbe defendant knew, or in tbe exercise of ordinary care should have known, that tbe chair was lying where it was. Nor is tbe plaintiff’s case strengthened by tbe evidence of dim lighting in tbe dance ball. It was customary for tbe ball to be kept in semidarkness to suit tbe wishes of tbe patrons. Tbe evidence is that they “did not want too much light, they bad rather be in a shady place.” Anyway, tbe plaintiff testified that before she went in tbe rest room there was sufficient light in tbe dance ball for her to “see tbe people and objects around on tbe floor.” And one of her companions said “it was light enough to have read a menu.” Besides, it appears that tbe plaintiff was thoroughly familiar with tbe dance ball. She testified she bad been there many times when tbe lighting conditions were tbe same. She further said: “I have been going out there three or four times a week for a period ■ of something like four years. I knew quite a bit about tbe place.” We have not overlooked tbe statement of tbe witness Hudgins, manager of tbe club, to tbe effect that be made no formal “inspection through tbe dance ball on tbe particular evening,” followed by bis admission that “making an inspection through tbe dance ball was my duty and my responsibility.” This, when considered with the rest of tbe evidence and circumstances bearing on tbe issue of negligence, is without material significance. This record, when interpreted in tbe light of tbe controlling principles of law, impels tbe conclusion that tbe plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie case of actionable negligence against tbe defendant. Therefore, we *162 do not reach fqy. consideration the question of contributory negligence. The judgment below is Affirmed. ValeNtiNE, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.