In re: Gregory Fredrick Wackerman

FILED JUN 30 2014 1 NO FO PUBL A IO T R IC T N SUSAN M. SPRAUL, CLERK U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL 2 OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT 3 UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL 4 OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT 5 In re: ) BAP No. EC-13-1277-KuJuTa ) 6 GREGORY FREDRICK WACKERMAN, ) Bk. No. 12-14331 ) 7 Debtor. ) Adv. No. 12-01142 ______________________________) 8 ) GREGORY FREDRICK WACKERMAN, ) 9 ) Appellant, ) 10 ) v. ) MEMORANDUM* 11 ) BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.; U.S. ) 12 BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION; ) RECONTRUST COMPANY, N.A., ) 13 ) Appellees. ) 14 ______________________________) 15 Argued and Submitted on May 15, 2014 at Sacramento, California [16] Filed – June 30, 2014 [17] Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court 18 for the Eastern District of California 19 Honorable Fredrick E. Clement, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding [20] Appearances: Jerry R. Lowe argued for appellant; Matthew James 21 Brady of Reed Smith, LLP argued for appellees. [22] Before: KURTZ, JURY and TAYLOR, Bankruptcy Judges. [25] 26 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication. 27 Although it may be cited for whatever persuasive value it may have (see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1), it has no precedential value. 28 See 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8013-1. 1 INTRODUCTION 2 Debtor Gregory Fredrick Wackerman appeals from a summary 3 judgment ruling in favor of defendants Bank of America, N.A., 4 U.S. Bank National Association and ReconTrust Company, N.A. 5 Wackerman also appeals from the denial of his motion for 6 reconsideration. In both instances, Wackerman’s arguments on 7 appeal boil down to whether the bankruptcy court should have 8 given him further opportunities to obtain and present evidence to 9 support his positions. 10 In the first instance, Wackerman in essence argues that the 11 bankruptcy court should have continued the summary judgment 12 proceedings so that he could have a further opportunity to obtain 13 and present evidence on the dispositive issue: the timing of 14 defendants’ foreclosure sale. But Wackerman never requested such 15 a continuance. We will not reverse the bankruptcy court for not 16 granting relief Wackerman never requested. 17 In the second instance, Wackerman argues that the bankruptcy 18 court should have given him a second chance to present sufficient 19 evidence to support his reconsideration motion. But Wackerman 20 did not ask for this second chance until the hearing on the 21 reconsideration motion was in progress, and after the court had 22 announced its tentative ruling to deny the reconsideration 23 motion. In denying Wackerman’s request, the bankruptcy court 24 duly and properly exercised its discretion. Even though another 25 judge may have decided the matter differently, the bankruptcy 26 court applied the correct legal standard and did not make any 27 clearly erroneous findings of fact. Accordingly, we AFFIRM. [2] 1 FACTS 2 The relevant facts are largely undisputed. On May 14, 2012, 3 somewhere between 10:00 a.m. and 10:30 a.m., defendants conducted 4 a nonjudicial foreclosure sale of Wackerman’s residence located 5 in Mariposa, California. That same morning, at 10:11 a.m., 6 Wackerman commenced his chapter 131 bankruptcy case. Wackerman 7 then filed an adversary complaint alleging that the sale violated 8 the automatic stay. The complaint sought a declaratory judgment 9 that the sale was void, as well as compensatory damages, punitive 10 damages and attorney’s fees. 11 After defendants answered the complaint, the parties 12 submitted a joint discovery plan, which the court adopted as an 13 order of the court by order entered October 17, 2012.2 That 14 order set a discovery cutoff date of January 15, 2013. On 15 January 31, 2013, after the close of discovery, defendants filed 16 their summary judgment motion. Defendants asserted that they 17 were entitled to summary judgment because the foreclosure sale 18 was completed before Wackerman filed his bankruptcy case, so the 19 automatic stay was not yet in effect at the time the sale [20] 21 1 Unless specified otherwise, all chapter and section 22 references are to the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532 , and all Rule references are to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy 23 Procedure. All Civil Rule references are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. [2] The parties did not provide us