In the Interest of S. L. B.

McMurray, Presiding Judge. Appellant appeals the order of the juvenile court terminating her parental rights in her two-year-old son, S. L. B. Held: “Pursuant to OCGA § 15-11-81 (a) there exists a two-step process in considering the propriety of termination of parental rights. First, the court shall determine whether there exists clear and con vincing evidence of parental misconduct or inability; secondly, if such clear and convincing evidence exists, the court shall then considei whether termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the child, ‘after considering the physical, mental, emotional, and mora condition and needs of the child . . . including the need for a secure and stable home.’ . . . OCGA § 15-11-81 (a). With certain exceptions not here applicable, the court may terminate parental rights if the court determines parental misconduct or inability by finding that: the child is a deprived child within the meaning of OCGA § 15-11-2 . . . the lack of proper parental care or control by the parents in questior is the cause of the child’s status as deprived; such cause of depriva tion is likely to continue or will not likely be remedied; and the ‘con tinued deprivation will cause or is likely to cause serious physical mental, emotional, or moral harm to the child.’ [Emphasis omitted. OCGA § 15-11-81 (b) (4) (A) (iv). OCGA § 15-11-81 (b) (4) (B) provides, inter alia, that in determining whether the child is withou proper parental care and control, the court shall consider, without be ing limited to, the following: a medically verifiable deficiency of th parent’s physical, mental, or emotional health of such duration or na ture as to render the parent unable to provide adequately forth physical, mental, emotional, or moral condition and needs of th child; conviction of the parent of a felony and imprisonment therefc which has a demonstrated negative effect on the quality of the pai ent-child relationship; and, egregious conduct or evidence of pas egregious conduct of the parent toward the child or toward anothe child of a physically, emotionally, or sexually cruel or abusive ns ture.” In the Interest of S. H., 204 Ga. App. 135, 138 (418 SE2d 454 The child had been continuously in the custody of the Depar ment of Human Resources since he was five days old. He has sped health problems, including heart and respiratory difficulties, and *803 developmentally delayed. The child has been. hospitalized several times, has received treatment and therapy most of his life, and continues to receive treatment from each of three therapists on a weekly basis. Additionally, the therapy routine must be continued at home on a daily basis. The termination hearing was held shortly before the child’s second birthday. The juvenile court found that clear and convincing evidence established that: “the mother maintained stable housing for a period of at least one year prior to being evicted from her home approximately three weeks before this hearing; that the mother now lives in a mobile home that is neat and clean although roaches and ants have been observed in the kitchen and on the beds; that the mother maintained telephone, utilities and cable tv service for at least six months prior to this hearing; that the mother was ordered to pay child support of $5 per week and paid $130 from June 30,1992 until January of 1993, and that she has made no child support payments since February, 1993; that the mother’s food stamps have been discontinued due to false itatements made by the mother; that the mother had little food in he house at the time of the hearing and no money to purchase food ntil her check arrives on the first of the month; that the mother has oor money management skills and refused to accept home based ser-/ices which included instruction in budgeting; that there is no evi-lence that the mother’s money management skills will improve; that he mother has a functional IQ of 67; that the mother has speech lommunication problems which make it difficult to understand her at imes; that there is no question of the mother’s love and concern for he child; that the mother is self-focused and has a very limited un-lerstanding of the child’s physical problems and learning disabilities; hat the mother’s attendance at the child’s therapy sessions has been nconsistent; that the mother has exhibited a limited ability to provide for the child’s physical safety; that the mother abuses alcohol in hat she drinks on weekends and sometimes during the week until she ‘eels good’, which is usually about a twelve pack of beer; that when he drinks she often becomes loud and boisterous; that the mother >led guilty to public drunkenness in an incident which occurred in qpril, 1993; that the mother has been observed through the open door f her residence having sex with men, some of whom take advantage f her when she is drunk; that the mother has never addressed her lcohol problem; that there is no evidence that the mother’s alcohol buse will be controlled; that the mother frequently reacts to stress or lustration by becoming loud and angry and profane; that the mother as consistently refused to attend mental health counseling as retired by this Court; that the mother refused to complete a court-dered job training evaluation, attending only six of a thirty day pro-am; that the mother has failed to complete classes in parenting *804 skills and refused home based services which included parenting skills instruction; that the mother has not demonstrated her understanding of the needs of the child or her ability to meet the child’s