Neroni v. Becker

SUMMARY ORDER Appellant Frederick Neroni, a disbarred attorney proceeding pro se, appeals the judgment of the district court dismissing his claims against New York state court Judge Carl Becker, who presided over a civil suit against Appellant arising from the events that led to his disbarment. Cf. Mokay v. Mokay, 67 A.D.3d 1210, 889 N.Y.S.2d 291 (3d Dep’t 2009). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal. We review de novo a district court’s decision dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Jaghory v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Educ., 131 F.3d 326, 329 (2d Cir.1997). We also review de novo “the essentially legal determination of whether the requirements for abstention have been met.” Diamond “D” Constr. Corp. v. McGowan, 282 F.3d 191, 197 (2d Cir.2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). We affirm the district court’s dismissal of Appellant’s claims for injunctive relief related to Judge Becker’s rulings in his case or potential future involvement in other cases. His claims for retrospective relief are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 71-73, 106 S.Ct. 423, 88 L.Ed.2d 371 (1985). His claims for prospective injunc-tive relief also fail because, as the district court properly concluded, any potential injury from Judge Becker’s involvement in further state court proceedings involving Appellant are highly speculative given Judge Becker’s recusal from all such cases. See Tom Doherty Assocs., Inc. v. Saban Entm’t, Inc., 60 F.3d 27, 37 (2d Cir.1995) (to warrant injunctive relief, a litigant must show, inter alia, irreparable harm that is “not remote or speculative^] but actual and imminent”). Appellant challenges the constitutionality of two New York statutes. The district court abstained based on the three-part test derived from Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Association, 457 U.S. 423, 432, 102 S.Ct. 2515, 73 L.Ed.2d 116 (1982). See, e.g., Spargo v. N.Y. State Comm’n on Judicial Conduct, 351 F.3d 65, 75 (2d Cir.2003) (“Younger abstention is mandatory when: (1) there is a pending state proceeding, (2) that implicates an important state interest, and (3) the state proceeding affords the federal plaintiff an adequate opportunity for judicial review of his or her federal constitutional claims.”). While this appeal was pending, however, the Supreme Court rejected this three-part test in favor of a categorical approach. See Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, — U.S.-, 134 S.Ct. 584, 591, 593, 187 L.Ed.2d 505 (2013). We therefore vacate the district court’s decision to abstain pursuant to Younger, and remand Appellant’s constitutional claims to the district court with instructions to consider, in the first instance, whether abstention remains appropriate in light of Sprint. In doing so, we express no opinion as to the continued applicability of Younger in this case or as to the merits of Appellant’s claims. The district court’s dismissal of Appellant’s claims for injunctive relief is AFFIRMED. We VACATE AND REMAND for further consideration that portion of the district court’s decision in *120 which it abstained from deciding Appellant’s constitutional claims. -s IO f KEY NUMBER SYSTEM y