with copies of their joint 25 discovery plan or of the bankruptcy court’s October 17, 2012 26 order. However, we were able to obtain copies of these and other documents from the bankruptcy court’s docket. We can take 27 judicial notice of items in the bankruptcy court record. See O'Rourke v. Seaboard Sur. Co. (In re E.R. Fegert, Inc.), 887 F.2d 28 955 , 957–58 (9th Cir. 1989). [3] 1 occurred. As a result, defendants reasoned, none of Wackerman’s 2 claims for relief had any merit, because they were all premised 3 on the allegation that the sale violated the automatic stay. 4 In support of their claim that the sale occurred before the 5 bankruptcy case was filed, defendants relied on the declaration 6 of Mary Lou McKeighan filed in support of the summary judgment 7 motion (“McKeighan MSJ Declaration”). McKeighan declared that 8 she served as auctioneer at the sale and that, at the conclusion 9 of the sale, she checked the time on her mobile phone and 10 recorded that time onto a sale log. According to McKeighan, she 11 routinely takes notes and records them onto a sale log 12 immediately after the conclusion of each sale she conducts. A 13 copy of the sale log from the sale of Wackerman’s residence is 14 attached as an exhibit to the McKeighan MSJ Declaration and 15 indicates under the heading “sale results” that the residence was 16 sold “back to beneficiary” at “10:06”. Based on her sale log 17 notes, McKeighan declared that the sale of Wackerman’s residence 18 concluded at 10:06 a.m. on May 14, 2012. 19 Wackerman filed a half-page opposition to the summary 20 judgment motion. Wackerman claimed that the precise time of the 21 sale, and whether it concluded before or after the bankruptcy 22 filing, was a genuine issue of material fact. But Wackerman did 23 not submit any evidence in support of this claim. Instead, 24 Wackerman asserted that the bankruptcy court should deny the 25 summary judgment motion and reopen discovery because defendants 26 had not disclosed to Wackerman the precise information contained 27 in the McKeighan MSJ Declaration, nor had they disclosed the sale 28 log from the sale of Wackerman’s residence. [4] 1 In light of Wackerman’s opposition, the bankruptcy court 2 entered an order continuing the summary judgment hearing from 3 February 28, 2013 to March 28, 2013. The order directed the 4 parties to file supplemental declarations explaining whether 5 defendants had made the requisite disclosures under Civil 6 Rule 26(a)(1) regarding McKeighan and regarding the sale log and, 7 if not, what were the proper remedies for the nondisclosure. 8 In accordance with the court’s order, Wackerman’s counsel 9 filed a declaration in which he admitted that defendants had 10 disclosed McKeighan’s identity, her contact information and a 11 copy of a different declaration by McKeighan – her September 2012 12 declaration filed in the main bankruptcy case in support of 13 defendants’ motion for relief from stay (“McKeighan MRS 14 Declaration”). 15 Even so, Wackerman argued that defendants also should have 16 disclosed the sale log and the contents of the McKeighan MSJ 17 Declaration. According to Wackerman, the appropriate remedy for 18 this failure to disclose was denial of the summary judgment 19 motion and the reopening of discovery so that Wackerman could 20 take McKeighan’s deposition. 21 In addition, Wackerman filed his own declaration in which he 22 stated that he had been diligently searching for a man he met on 23 the date of the sale outside the building where the sale 24 occurred. Even though Wackerman was not able to identify this 25 man by name and did not know precisely what the man would say if 26 asked, Wackerman believed the man would testify that the sale 27 occurred several minutes later than as declared by McKeighan. In 28 relevant part, Wackerman declared as follows: [5] 1 Before the auction began, I spoke with a gentleman who represented to me that he was attending the auction to 2 bid on my home. I told him that I was trying to file bankruptcy to stop the sale. He went inside the 3 building where the auction was being conducted and I stayed outside to discuss the status of the bankruptcy 4 filing with my attorney Jerry R. Lowe. I spoke with the gentleman as he was leaving and I asked him whether 5 my house sold. He indicated to me that he did not bid on it because I was filing bankruptcy, but that it had 6 sold. As a result of my conversation with him, I have reason to believe that the sale of the home took place 7 closer to 10:30 a.m. I have been diligently attempting to locate this gentleman again so that my attorney may 8 discuss the issue of when the sale actually happened. 