Edwards v. Hood Motor Co.

JohNsON, J. Before a verdict is complete it must be accepted by tbe court, but it is tbe duty of tbe presiding judge, before accepting a verdict, to scrutinize its form and substance to prevent insufficient or inconsistent findings from becoming a record of tbe court. Therefore, where tbe findings are indefinite or inconsistent, tbe presiding judge may give additional instructions and direct tbe jury to retire again and bring in a proper verdict, but be may not tell them what their verdict shall be. Baird v. Ball, 204 N.C. 469, 168 S.E. 667. However, a party litigant has a substantial right in a verdict obtained in bis favor. Accordingly, where a consistent verdict has been returned on issues wbicb are determinative and is rejected by tbe court as a matter of law, and such ruling is held to be erroneous, tbe appellate Court will remand tbe cause for appropriate proceedings. Allen v. Yarborough, 201 N.C. 568, 160 S.E. 833; Butler v. Gantt, 220 N.C. 711, 18 S.E. 2d 119; Ferrall v. Ferrall, 153 N.C. 174, 69 S.E. 60; Abernethy v. Yount, 138 N.C. 337, 50 S.E. 696. In tbe trial below, tbe verdicts first returned may be reconciled under a permissive application of tbe doctrine of proximate cause (Luttrell v. Mineral Co., 220 N.C. 782, 18 S.E. 2d 412), and tbis is so, apart from application of tbe principles of intervening or insulated negligence (Butner v. Spease, 217 N.C. 82, 6 S.E. 2d 808). While tbe record indicates tbe jury may have applied tbe doctrine of intervening or insulated negligence in arriving at their composite verdicts, nevertheless, it does not follow as a matter of law or factual certainty that such was tbe case. Hence, tbe verdict in tbe instant case is not essentially inconsistent. Tbe court may have set tbe verdict aside as a matter of discretion, but it was error to refuse to accept tbe verdict as a matter of law. Allen v. Yarborough, supra. Tbis error vitiated all subsequent proceedings below, and we so bold. Tbe verdict will be treated as having been received, and tbe cause will be remanded for further proceedings, with tbe parties being relegated to their rights as of tbe coming in *273 of tbe verdict to tbe extent (1) that tbe plaintiff may move tbe court to set aside tbe verdict in tbe exercise of its discretion, and (2) tbat tbe defendants may move for judgment on tbe verdict. Ordinarily, a motion to set aside a verdict in tbe discretion of tbe court must be made and decided at tbe trial term. Fowler v. Murdock, 172 N.C. 349, 90 S.E. 301; McIntosh, N. C. Practice and Procedure, p. 671. However, tbis rule is subject to exception where, as bere, an erroneous ruling of tbe trial court deprives a litigant of tbe opportunity to invoke tbis inherent discretionary power of tbe court. Batson v. Laundry Co., 202 N.C. 560, 163 S.E. 600; Tickle v. Hobgood, 212 N.C. 762, 194 S.E. 461. Error and remanded.