Williams Ex Rel. Williams v. Aldridge Motors, Inc.

JOHNSON, J. Chapter 1, Section 6, Public Laws of 1923, as amended, now codified as G.S. 18-6, prescribes the procedure under which vehicles used in transporting liquor in violation of law may be seized and confiscated under State law. Under the provisions of this statute the owner of a seized vehicle may intervene in the forfeiture proceeding and obtain possession of the vehicle by showing that it “was used in transporting liquor without his knowledge and consent.” Similarly, the holder of a lien on a seized vehicle may intervene and, by showing that the lien was “created without the lienor having any notice that the carrying vehicle was being used for illegal transportation of liquor,” require that the proceeds derived from the sale of the vehicle be applied toward the satisfaction of the lien. *356 In tbe case at band tbe gravamen of tbe defendants’ counterclaims is tbat tbe conduct of tbe plaintiff in putting tbe automobile to use in tbe liquor traffic under circumstances leading to seizure and forfeiture under G.S. 18-6, followed by failure on bis part to notify defendants of tbe seizure — they being without notice from other sources — resulted in failure of tbe defendants to intervene seasonably in tbe forfeiture proceeding and protect their rights, and was a willful, criminal, tortious course of conduct as against tbe defendants, arising subsequent to and independent of tbe execution of tbe conditional sale contract, entitling tbe defendants to recover damages against tbe plaintiff to tbe extent of their losses. Conceding as we may tbat such conduct on tbe part of a conditional sale vendee may be made tbe basis of an independent tort action, 27 Am. Jur., Infants, Sections 92 and 94; 43 C.J.S., Infants, Sec. 89; Vermont Acceptance Corp. v. Wiltshire, 103 Vt. 219, 153 Atl. 199, 73 A.L.R. 792; Collins v. Norfleet-Baggs, 197 N.C. 659, 150 S.E. 177; Annotation: 127 A.L.R. 1441, p. 1449 (the facts in Morris Plan Co. v. Palmer, 185 N.C. 109, 116 S.E. 261, relied on by plaintiff, being distinguishable), even so, recovery may not be sustained where tbe crucial facts found by tbe court merely show, as in tbe instant case, (1) a seizure for cause by tbe State, and (2) failure of tbe lienee to notify tbe lienor of tbe seizure. In order to prevail in such circumstances, it must be made to appear substantially (1) tbat tbe lienor was without knowledge or notice of tbe forfeiture proceeding from any source and by reason thereof failed to intervene within tbe time allowed therefor; (2) tbat tbe lienor was without knowledge or notice tbat tbe automobile was being used for tbe illegal transportation of liquor, so tbat, if be bad intervened, be would have been entitled as a bona fide lienor to tbe proceeds of sale for application on bis lien debt; and (3) tbe extent of tbe resultant loss sustained by tbe lienor. In tbe instant case tbe findings of fact are silent respecting these vital factors. In gist, tbe findings are: Tbat tbe plaintiff entered a plea of guilty to tbe charge of transporting intoxicating liquor; tbat tbe automobile was seized and ordered sold, and was thereafter sold; tbat tbe plaintiff did not notify either defendant of tbe arrest or seizure until weeks after tbe sale. It is manifest tbat tbe findings do not support tbe judgment. And this is so even if we glean from tbe conclusions of law such of them as might be termed findings of fact. Therefore tbe plaintiff’s exception to tbe judgment, which challenges tbe sufficiency of tbe findings of fact to support the judgment (Medical College v. Maynard, 236 N.C. 506, 73 S.E. 2d 315; In re Sams, 236 N.C. 228, 72 S.E. 2d 421; Sprinkle v. Reidsville, 235 N.C. 140, 69 S.E. 2d 179), must be sustained. It is so ordered. This works a reversal of tbe judgment as to tbe counterclaims, and necessitates a remand of tbe cause for further bearing and proceedings in respect to the issues raised by tbe *357 counterclaims. See Benbow v. Robbins, 72 N.C. 422; Trust Co. v. Transit Lines, 200 N.C. 415, 157 S.E. 62; 31 Am. Jur., Jury, Sec. 48; Annotation: 106 A.L.R. 203; Erwin Mills v. Textile Workers Union, 235 N.C. 107, 68 S.E. 2d 813. - In this Court the plaintiff demurred ore tenus to each counterclaim for failure to state a cause of action. We are of the opinion and so hold that the demurrers should be overruled. The counterclaims, when construed with that degree of liberality required, present facts sufficient to constitute causes of action. Scott v. Insurance Co., 205 N.C. 38, 169 S.E. 801, and cases cited. Besides, the demurrers are defective in form for failure to specify wherein each counterclaim fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Wilson v. Motor Lines, 207 N.C. 263, 176 S.E. 750, and cases cited. The cause will be remanded for further proceedings in accord with this opinion. Reversed and remanded. DeviN, C. J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.