9 Wackerman Declaration (March 14, 2013) at ¶ 2. 10 Meanwhile, defendants’ counsel filed a declaration in which 11 he claimed that any omission in defendants’ initial disclosure 12 was harmless because Wackerman’s counsel had admitted to him that 13 he was aware of the McKeighan MRS Declaration in which McKeighan 14 had similarly testified that the sale occurred at 10:06 a.m. on 15 May 14, 2012. As for the sale log, defendants’ counsel testified 16 that he was not aware of its existence until two days before he 17 filed the summary judgment motion. Based on these facts, 18 defendants contended (1) that Wackerman knew from the contents of 19 the McKeighan MRS Declaration that McKeighan would testify that 20 the sale occurred at 10:06 a.m. on May 14, 2012, (2) that 21 Wackerman had ample opportunity before the discovery cutoff to 22 take McKeighan’s deposition but chose not to do so, and (3) that 23 discovery should not be reopened and the summary judgment motion 24 should be granted. 25 The bankruptcy court held a hearing on the summary judgment [6] 1 motion on March 28, 2013.3 Defendant’s counsel appeared at the 2 hearing, but no one appeared on behalf of Wackerman. At the 3 hearing, the court adopted its tentative ruling as its final 4 ruling. As set forth in that ruling, the bankruptcy court agreed 5 with all of defendants’ contentions. It further ruled that 6 defendants had adequately disclosed McKeighan’s identity and 7 contact information and that Civil Rule 26(a) did not require 8 defendants to disclose the contents of McKeighan’s anticipated 9 summary judgment declaration testimony. 10 As for the sale log, the court credited the declaration 11 testimony of defendants’ counsel indicating that defendants were 12 unaware of the sale log until a couple of days before the filing 13 of the summary judgment motion. According to the court, prior to 14 filing their summary judgment motion, defendants did not have 15 possession, custody or control of the sale log, so they were not 16 obligated to provide Wackerman with a copy of it as part of their 17 initial disclosures or as part of their continuing duty to update 18 their disclosures. Based on McKeighan’s testimony regarding the 19 nature of the sale log, the nature of her role in the sale, and 20 the nature of her affiliation with LPS Agency Sales & Posting, 21 Inc., the company that conducted the sale, the court concluded 22 that the sale log was an internal document that McKeighan kept 23 for her own records and that the relationship between McKeighan 24 and defendants was too attenuated for the court to conclude that [25] 26 3 The parties have not provided us with a copy of the 27 transcript from the March 28, 2013 hearing. However, we were able to obtain a copy of this transcript from the bankruptcy 28 court’s docket. See In re E.R. Fegert, Inc., 887 F.2d at 957–58. [7] 1 defendants had control over the document for disclosure purposes. 2 With respect to Wackerman’s declaration, the court 3 determined that the portions of the declaration which arguably 4 could support Wackerman’s allegation that the sale occurred after 5 his bankruptcy filing were all inadmissible hearsay or were based 6 on Wackerman’s lack of personal knowledge. Therefore, the court 7 explained, Wackerman had failed to present any admissible 8 evidence to counter defendants’ evidence demonstrating that the 9 sale concluded before the bankruptcy filing. Hence, the 10 bankruptcy court concluded that defendants had met their summary 11 judgment burden, Wackerman had not met his summary judgment 12 burden, and defendants were entitled to summary judgment. 13 On April 16, 2013, the day after the court entered summary 14 judgment in favor of defendants, Wackerman filed a motion for 15 reconsideration based on his receipt of newly discovered 16 evidence. This newly discovered evidence consisted of the 17 declaration testimony of Daniel McMonegal. Contrary to 18 McKeighan’s testimony that the sale concluded at 10:06 a.m., 19 McMonegal declared that the sale concluded at approximately 20 10:20 a.m. According to McMonegal, he attended the sale of 21 Wackerman’s residence because he was interested in potentially 22 bidding for the property. McMonegal indicated that, while he was 23 at the sale, he was very conscious of the time because he was 24 scheduled to pick up his girlfriend at 10:30 a.m., and he did not 25 want to be late. As McMonegal put it, it was roughly a five 26 minute drive to the place where he was supposed to pick up his 27 girlfriend, and he left the building where the sale was taking 28 place as soon as the sale concluded. McMonegal further declared [8] 1 that the sale did not begin promptly at 10:00 a.m. as scheduled 2 but rather was slightly delayed. Consequently, he stated, he was 3 checking his phone regularly to ensure he would be on time to 4 pick up his girlfriend. 