Walker v. American Bakeries Co.

*442 EeyiN, J. The defendant deems the question of the sufficiency of the plaintiffs evidence to carry the ease to the jury foreclosed against it by prior decisions. Grimm v. Watson, 233 N.C. 65, 62 S.E. 2d 538; Pridgen v. Produce Co., 199 N.C. 560, 155 S.E. 247; Stevens v. Rostan, 196 N.C. 314, 145 S.E. 555. For this reason, it does not assign as error the refusal ■of the trial judge to dismiss the action upon a compulsory nonsuit. Its counsel earnestly contend, however, that the judge committed error in giving the jury this instruction: “The court charges you if there was a solid line and if the plaintiff had a clear unobstructed view for a distance of 500 feet or more, the law did not require him to wait until he got away from this line before he could pass.” The driver of an automobile desiring to pass an overtaken vehicle must observe the statutory regulations which prohibit passing at certain places on the highway. Two of these regulations forbid the overtaking and passing of vehicles upon curves in the highway where specified conditions exist. They are as follows: 1. “The driver of a vehicle shall not overtake and pass another vehicle proceeding in the same direction . . . upon a curve in the highway where the driver’s view along the highway is obstructed within a distance of five hundred feet.” G.S. 20-150 (b). 2. “The driver of a vehicle shall not drive to the left side of the center line of a highway . . . upon a curve in the highway where such center line has been placed upon such highway by the state highway and public works commission, and is visible.” G.S. 20-150 (d). These regulations are parts of the same statute. It is a basic rule of statutory construction that “the various provisions of an act should be read so that all may, if possible, have their due and conjoint effect without repugnancy or inconsistency, so as to render the statute a consistent and harmonious whole.” 50 Am. Jur., Statutes, section 363. See, also, in this connection: Rice v. Panel Co., 199 N.C. 154, 154 S.E. 69; Jones v. Board of Education, 185 N.C. 303, 117 S.E. 37. When this rule is applied in this case, it is evident that the statutory provisions under consideration are harmonious rather than conflictive. They are not designed to regulate the behaviour of the operator of an overtaking automobile in any event unless he is traveling upon a curve in the highway. Whether the one statutory regulation or the other applies to the driver of an overtaking vehicle proceeding upon a curve in the highway depends on whether the curve is marked by a visible center line placed upon the highway by the State Highway and Public Works Commission. Where the curve is so marked, the action of the operator of the overtaking automobile is governed by G.S. 20-150 (d), which forbids him to drive to the left side of the center line in order to pass the overtaken vehicle; and where the curve is not so marked, the conduct of the driver *443 of tbe overtaking automobile is controlled by G.S. 20-150(b), wbicb permits bim to pass tbe overtaken vehicle unless bis view along tbe highway is obstructed within a distance of five hundred feet. Tbe instruction under examination would be unobjectionable if all of tbe testimony supported tbe plaintiff’s contention that be overtook and attempted to pass tbe defendant’s truck upon a straight stretch of highway. Furthermore, it would be harmless if all tbe evidence indicated that tbe event occurred upon an unmarked curve. But tbe defendant introduced testimony tending to show that tbe plaintiff undertook to pass tbe overtaken truck upon a curve in tbe highway marked by a visible center line placed upon tbe highway by tbe State Highway and Public Works Commission. In tbe light of this evidence, tbe wholly unqualified instruction that tbe plaintiff bad tbe legal right to cross tbe center line in order to pass tbe overtaken truck constituted prejudicial error, entitling defendant to a new trial. Tbe unqualified instruction nullified tbe provisions of G.S. 20-150 (d). Although tbe statute is designed primarily to prevent collision between an overtaking automobile and a vehicle coming from tbe opposite direction, its provisions are germane to litigation between an overtaking motorist and tbe driver of an overtaken vehicle if there is evidence to tbe effect that tbe underlying accident was occasioned by an unsuccessful effort on tbe part of the former to pass tbe latter upon a marked curve. Tbe driver of tbe overtaken vehicle is certainly not required in such case to anticipate that tbe latter will attempt to pass in violation of tbe statute. New trial.