State Ex Rel. Employment Security Commission v. Jarrell

Ervin, J. Under the statute providing for judicial review of the decisions of the Employment Security Commission, the findings of fact of the Commission are binding upon the reviewing court if supported by evidence, and the judicial review is limited to determining whether errors of law have been committed by the Commission. G.S. 96-15 (i); Unemployment Compensation Comm. v. Harvey & Son Co., 227 N.C. 291, 42 S.E. 2d 86; In re Steelman, 219 N.C. 306, 13 S.E. 2d 544, 135 A.L.R. 929. For this reason, the function of the reviewing court is ordinarily twofold: (1) To determine whether there was evidence before the Commission to support its findings of fact; and (2) to decide whether the facts found sustain the conclusions of law and the resultant decision of the Commission. Unemployment Compensation Comm. v. Harvey & Son Co., supra. The appellant has not preserved any exceptions to any of the findings of fact of the Commission. Russos v. Bailey, 228 N.C. 783, 47 S.E. 2d 22; Smith v. Davis, 228 N.C. 172, 45 S.E. 2d 51, 174 A.L.R. 643; Rader v. Coach Co., 225 N.C. 537, 35 S.E. 2d 609. Hence, we are spared the task of determining whether the testimony before the Commission supported the facts found by it. The appellant’s exception raises this question: Do the facts found by the Commission sustain the judgment of the Superior Court ? Since this judgment merely affirmed the decision of the Commission, recourse must be had to that decision and to the legal premise on which it rests for the solution of our problem. The issue before the Commission was whether the claimants were barred from recovery of the benefits claimed by them by this provision of the statute: “An individual shall be disqualified for benefits . . . for any week with respect to which the Commission finds that his total or partial unemployment is due to a stoppage of work which exists because of a labor dispute at the factory, establishment, or other premises at which he is or was last employed, provided that this subsection shall not apply if it is shown to the satisfaction of the Commission that (1) he is not participating in or financing or directly interested in the labor dispute which caused the stoppage of work; and (2) he does not belong to a grade or class of workers of which, immediately before the commencement of the stoppage, there were members employed at the premises at which the- stoppage occurs, any of whom are participating in or financing or directly interested in the dispute.” G.S. 96-14 (d). *385 Each of tbe claimants was required to sbow to tbe satisfaction of tbe Commission that be was not disqualified for benefits under tbe Employment Security Law by tbis statute. In re Steelman, supra. Tbis being so, tbe decision of tbe Commission constituted an adjudication tbat tbe 55 claimants were not disqualified for benefits under G.S. 96-14 (d). As tbe claimants did not base tbeir claims on tbe proviso in tbe statute, tbis adjudication was necessarily bottomed upon tbe conclusion of law tbat tbe unemployment of tbe claimants during tbe periods covered by tbeir claims was not due to a stoppage of work wbicb existed because of a labor dispute at Pee Dee Mill No. 2. Tbis brings us to tbe final question as to whether tbis conclusion of law is sustained by tbe only finding of fact invoked for tbat purpose, i.e., tbe finding tbat on 7 July, 1947, tbe Company posted tbis notice on its bulletin board: “Notice to all employees. Pee Dee Mill No. 2 will cease all operations effective as of tbis date for an indefinite period. All employees are free to seek employment elsewhere.” Tbe Commission advances a line of reasoning to establish tbe connection between tbis finding of fact and tbe conclusion of law necessarily underlying tbe decision of tbe Commission and tbe judgment of tbe Superior Court affirming it. It concedes tbat all unemployment of workers at Pee Dee Mill No. 2 between 2 June, 1947, and tbe moment of tbe posting of tbe notice of 7 July, 1947, was occasioned solely by a strike arising out of tbe inability of tbe Company and tbe Union representing a majority of its employees to agree on a contract covering work in tbe mill. It asserts, however, tbat tbe notice of 7 July, 1947, constituted in law a discharge by tbe Company of all of its employees, and tbat by reason thereof any subsequent unemployment of tbe claimants was occasioned by tbeir discharge and not by a stoppage of work wbicb existed because of a labor dispute at Pee Dee Mill No. 2. Tbe Commission insists tbat tbis conclusion is valid regardless of what events may have occurred at tbe plant subsequent to tbe posting of tbe notice and regardless of what parts tbe claimants may have played in such events. Tbis reasoning ignores both tbe plain wording of tbe notice, and tbe realities of tbe situation as depicted by tbe other findings of tbe Commission. When tbe notice was posted, Pee Dee Mill No. 2 was completely closed by a strike wbicb bad been in progress for more than a month. Efforts to resume operations bad proved futile. There was no prospect tbat tbe plant could be reopened by tbe Company at any time within tbe foreseeable future. By posting tbe notice, tbe Company merely accepted tbe shut-down of tbe mill as an accomplished fact, and signified its willingness to terminate its employment relationship with any worker who elected to withdraw from tbe existing labor dispute and to seek work elsewhere. Tbe notice did not alter tbe status of any employee who *386 refrained from exercising ibis option. It certainly did not cause tbe unemployment of those wbo were already on strike and wbo continued on strike until tbe existing labor dispute ended. None of tbe findings of fact indicate tbat any of tbe claimants elected to withdraw from tbe labor dispute and to seek work elsewhere. It follows tbat tbe facts found by tbe Employment Security Commission do not support tbe conclusion of law and tbe resultant decision of tbe Commission, or tbe judgment of tbe Superior Court affirming such decision. Tbe judgment of tbe Superior Court is, therefore, Reversed.