Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Keller

*501 SPARKS, Circuit Judge. It is contended by tbe government that ■the Board of Tax Appeals erred: (1) In not holding that the distribution o £ assets of the company to respondents, prior to the sale of the company’s capital stock, created a condition of insolvency which made respondents, as transferees under- the trust fund doctrine, liable for the taxes involved in those proceedings, as recognized in McDonald, Receiver, v. Williams, 174 U. S. 397, 19 S. Ct. 743, 43 L. Ed. 1022; Hollins v. Brierfield Coal & iron Co., 150 U. S. 371, 14 S. Ct. 127, 37 L. Ed. 1113; Ratcliff v. Clendenin (C. C. A.) 232 F. 61; Great Western Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Harris (C. C. A.) 128 F. 321; Lawrence v. Greenup (C. C. A.) 97 F. 906; Illinois R. S., c. 32, par. 23 (Cahill’s 1929), subdivision (2). (2) In, holding that the agreement of respondents to pay the current bills of the company existing as of August 1, 1925, was not sufficiently broad to include the taxes involved in these proceedings. The first contention, hinges npon whether the distribution of assets to respondents rendered the company insolvent. Tbe burden of proving such insolvency, if it existed, was upon the Commissioner. Revenue Act of .1928, § 602 (adding § 912, to Revenue Act 1924), 45 Stat. 872, 873 (26 USCA § 1229). The Board found as a fact that the distribution referred to did not render the company insolvent, and we think the finding was supported by substantial evidence; hence we are precluded from disturbing it. Rusk v. Commissioner (C. C. A.) 53 F.(2d) 428; Hutchins Lumber & Storage Co. v. Commissioner (C. C. A.) 53 F.(2d) 1016. In Sanger v. Upton, 91 U. S. 56, 23 L. Ed. 220, it was held that tho capital stock of a corporation, was a trust fund for the payment of its debts: but in later years that doctrine has been held not to apply to a solvent corporation. United States v. Armstrong (C. C. A.) 26 F.(2d) 227; Ratcliff v. Clendenin, supra; Great Western Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Harris, supra; Lawrence v. Greenup, supra. It is further contended by Commission-®r that ho is entitled to recover under the Illinois statute, supra, which holds directors liable for debts and contracts of a corporation when they declare or assent to a dividend if the corporation is thereby rendered insolvent or its capital is thereby impaired. Wheeler v. Pullman Iron & Steel Co., 143 Ill. 197, 32 N. E. 420, 17 L. R. A. 818; Tudor v. United States, (C. C. A.) 56 F. (2d) 64. In relation to questions involving rules of property, federal courts and the Board of Tax Appeals follow the statutes and decisions of the state in which the properly involved is located; but as to a question of tho kind now under consideration the decisions of the federal courts must prevail. Weiss v. Weiner, 279 U. S. 333, 49 S. Ct. 337, 73 L. Ed. 720; Burk-Waggoner Oil Ass’n v. Hopkins, 269 U. S. 110, 46 S. Ct. 48, 70 L. Ed. 183. It is next contended by the Commissioner that tho government is entitled to recover on the written agreement signed by respondents, in which they promised to pay the current bills of tho company which were existent on August 1, 1925. By this agreement the purchasers were protected against all liabilities of the company as of August 1, 1925, which were owing- or might become due to any person, copartnership, or corporation. Whether the United States can be considered as included in any of the classes of creditors designated wo think it unnecessary to decide. It will be observed that the agreement is twofold in its nature: First, the sellers guarantee to purchasers that there are no existing debts against the company except current bills; second, they then agree to pay all unpaid current bills. The government cannot avail itself of the guarantee, nor does it seek to do so. It may, however, avail itself of sellers’ promise to pay current bills, provided its claim can be considered as a current bill. The determination of this contention depends entirely on whether the government’s claim for taxes for the years 1920 to .1923 inclusive, which were unknown to exist at ihe time of the execution of the written agreement referred to and were not asserted by tbe Commissioner until 1928, can be said to be included within the term “current bills” of the company on August 1,1925. The word “current,” when used as an adjective, has many and diverse meanings, and its definition depends largely upon the word which it modifies or the subject-matter with which it is associated. When applied to liabilities or bills of account, we think it conveys the idea of time, and refers to the present time or the present passing period; and yet when used in that sense the limitation as to time is not always tho same, hut is rather controlled bylaw or by the custom established in relation to the subject-matter then under discussion. We speak generally of current bills, and in most instances we there *502 by refer to tbe bills of account which are to be paid, during the month; because in ordinary affairs most accounts, other than capital accounts, which are occasioned by the operation of one’s business and in the care of one’s self and family, are expected to be presented and paid within the month. The expression “current taxes” is indeed a very common one, and unquestionably refers to taxes due or assessed within the present year, because the law requires taxes to be assessed and paid but once each year; a current bank account is one that is subject to present cheeking; a current periodical refers to one which is published during the present period, whatever that period may be. We think the parties to the agreement in the instant case used the term “current bills” in the sense to which we have just referred. TJiis view is consistent with the holding of the Board of Tax Appeals, and we are convinced that the ruling is correct. The taxes sought to be collected in this action were current taxes during the respective years to which they relate, and since those respective years they have been due and owing from the company, notwithstanding the company and respondents were ignorant of their existence; but we think they cannot be considered as current taxes as of August 1, 1925, and thus be brought within the term “current bills” of the company as of that date. The government, if it had so desired, for the purpose of collecting the taxes in controversy could have distrained the property of the company while it was in the company’s possession; and if Clifford, Glabaznya, and Bauer had sustained a loss by reason thereof they could have recovered to the extent of that loss on the warranty given them by respondents, and thus the same result would have been accomplished as is now1 sought by the Commissioner in this proceeding. But the fact that the purchasers could' have recovered on respondents’ warranty for the taxes collected by the government out of the assets of the company does not authorize the government to sue respondents directly for those taxes after the assets have been disposed of by the company.. It is quite obvious that up to the time the agreement was signed by respondents they were not personally liable for the company’s taxes. There is no fraud claimed, and it is conceded that respondents acted in good faith. If they became liable by signing the agreement, it is on the theory that, when a contract is entered into for the benefit of a third party, that party may recover on it-provided he brings himself within the terms of the promise which he claims was made for his benefit. In such cases the contracts should be construed with at least reasonable strictness against the third party, who seeks to benefit by it. In the instant case the burden is upon the government to establish the fact that its claim for taxes due iñ 1920 to 1923, inclusive, constituted a “current bill” of the company on August 1, 1925, and in this it has failed. Respondents challenge the right of the Commissioner to appeal from an adverse decision of the Board of Tax Appeals. We think there is no merit in this contention. In Commissioner v. Liberty Bank & Trust Company, 59 F.(2d) 320, decided May 12, 1932, by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the court, in a very lucid and exhaustive opinion, held that the Commissioner.has such right of appeal, and we think the ruling is correct. Decree affirmed.