Williams v. City of Pittsburgh

*238 MEMORANDUM ORDER CINDRICH, District Judge. Dorothy Wimbs has moved for reconsideration of the court’s November 20, 1998 Order granting the City of Pittsburgh’s, Earl Buford’s and Scott Ober’s motion for summary judgment against her. Defendants have duly responded. Wimbs first contends that the decision was unexpected because she believed her claims had been entirely transferred to Magistrate Judge Benson by virtue of an amended complaint in the case arising out of the same incident (originally filed against different defendants), Civil Action No. 98-229, filed before him and Judge Ziegler. As explained in our November 20 Order, the cases admittedly were in an awkward procedural position. One option might have been to order the City’s motion for summary judgment to be refiled before Magistrate Judge Benson. Another option we considered just as valid, however, was to decide the motion for summary judgment as part of the Williams case. After all, the motion was filed in Williams, and the response was filed as part of Williams as well. In addition, Wimbs’ response was filed, after several reminders from my staff, after she filed her amended complaint in the ease before Judge Benson. Having responded in this case, it should not be so unexpected that a ruling would be made as part of this case. Finally, the identity of the judicial officer who decides the motion should make no difference. While there was more than one way to resolve the procedural problem, this is no ground for reconsideration. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania has written helpfully on the standard for deciding a motion for reconsideration in this circuit. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that “[t]he purpose of a motion of reconsideration is to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.” Cohen v. Austin, 869 F.Supp. 320, 321 (E.D.Pa.1994) (citing Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir.1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1171, 106 S.Ct. 2895, 90 L.Ed.2d 982 (1986)). Accordingly, a district court will grant a party’s motion for reconsideration in any of three situations: (1) the availability of new evidence not previously available, (2) an intervening change in controlling law, or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or to prevent manifest injustice. Reich v. Compton, 834 F.Supp. 753, 755 (E.D.Pa.1993) (citing Dodge v. Susquehanna Univ., 796 F.Supp. 829, 830 (M.D.Pa.1992)). New Chemic (U.S.), Inc. v. Fine Grinding Corp., 948 F.Supp. 17, 18-19 (E.D.Pa.1996). Because of the interest in finality, at least at the district court level, motions for reconsideration should be granted sparingly; the parties are not free to relitigate issues the court has already decided. Rottmund v. Continental Assurance Co., 813 F.Supp. 1104, 1107 (E.D.Pa.1992). Stated another way, a motion for reconsideration is not properly grounded in a request for a district court to rethink a decision it has already made, rightly or wrongly. Glendon Energy Co. v. Borough of Glendon, 836 F.Supp. 1109, 1122 (E.D.Pa.1993). As the City points out in its response, many parties who lose motions, especially for failures of proof, seek to offer more evidence and ultimately to overturn their loss through reconsideration, after being instructed by the court on the weaknesses of their case. But motions for reconsideration must be strictly reviewed for at least four reasons. First, it would tend to undercut the court’s first decision and transform it into an advisory opinion, which is prohibited. Second, motions for reconsideration run counter to the operation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provide all the necessary safeguards to promote fair decisions. Third, broad interpretation of motions for reconsideration is not supported by controlling precedent. And last but not least, reconsideration of disposi-tive decisions on the grounds advanced by Wimbs hinders the court’s ability to decide motions awaiting resolution that have yet to be reviewed once, let alone twice. Wimbs’ motion fits none of the categories justifying reconsideration cited above. Even if we were to consider the merits of her *239 motion, which we are not inclined to do, Wimbs proposes to submit the affidavit of a physician who she says can link her current speech impediment to defendants’ conduct that allegedly caused it. What was lacking in her opposition to the motion for summary judgment, however, was proof that she was any more than a bystander to the events in question. Her physician is unlikely to provide such proof. Her offer to submit her own affidavit about her fear of bodily harm runs counter to the actual presentation of evidence on summary judgment, when the court examined deposition excerpts she submitted, including from her own deposition, without mentioning any potentially unconstitutional conduct directed toward her. Hackman v. Valley Fair, 932 F.2d 239, 241 (3d Cir.1991) (party cannot submit affidavits to contradict earlier deposition testimony to prevent summary judgment). None of Wimbs’ other suggested alternatives to the court’s entry of summary judgment is persuasive. For the foregoing reasons, Wimbs’ Motion for Reconsideration of Memorandum Order Dated November 20,1998 etc., Doc. No. 132, is DENIED in its entirety. A copy of this memorandum order shall also be filed at Civil Action No. 98-229.