Alexander v. Union Planters Bank

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT _______________

m 00-60301 Summary Calendar _______________

FIDELIA ALEXANDER, ETC., ET AL.,

Plaintiffs,

CLINTON ALEXANDER AND BENEFICIARIES OF THE BEBE ALEXANDER FAMILY TRUST,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

VERSUS

UNION PLANTERS BANK,

Defendant-Appellee.

_________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi (2:98-CV-128-B-B) _________________________ September 15, 2000

Before SMITH, BENAVIDES, and JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:* DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the (continued...)

then dismissed so they could refile in another Clinton Alexander, pro se, appeals, for her- county. self and as next-friend of her sister, Fidelia Al- exander, a summary judgment declaring that a Before plaintiffs refiled, the bank sued in previous settlement agreement releases defen- yet a third county, seeking to resign as trustee, dant Union Planters Bank from any liability for to have the rights of the beneficiaries of the the matters being litigated in this suit. We af- trust determined, and to be discharged from firm, concluding that the district court further obligations under the trust. On the correctly held that the language of the date of trial, the parties entered into a settlement agreement unambiguously governs settlement agreement stating, inter alia, that these issues, that there is no evidence of fraud “all claims now existing or alleged to exist or inequitable conduct, and that there was among the parties in this case are released and adequate consideration to form a valid discharged . . . .” contract. Fidelia and Clinton then filed the instant I. suit, seeking damages from the bank for Fidelia and Clinton Alexander were breaches of fiduciary duties and fraudulent be- beneficiaries under the Bebe H. Alexander havior with respect to the administration of the Family Trust, created by the will of their trust. They claim that the term “parties” in the grandfather. His daughter, Bebe, and Clinton 1996 settlement referred only to the and Fidelia were beneficiaries. beneficiaries of the trust and not to the bank, even though the bank was the plaintiff in that Most of the payments from the trust were case. Plaintiffs argue that the fact that the made to Bebe, but Fidelia and Clinton then bank interpreted the term “parties” to include requested that payments be made to them. it means there was no meeting of the minds. The will provided that the bank as trustee, at The bank disagrees, reasoning that the plain its discretion, could make payments for such language of the settlement releases it from all purposes. After considering Fidelia and Clin- liability that existed to Fidelia and Clinton as of ton’s request, the bank denied them any the time of the settlement. payments, instead choosing to continue to pay the majority of the income to Bebe. III. We review a summary judgment de novo. II. See Rivers v. Central & S.W. Corp., 186 F.3d Fidelia and Clinton, pro se, sued the bank in 681, 682 (5th Cir. 1999). The district court state court, accusing it of various violations of correctly determined that the language of the its duty as trustee, including failing to sell the settlement unambiguously released all parties farm in 1980 when land prices were at a peak to that suit from any liability that existed and violating the trust’s terms by paying most among them at that time. It is hard to imagine of the income to Bebe. Fidelia and Clinton how a global settlement could be much more plainly worded than “all claims now existing or alleged to exist among the parties in this case * (...continued) are released and discharged . . . .” This limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. unambiguous language precludes us from 47.5.4. going beyond the written words of the

settlement and delving into parole evidence of etc.” Taylor v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., what the parties intended when they signed the 519 So. 2d 436, 438 (Miss. 1988). agreement. See Cooper v. Crabb, 587 So. 2d 236, 241 (Miss. 1991). Although plaintiffs allege “sheer chicanery” and “bad faith and trickery” on the part of the Any party represented by competent bank’s attorney, we find no evidence of fraud counsel should have realized that this in the record. Indeed, the record shows that agreement would be interpreted to release the the settlement was negotiated by the lawyers bank from all liability. It is undisputed, for the two divided camps of beneficiaries, and however, that Clinton and Fidelia Alexander there is no record of the attorney’s making any made an honest mistake in thinking that the representations at all as to the meaning of the settlement agreement did not include the settlement terms to either Clinton and Fidelia bank.1 Unfortunately for them, no matter how or their attorneys. sincere their mistaken belief was that the agreement did not release the bank from The bank’s attorney was present in the liability, “[a] unilateral mistake will not be the courtroom and did sign the agreement, but basis for upsetting a settlement unless there is there is no evidence whatsoever of fraud on his some evidence of fraud, duress, overreaching, part. Plaintiffs’ argument that he is guilty of bad faith and trickery is instead made in response to his taking the position that the set- 1 The undisputed evidence is that the sisters tlement agreementSSwhich he signed in were both too ill to be in the courtroom and settlement of the case in which his client was therefore had to have their attorneys relay the the plaintiffSSapplied to his client. settlement negotiations to them in a separate room. Thus, the fact that they may have become confused Plaintiffs contend that the settlement could as to the exact wording and intent of the settlement is somewhat understandable. More remarkable are not include the bank because they were the af_fidavits from the sisters’ attorneys in which “specific in their instructions that no settlement they seem to trumpet their own shortcomings. agreement should bar their eventual claim They state that when Wright signed the settlement against Union Planters for damages.” agreement, they both believed that it did not release Therefore, they argue, any interpretation of the Bank from any liability. They further state in “parties” that includes Union Planters Bank is their affidavits SS which are identically either erroneous or trickery. wordedSSthat the Bank should have communicated more plainly that the settlement agreement released Plaintiffs, however, have failed to allege to it from liability. whom, if anyone, other than their attorneys, Had the ailing sisters been negotiating for they gave these specific instructions. They them_selves we might consider the question of further do not allege that the bank was aware whether the Bank should have explained each ele- of their desire to reserve the right to sue the ment of the settlement agreement to them. But bank for breach of its duties as trustee, or that where, as here, clients are represented by supposedly competent counsel, we reject any the bank or its attorneys ever communicated argument that opposing counsel has a duty to make anything to them about the meaning of the sure that each unambiguous part of an agreement agreement. Therefore, the fact that the is subjectively understood by both lawyer and settlement agreement stated that it released all client. “parties in the case” cannot lead to recission of

the contract on grounds that plaintiffs were fraudulently induced to make a unilateral mistake.

Plaintiffs alternatively aver that there was no consideration given by the bank in exchange for its release from liability. They argue that the bank agreed to do no more than fulfill its pre-existing duties as trustee, which cannot amount to consideration given in exchange for a promise to release it from liability. Plaintiffs do not recognize, however, that the bank dropped its suit seeking court approval to resign as trustee and to be dis- charged from further obligations under the trust. This consideration was sufficient to form a valid contract.

AFFIRMED.