Arco Industries Corp. v. American Motorists Insurance

Mackenzie, J. This case is before us on rehearing, limited to part vm of our most recent opinion in this *146 dispute, Arco Industries Corp v American Motorists Ins Co (On Second Remand), 232 Mich App 146, 170-171; __ NW2d __ (1998). In part vin, we originally held that, in accordance with the language of the majority opinion in Yaldo v North Pointe Ins Co, 457 Mich 341; 578 NW2d 274 (1998), Arco was entitled to collect twelve percent penalty interest pursuant to MCL 500.2006; MSA 24.12006. Upon further review, we conclude that our reliance on Yaldo was misplaced. We now affirm the trial court’s determination that Arco could not collect twelve percent penalty interest under the statute. Yaldo involved the fire loss of a building sold on a land contract and the insurer’s subsequent refusal to pay the plaintiff land-contract vendor under its policy’s loss payable clause. After a judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff, a dispute arose concerning the rate of interest on the judgment. The plaintiff contended that the insurance policy was a “written instrument,” entitling him to twelve percent judgment interest under MCL 600.6013(5); MSA 27A.6013(5). The insurer, on the other hand, asserted that the lower interest rate set forth in MCL 600.6013(6); MSA 27A.6013(6) applied because its policy was not a “written instrument” within the meaning of subsection 5. Yaldo, supra, pp 343-345. Thus, as the Yaldo majority acknowledged, the issue before the Court was “whether subsection 5 or subsection 6 of MCL 600.6013; MSA 27A.6013” applied for purposes of computing interest on the judgment. Id., p 344. The Court determined that the term “written instrument” as used in MCL 600.6013(5); MSA 27A.6013(5) was “clear and unambiguous,” and held that an “insurance *147 policy is a written instrument,” entitling the plaintiff to twelve percent judgment interest. Id., p 346. After resolving the issue, the Yaldo majority then turned to additional arguments raised by the defendant, including a claim that this Court erred in its opinion, see 217 Mich App 617, 622, n 1; 552 NW2d 657 (1996), when it observed that, even if subsection 5 did not apply, twelve percent interest could have been awarded under MCL 500.2006(4); MSA 24.12006(4), governing penalty interest when an insurance company is dilatory in making timely payments on a claim. The Yaldo majority found no error, stating that “[w]here the action is based solely on contract, the insurance company can be penalized with twelve percent interest, even if the claim is reasonably in dispute.” Yaldo, supra, p 348, n 4. It was this interpretation of MCL 500.2006(4); MSA 24.12006(4) upon which we relied in part vm. Arco, supra, p 171. Upon further review, we conclude that the Yaldo majority’s interpretation of MCL 500.2006(4); MSA 24.12006(4) was dictum. At issue in Yaldo was the interpretation and application of the judgment interest statute, MCL 600.6013; MSA 27A.6013, and not the penalty interest statute. It is a well-settled rule that statements concerning a principle of law not essential to determination of the case are obiter dictum and lack the force of an adjudication. Roberts v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 422 Mich 594, 597-598; 374 NW2d 905 (1985); Auto-Owners Ins Co v Stenberg Bros, Inc, 227 Mich App 45, 51-52; 575 NW2d 79 (1997). The portion of the Yaldo majority opinion discussing MCL 500.2006(4); MSA 24.12006(4) was not necessary to its decision of the issue before the Court and must therefore be regarded as merely dictum that is not binding *148 on this Court. Compare Auto Club Ins Ass’n v State Farm Ins Cos, 221 Mich App 154, 170, n 5; 561 NW2d 445 (1997). Accordingly, Yaldo did not establish a rule of law with regard to the interpretation of MCL 500.2006(4); MSA 24.12006(4). Since 1983, when this Court decided Siller v Employers Ins of Wausau, 123 Mich App 140, 143-144; 333 NW2d 197 (1983), it has been clearly established that, in cases involving claims of breach of an insurance contract, under MCL 500.2006; MSA 24.12006 “an insurer may refuse to pay a claim and be relieved of paying interest on the claim only when ‘the claim is reasonably in dispute.’ ” The Siller interpretation has been followed in Norgan v American Way Life Ins Co, 188 Mich App 158, 164; 469 NW2d 23 (1991), and by federal courts applying Michigan law. See Bd of Trustees of Michigan State Univ v Continental Casualty Co, 730 F Supp 1408, 1416-1417 (WD Mich, 1990). See also Jones v Jackson Nat’l Life Ins, 819 F Supp 1372, 1379 (WD Mich, 1993), aff'd 27 F3d 566 (CA 6, 1994); All American Life & Casualty Co v Oceanic Trade Alliance Council Int’l, Inc, 756 F2d 474, 480-482 (CA 6, 1985). The purpose of the penalty interest statute is to penalize insurers for dilatory practices in settling meritorious claims, not to compensate a plaintiff for delay in recovering benefits to which the plaintiff is ultimately determined to be entitled. Jones, supra, p 1379. See also Fletcher v Aetna Casualty & Surety Co, 80 Mich App 439, 445; 264 NW2d 19 (1978). In its June 9, 1989, opinion denying Arco an award of penalty interest, the trial court specifically found that AMCO had disputed its defense obligation to Arco in good faith, that there were legitimate issues being *149 contested, and that there had been no effort to delay or to forestall the recovery of benefits given the complexity of the case. The lengthy history of this case— including, to date, three visits to this Court and two to the Supreme Court — amply supports the court’s finding. Applying the reasoning of Siller, supra, and its progeny, we therefore affirm the trial court’s determination that Arco was not entitled to twelve percent penalty interest under MCL 500.2006; MSA 24.12006, because amico’s obligation to pay benefits under its policies was reasonably in dispute. In all other respects, we adhere to our decision reported at 232 Mich App 146; __ NW2d __ (1998).