Andrew v. CHEVY CHASE BUICK

PER CURIAM: On September 15, 2008, counsel for Chevy Chase Buick wrote a letter to the Clerk of this Court in which he noted that, while the dispositive issues below had been resolved, a motion for attorney’s fees filed by Hyundai Motor Finance Co. remained pending in the trial court. Construing the letter as a motion to dismiss for lack of appellate jurisdiction, we deny it. A judgment is final for purposes of appeal notwithstanding the pendency of a post-trial motion for attorney’s fees. See Pallie v. Riggs Nat’l Bank, 697 A.2d 1289, 1242 n. 1 (D.C.1997); Dyer v. William S. Bergman & Assocs., Inc., 635 A.2d 1285, 1288 (D.C. 1993) (citing Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 108 S.Ct. 1717, 100 L.Ed.2d 178 (1988)); Marlyn Condo., Inc. v. McDowell, 576 A.2d 1346, 1347 n. 1 (D.C.1990); see also Valentine v. Elliott (In re Estate of Delaney), 819 A.2d 968, 1001 (D.C.2003) (“[W]hen a requested amendment raises issues that are, for all practical purposes, collateral to and separate from the decision on the merits, the order disposing of the merits remains ap-pealable.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). So ordered.