needs. . . Based upon these findings of fact the juvenile court determined that the child was deprived, that the deprivation was due to “the action and inaction and inabilities of the parents” and that based upon the mother’s capabilities, continuing alcohol abuse, and rejection of treatment or assistance, that the causes of the deprivation were not likely to be remedied, and that continuation in foster care without a hope of permanency is likely to cause serious harm to the emotional, physical, and moral well being of the child. Appellant contends that the juvenile court’s findings that the child was deprived, that the deprivation was caused by lack of proper care by the mother, that the deprivation was likely to cause serious harm, and that continued deprivation was likely to cause serious harm were not supported by clear and convincing evidence. Indeed, the sole enumeration of error addresses the sufficiency of the evidence to authorize the termination of appellant’s parental rights in S. L. B. “ ‘The standard of appellate review where a parent’s rights to his child have been severed is “ ‘whether after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the appellee, any rational trier of fact could have found by clear and convincing evidence that the natural parent’s rights to custody have been lost.’ ” Blackburn v. Blackburn, 249 Ga. 689, 694 (292 SE2d 821) (1982).’ In the Interest of B. J. H., 194 Ga. App. 282 (390 SE2d 427) (1990). ‘The factfinding and weighing of evidence is to be done in the trial court under the clear and! convincing evidence test. The reviewing court is to defer to the lower court in the area of factfinding and should affirm unless the appellate! standard of review ... is not met.’ In re B. D. C., 256 Ga. 511, 513 (350 SE2d 444) (1986).” In the Interest of B. P., 207 Ga. App. 242 244 (427 SE2d 593). In this connection, we note that while appellanl points out a number of conflicts in the evidence, such conflicts do no necessarily preclude satisfaction of the appellate standard of review Furthermore, appellant’s reliance upon Hooks v. Baldwin County Dept. of Family &c. Svcs., 162 Ga. App. 142 (290 SE2d 356) is mis placed since the mother in that case had successfully demonstratec her ability to care for her child, while appellant has not. “Once explicit findings, supported by clear and convincing evi dence, have been made as to the existence of a statutory ground o parental default or inability, the juvenile court must give its consider ation to the best interest of the child. However, the statute does no narrowly define those essential factors which must enter into the juj venile court’s consideration of the child’s best interest. The statutl specifies only that the child’s best interest must necessarily encorcj pass a broad consideration of his ‘physical, mental, emotional, anl *805 moral condition . . . , including the need for a secure and stable home.’ Thus, entirely unlike the juvenile court’s determination of parental default or inability which is narrowly limited to the objective grounds enumerated in OCGA § 15-11-81 (b), the inquiry into the best interest of the child is necessarily a broader and somewhat more subjective one. Those broad factors which are enumerated as relevant to the juvenile court’s consideration of the child’s best interest are precisely the sort of subjective factors which must not enter into its initial determination of the existence of a statutory ground of parental default or inability. Crook v. Ga. Dept. of Human Resources, [137 Ga. App. 817 (224 SE2d 806)]. Thus, in the second stage of the juvenile court’s consideration of a petition to terminate parental rights, it must make a subjective finding as to the best interest of the child, which finding, by its terms and nature, cannot be confined to any set of objective standards and which is not readily amenable to appellate review other than for a manifest abuse of discretion. See generally In re H. B. & K. B., [174 Ga. App. 435 (330 SE2d 173)].” In the Interest of G. K. J., 187 Ga. App. 443, 444 (3), 445 (370 SE2d 490). “Moreover, ‘those same factors which show the existence of parental misconduct or inability can also support a finding that the termination of parental rights of the defaulting parent would be in the child’s best interest. Thus, a finding as to whether the termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the child represents, in essence, a finding as to whether the specifics of the parental default that have otherwise been found to exist are of such magnitude as to warrant the conclusion that the child himself would be better served by the grant of the petition to terminate. (Cits.) In this regard, our review of the entire record shows that there was likewise sufficient clear and convincing evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that the termination of (appellant’s) parental rights . . . would be in [the child’s] best interest.’ In the Interest of G. K. J., 187 Ga. App. 443, 444 (2) (370 SE2d 490) (1988). See also In the Interest of S. K. L., 199 Ga. App. 731 (1) (405 SE2d 903) (1991).” (Emphasis omitted.) In the Interest of B. P., 207 Ga. App. 242, 245, supra. The judgment of the juvenile court terminating the parental rights of appellant is affirmed. Decided October 6, 1994. Summer & Summer, Chandelle T. Summer, for appellant. I Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, William C. Joy, Senior IAssistant Attorney General, Teresa E. Lazzaroni, Assistant Attorney *806 General, Charles W. Smith, Jr., for appellee. *805 Judgment affirmed. Pope, C. J., and Smith, J., concur.