Morrell v. Building Management, Inc.

Barnhill, C. J. This cause was tried in tbe court below on tbe theory that the testator devised to bis two sons an estate in remainder — either vested or contingent. Tbe plaintiff contended that whatever estate was devised was contingent, as to each son, upon whether be survived tbe trust, and that since plaintiff’s father died prior to tbe expiration of tbe trust, be took nothing under tbe will; that tbe words “or their heirs” created another class of devisees who should take tbe share of a son in the event tbe son should die prior to tbe date set for tbe distribution of tbe corpus of the estate. That is to say, be contended that tbe roll must be called as of that date to ascertain who are the devisees; that he is tbe sole heir of William R. Meeks, and that as such be became the owner of one-balf of the corpus at tbe expiration of tbe trust. On tbe other band, the defendants contend that William R. Meeks, immediately upon tbe death of the testator, was vested with title to one-balf of tbe corpus in remainder in fee, subject only to tbe terms of tbe trust which merely postponed tbe enjoyment thereof. The parties, both in their briefs and oral arguments, pursue the appeal to this Court upon tbe same assumption. But the will creates no prior estate, less than a fee, with limitation over to the two sons such as would make tbe estate devised to them an estate in remainder, either vested or contingent. Hence tbe law of remainders and future interests has no application here. “Where an active trust is created for the use and benefit of named beneficiaries, or there is a gift of all or a part of the income therefrom to *267 the beneficiaries, pending final division, or there is other language in the will evidencing a clear intent that a beneficial interest in the estate shall vest in the parties named immediately upon the death of the testator, with directions to the trustees to divide and deliver the estate at a stated time in the future, the interest vests immediately upon the death of the testator and the date of division merely postpones the complete enjoyment thereof.” Carter v. Kempton, 233 N.C. 1, 62 S.E. 2d 713. This rule, to be followed in the construction of wills, is now settled law in this jurisdiction. Williams v. Smith, 57 N.C. 254; Fuller v. Fuller, 58 N.C. 223; C oddington v. Stone, 217 N.C. 714, 9 S.E. 2d 420; Robinson v. Robinson, 227 N.C. 155, 41 S.E. 2d 282; McQueen v. Trust Co., 234 N.C. 737, 68 S.E. 2d 831; Jackson v. Langley, 234 N.C. 243, 66 S.E. 2d 899; Weill v. Weill, 212 N.C. 764, 194 S.E. 462; Priddy & Co. v. Sanderford, 221 N.C. 422, 20 S.E. 2d 341; Pridgen v. Tyson, 234 N.C. 199, 66 S.E. 2d 682; see also 57 A.J. 807; 69 C. J. 595; 2 Simes Future Interests 103. The will under consideration creates no contingent future interest. The beneficiaries of the trust are named in the will and were persons in being at the time the will took effect and the estate was created. They were, under the terms of the will, to have and receive the income from the property monthly, and upon the termination of the trust, they were to receive their respective shares, freed of the trust provisions. Thus there is no postponement of the vesting of their title to the property. Instead, title thereto vested in them immediately upon the death of the testator. The trust merely served to postpone their right to the full enjoyment of the estate devised until its termination. Even if we should conclude that in view of the fact the sons were to receive only the income from the estate during the life of the trust, neither son could convey a valid and marketable title to his share of the property during the life of the trust — -and we do not so conclude — this would not affect the result. The deed executed by William E. Meeks would operate as an estoppel against him and those claiming by or through him by deed, will, or inheritance. When a grantor conveys land to which he has no title or a defective title at the time of the conveyance, but who thereafter acquires title to the property, his after-acquired title “feeds the estoppel” and, by operation of law, vests the title thus acquired in the grantee. Croom v. Cornelius, 219 N.C. 761, 14 S.E. 2d 799; Thames v. Goode, 217 N.C. 639, 9 S.E. 2d 485; Woody v. Gates, 213 N.C. 792, 197 S.E. 561; Bell v. Adams, 81 N.C. 118; Benick v. Bowman, 56 N.C. 314. The judgment entered in the court below will be modified by striking out the words “in remainder” as used in the court’s conclusion of law therein contained so that it will read “. . . that at the death of Felix J. Meeks, Sr., William E. Meeks, Sr. became seized of a vested and trans- *268 mittible estate in fee simple to a one-half undivided interest in the locus in quo, the complete enjoyment of possession of which was postponed until the termination of the trust estate, there being no condition precedent which prevented the immediate vesting of the estate upon the death of Felix J. Meeks, Sr.” As so modified said judgment is affirmed. Modified and affirmed.