In re: Jessica Seymour

FILED AUG 01 2013 1 SUSAN M SPRAUL, CLERK U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL 2 OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

3 UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL 4 OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT 5 In re: ) BAP No. WW-12-1429-TaPaJu ) 6 JESSICA SEYMOUR, ) Bk. No. 12-14039-TWD ) 7 Debtor. ) ______________________________) 8 ) JESSICA SEYMOUR, ) 9 ) Appellant. ) MEMORANDUM* 10 ______________________________) 11 Submitted Without Oral Argument1 12 on July 25, 2013 13 Filed - August 1, 2013 14 Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Washington 15 Honorable Timothy W. Dore, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding 16 17 Appearances: Jessica Seymour, pro se, on brief. 18 Before: TAYLOR, PAPPAS, and JURY, Bankruptcy Judges. 19 20 21 22 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication. 23 Although it may be cited for whatever persuasive value it may 24 have (see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1), it has no precedential value. See 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8013-1. 25 1 After examination of the appellant’s informal brief and 26 the record, and after notice to the appellant, the Panel 27 unanimously determined that oral argument was not necessary for this appeal and entered an order so providing on April 18, 2013. 28 See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8012.

1 INTRODUCTION 2 Jessica Seymour (“Debtor”) moved to revoke her chapter 7 3 discharge.2 The bankruptcy court entered an order denying her 4 motion. The Debtor appealed. We AFFIRM the bankruptcy court. 5 FACTS 6 The Debtor filed a pro se chapter 7 petition on April 19, 7 2012. On July 26, 2012, the Debtor received her bankruptcy 8 discharge pursuant to § 727. Four days later, on August 1, 2012, 9 the Debtor filed a motion to vacate her discharge (“Motion to 10 Vacate”). Among other things, she asserted that she recently 11 obtained information relating to mortgage fraud in connection 12 with the liens against her scheduled real property. She also 13 asserted that the bankruptcy court failed to advise her to 14 schedule a pending (and allegedly sealed) lawsuit, the outcome of 15 which could possibly benefit her creditors. 16 On August 8, 2012, the bankruptcy court entered an order 17 denying her motion. On August 21, 2012, the Debtor filed her 18 notice of appeal. 19 JURISDICTION 20 The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 21 §§ 1334 and 157(b)(2)(A). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 22 § 158. 23 ISSUE 24 Did the bankruptcy court err when it denied the Debtor’s 25 Motion to Vacate? 26 27 2 Unless otherwise indicated, all chapter and section 28 references are to the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532.

1 STANDARD OF REVIEW 2 We review the bankruptcy court's application of procedural 3 rules and construction of the Bankruptcy Code de novo. All 4 Points Cap. Corp. v. Meyer (In re Meyer), 373 B.R. 84, 87 (9th 5 Cir. BAP 2007). 6 DISCUSSION 7 The Debtor did not identify a legal basis for revocation of 8 discharge, either in her Motion to Vacate or on appeal. 9 To the extent that the Debtor sought relief under § 727(d), 10 the Debtor lacked standing to move for such relief based on the 11 clear language of the statute. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(d) (providing 12 that a chapter 7 trustee, a creditor, or the United States 13 Trustee may seek revocation of a chapter 7 debtor’s discharge); 14 In re Kirksey, 433 B.R. 46, 49 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2010) (debtor is 15 not an approved party permitted to request revocation of 16 discharge under § 727(d)). 17 To the extent that the Debtor sought relief based on the 18 bankruptcy court’s equitable powers under § 105(a), her motion 19 also fails; § 105 cannot be a basis for her requested relief. 20 See Disch v. Rasmussen, 417 F.3d 769, 778 (7th Cir. 2005) 21 ("[S]uch a broad interpretation of § 105(a) would make the list 22 of grounds for revoking a discharge found in § 727(d) 23 meaningless; anything not in the list could come in through the 24 back door of § 105(a)."); see also Loos v. Ayers (In re Loos), 25 2008 WL 8448070, at *5 (9th Cir. BAP Apr. 25, 2008) (same); Tan 26 v. Tranche 1 (SVP–AMC), Inc. (In re Tan), 2007 WL 7541007, at *8 27 (9th Cir. BAP Sept. 28, 2007) (same). 28 We liberally construe a pro se debtor’s pleadings and

1 documents. See Nilsen v. Neilson (In re Cedar Funding, Inc.), 2 419 B.R. 807, 816 (9th Cir. BAP 2009). Here, however, the Debtor 3 presented no cognizable basis for relief. Further, while she 4 asserted that, due to alleged impediments purportedly beyond her 5 control, she previously failed to discover mortgage fraud, failed 6 to schedule certain assets, and otherwise failed to take actions, 7 revocation of her discharge would not assist the Debtor in 8 resolving these issues. Revocation of the Debtor’s discharge, 9 thus, would be a futile and entirely unnecessary act.3 10 Therefore, the bankruptcy court did not err in denying the Motion 11 to Vacate. 12 CONCLUSION 13 Based on the foregoing, we affirm the bankruptcy court. 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 3 Instead, the Debtor should retain her discharge and provide her chapter 7 trustee with information as to newly 26 discovered assets or other relevant matters. The trustee, then, 27 can decide whether any bankruptcy related action is appropriate, and the Debtor can be assured that she fulfilled her obligations 28 to the bankruptcy system.