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Levi v. George
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT JUN 21 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
SIMON LEVI, No. 08-15242
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. CV-07-04378-MHP
v. MEMORANDUM * STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Marilyn H. Patel, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 25, 2010 ** Before: CANBY, THOMAS, and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges.
Simon Levi appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his action against the State Bar of California and Justices of the California Supreme
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Court as barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003), and we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.
The district court properly concluded that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred the action because it is a forbidden de facto appeal of the California Supreme Court’s decision denying Levi’s application for admission to the bar, and the remaining claims are inextricably intertwined with the forbidden appeal. See id. at 1158; Craig v. State Bar of Cal., 141 F.3d 1353, 1354 (9th Cir. 1998) (explaining that “[u]nder California law, only the state supreme court . . . has the authority to grant or deny admission to the bar[,]” and holding that “[b]ecause [plaintiff sought] review of the California Supreme Court’s decision to deny his individual application, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction” pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine).
We do not consider issues raised in the opening brief for which Levi developed no argument. See Acosta-Huerta v. Estelle, 7 F.3d 139, 144 (9th Cir. 1992) (issues raised in pro se litigant’s brief but not supported by argument are deemed waived).
Dismissals under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine are dismissals for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, Kougasian v. TMSL, 359 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2004), and thus, should be dismissed without prejudice, Freeman v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 179 F.3d 846, 847 (9th Cir. 1999) (order). Accordingly, we vacate in part the judgment, and remand for the limited purpose of dismissing the action without prejudice.
The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
AFFIRMED in part; VACATED in part; REMANDED.
Footnotes
[2] 08-15242
[3] 08-15242