Queen City Coach Co. v. Carolina Coach Co.

EeviN, J. Carolina, Liberty and Lloyds move at the outset to dismiss the appeal on the ground that judgment was rendered in favor of Virginia at the trial and that in consequence Virginia has no right to appeal. The movers find color of support for their position in the recital of the judgment that Queen is not entitled to recover anything from Virginia. The judgment is to be interpreted, however, in the light of the pleadings, the issues, the findings of fact, and the conclusions of law. Berrier v. Commissioners, 186 N.C. 564, 120 S.E. 328; Weeks v. McPhail, 129 N.C. 73, 39 S.E. 732; Taunton v. Dobbs, 240 Ala. 287, 199 So. 9; Aloe v. Lowe, 298 Ill. 404, 131 N.E. 612; Hays v. Madison County, 274 Ky. 116, 118 S.W. 2d 197; Attorney General v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 201 Mass. 370, 87 N.E. 621; Western Paving Co. v. Board of Com’rs of Lincoln County, 183 Okl. 281, 81 P. 2d 252; 49 C.J.S., Judgments, sections 438, 439. When this is done, it is manifest that the judgment adjudicates that Carolina, Liberty and Lloyds did not contract to make good to Queen the loss resulting from the collision between the Queen bus and the automobile driven by George O. Perkins; that in consequence Queen was not obligated to repay Virginia the moneys advanced to Queen by Virginia; and that the advancement of the moneys to Queen by Vir *705 ginia was tantamount to a performance by Yirginia of its obligation as Queen’s insurer. Tbis being true, tbe judgment put liability for tbe loss occasioned by tbe accident on Yirginia alone, and made Yirginia a “party aggrieved” witbin tbe purview of tbe statute prescribing wbo may appeal. G.S. 1-271. Yirginia makes these assertions by its assignments of error: 1. Tbat tbe trial judge erred in making certain findings of fact. 2. Tbat tbe trial judge erred in adjudging tbat tbe policies and endorsements did not bind Liberty and Lloyds to indemnify Queen for tbe loss arising out of tbe collision of tbe Queen bus and tbe Perkins car. 3. Tbat tbe trial judge erred in bolding tbat tbe contract of 29 May, 1947, did not obligate Carolina to furnish Queen liability insurance protection against tbe loss occasioned by tbe collision of tbe Queen bus and tbe Perkins car, and tbat in consequence Carolina did not breach an obligation to Queen in failing to provide Queen with such insurance protection. Tbe assignments of error based on exceptions to findings of fact are unavailing. Tbe parties waived trial of tbe issues of fact by a jury in conformity with G.S. 1-184. Tbe findings of fact of tbe trial judge are supported by competent evidence, and for tbat reason are binding on tbe parties. Mitchell v. Barfield, 232 N.C. 325, 59 S.E. 2d 810; Burnsville v. Boone, 231 N.C. 577, 58 S.E. 2d 351; Griggs v. Stoker Service Co., 229 N.C. 572, 50 S.E. 2d 914; Poole v. Gentry, 229 N.C. 266, 49 S.E. 2d 464. We turn to tbe courtroom scene in tbe Merchant of Venice for tbe conclusive answer to tbe argument of Yirginia tbat tbe policies and endorsements imposed on Liberty and Lloyds contractual duties to make good to Queen tbe loss arising out of tbe collision of tbe Queen bus and tbe Perkins car. It was not “so nominated in tbe bond.” When tbe policies of Liberty and Lloyds were originally issued, they insured Carolina against legal liability for loss caused by tbe operation of Carolina’s motor vehicles. Tbe endorsements of Liberty and Lloyds did not extend the coverage of their policies to Queen’s motor vehicles. Tbe endorsements merely made Queen an additional insured under tbe policies of Liberty and Lloyds, and granted to Queen as such additional insured liability insurance protection against loss arising out of tbe operation of Carolina’s motor vehicles on Queen’s franchise route. Yirginia lays bold on paragraph 11 and a portion of paragraph 12 of the contract of 29 May, 1947, to sustain its contention tbat Carolina obligated itself by tbe contract to furnish Queen liability insurance protection against tbe loss occasioned by tbe collision of tbe Queen bus with tbe Perkins car, and tbat Carolina breached tbis contractual obligation to Queen if tbe policies and endorsements furnished by Carolina did not, *706 in fact, require Liberty and Lloyds to indemnify Queen for this particular loss. Virginia advances these arguments on this phase of the case: Carolina bound itself to carry liability insurance to protect Queen from liability arising “as a result of the operation” of Carolina’s buses over Queen’s franchise route pursuant to the contract. The Carolina bus was on a trip over Queen’s franchise route for which Carolina was responsible under the contract at the time of its disablement. Since the Queen bus was going to the relief of the disabled Carolina bus at the time of the collision with the Perkins car, the resultant liability of Queen for the injuries to the occupants of the Perkins car arose “as a result of the operation” of Carolina’s bus over Queen’s franchise route pursuant to the contract. Hence, Carolina obligated itself by the contract to furnish Queen liability insurance protection against the loss occasioned by the collision of the Queen bus with the Perkins car. The arguments of Virginia on this aspect of the controversy resemble “the play-bill which is said to have announced the tragedy of Hamlet, the character of the Prince of Denmark being left out.” They ignore the crucial stipulation of paragraph 12 of the contract of 29 May, 1947, that the liability insurance to be carried by the lessor was to be on tuses of lessor. When all is said, the contract of 29 May, 1947, imposed these obligations, and these obligations only, on Carolina and Queen in respect to insurance: (1) It obligated Carolina to insure both itself and Queen against legal liability for losses caused by the operation of Carolina’s buses on Queen’s franchise route; and (2) it obligated Queen to insure both itself and Carolina against legal liability for losses caused by the operation of Queen’s buses on Carolina’s franchise route. This being so, the trial judge rightly ruled that Carolina did not contract to provide Queen with liability insurance protection against the loss arising out of the collision of the Queen bus and the Perkins car. Our interpretation of the contract of 29 May, 1947, is identical with that which the parties put upon it in issuing and accepting the endorsements and certificates. Smith v. Thompson, 210 N.C. 672, 188 S.E. 395; Williston on Contracts (Rev. Ed.), section 623. Virginia emphasized the validity of the interpretation by inserting in the endorsement to its policy the third stipulation declaring in express terms “that coverage is not provided to the Carolina Coach Company while its equipment is operating under rights or franchises granted to or held by Queen City Bus Company.” For the reasons giyen, the judgment is Affirmed.