Koonce v. Atlantic States Motor Lines, Inc.

Higgins, J. The defendant urges the judgment of the superior court should be reversed upon the ground the plaintiff accepted the monthly payment checks, for the entire period involved, with the notation on each check as set out in the statement of facts, and that the acceptance precludes the plaintiff from asserting any further claim. The defendant further contends if nonsuit is not warranted, at least a new trial should be awarded for the errors of the trial court (1) in denying the motion to limit recovery to the six months beginning August 1, 1954; (2) in permitting the plaintiff to testify that the parties had a similar accrual arrangement in 1941-42; (3) in giving undue emphasis and stress to the plaintiff’s contentions and his evidence in support; (3) other errors in the charge. Sharply divergent allegations of the parties and the evidence of each in support present a simple question of fact: Whether there was an agreement to accrue $250.00 per month of the plaintiff’s salary. It may be noted that the defendant did not plead accord and satisfaction of a disputed claim. Ordinarily, such is an affirmative defense to be taken .advantage of by pleading. Joyner v. Woodard, 201 N.C. 315, 160 S.E. 288. However, the court in effect gave the defendant the benefit of such plea by its charge: “When a creditor receives and collects a check sent by a debtor upon condition that it shall be a settlement in full of a disputed account, he may not thereafter repudiate the condition annexed to the acceptance. . . . All they (defendant) *394 plead is that they owe him nothing. So you will take this rule of law in this case, a check given and received by the creditor which purports to be in full of account to date does not conclude the creditor accepting it from showing that in fact it was not in full unless under the principle of accord and satisfaction there had been an acceptance of the check in settlement of a disputed account." Allgood v. Trust Co., 242 N.C. 506, 88 S.E. 2d 825; Rosser v. Bynum, 168 N.C. 340, 84 S.E. 393. We perceive no legal distinction between the plaintiff’s right to recover for the first six months beginning August 1, 1954, and his right to recover for the full term of his employment. Neither party contends there was ever any change in the contract. The plaintiff testified his salary was $750.00 per month, $500.00 to be paid in cash and $250.00 to be accrued; and that this contract continued without modification as long as he worked for the defendant. The defendant, on the other hand, offered testimony that the contract for the full term of the employment from August 1, 1954, to the time the plaintiff left the company, was unchanged; that it was for $500.00 per month, with no additional payment to be accrued, or otherwise. So the parties agree that no change was made in the contract after August 1, 1954. The question was simple. Which party was correct? The answer, whether simple or complex, was for the jury. Motion for judgment of nonsuit was properly denied. The plaintiff testified that on a prior occasion by agreement of the parties a raise in his salary was permitted to accrue and was paid in a lump sum at a later date. This evidence was received by the court for the limited purpose of showing a prior arrangement between the parties somewhat similar to that now contended for by the plaintiff. The prior course of dealing by the parties tended to some extent to corroborate the plaintiff in his present claim. The evidence was competent for that purpose and so limited by the court. The defendant’s other exceptions, including those to the charge, fail to disclose error. The court stated the contentions of the parties, reviewed the evidence thereon, and fairly and impartially applied the law to the factual situations as testified to and contended for by the parties. In the trial below, there is No Error.