5 Wackerman also filed with his reconsideration motion his own 6 declaration. In his declaration, he attempted to establish that 7 he was diligent in seeking this newly discovered evidence, by 8 declaring as follows: 9 Prior to the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, I made diligent efforts to locate a witness 10 who was present at the May 14, 2012, foreclosure hearing. My efforts included, but were not limited to, 11 asking people I knew, and other persons who I believed lived in Mariposa, California, if they were present at 12 the foreclosure auction or knew of anyone who was present at the foreclosure auction. On or about 13 April 6, 2013, Daniel McMonegal, came forward, and informed me that he was present at the foreclosure 14 sale. 15 Wackerman Decl. (April 30, 2013) at ¶ 2. 16 The bankruptcy court held a hearing on the reconsideration 17 motion on May 31, 2013. In the court’s tentative ruling, which 18 it adopted as its final ruling, the court acknowledged that 19 Wackerman’s newly discovered evidence, if timely presented to the 20 court in conjunction with Wackerman’s opposition to the summary 21 judgment motion, might have supported Wackerman’s factual 22 position regarding the time of sale sufficient to establish the 23 time of sale as a genuine issue of material fact that would have 24 prevented the court from entering summary judgment in favor of 25 defendants. However, the court was not persuaded that Wackerman 26 had adequately established that he had exercised reasonable 27 diligence in locating McMonegal and obtaining his declaration 28 testimony. [9] 1 At the hearing, Wackerman orally requested that the court 2 give him the opportunity to present additional testimony 3 regarding his diligence, but the court declined to do so. 4 According to the court, Wackerman had already been given ample 5 opportunity to make his case on the diligence issue, and the 6 court was not going to reopen the record to permit him to attempt 7 to cure the insufficiency of his evidence regarding diligence. 8 In the bankruptcy court’s own words: 9 The problem here is this came up for summary judgment, and you knew that was coming, and then there 10 was a motion to [reconsider] that, so – you’ve known all along, so we’re not going to take supplemental 11 testimony. You’ve had a couple of bites at this apple. 12 You need to make the argument on the record you’ve got ‘cause I’m not going to add – I’m not going to 13 supplement the record. This would be the third time we’ve come around to this. [14] 15 Hr’g Trans. (May 31, 2013) at 4:5-13. 16 On June 3, 2013, the bankruptcy court entered an order 17 denying Wackerman’s reconsideration motion, and on June 11, 2013, 18 Wackerman timely filed a notice of appeal seeking review of the 19 denial of the reconsideration motion as well as the court’s 20 April 16, 2013 summary judgment in favor of defendants. 21 JURISDICTION 22 The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 23 §§ 1334 and 157(b)(2)(A). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 24 § 158. 25 ISSUES 26 1. Did the bankruptcy court correctly determine that 27 defendants were entitled to summary judgment? 28 2. Did the bankruptcy court abuse its discretion by [10] 1 granting summary judgment without giving Wackerman more time to 2 identify and locate a third party witness to the sale? 3 3. Was the bankruptcy court’s finding regarding defendants’ 4 lack of control over the sale log clearly erroneous? 5 4. Did the bankruptcy court abuse its discretion by denying 6 Wackerman’s reconsideration motion? 7 5. Did the bankruptcy court abuse its discretion by not 8 giving Wackerman another opportunity to establish that he was 9 reasonably diligent in seeking and obtaining his newly discovered 10 evidence? 11 STANDARDS OF REVIEW 12 We review the bankruptcy court’s grant of summary judgment 13 de novo. Boyajian v. New Falls Corp. (In re Boyajian), 564 F.3d 14 1088, 1090 (9th Cir. 2009); Lopez v. Emergency Serv. Restoration, 15 Inc. (In re Lopez), 367 B.R. 99, 103 (9th Cir. BAP 2007). 16 We review the bankruptcy court’s denial of an extension of 17 time to respond to a summary judgment motion for an abuse of 18 discretion. Ahanchian v. Xenon Pictures, Inc., 624 F.3d 1253 , 19 1258 (9th Cir. 2010). We similarly review for an abuse of 20 discretion the bankruptcy court’s denial of a reconsideration 21 motion. First Ave. W. Bldg. LLC v. James (In re OneCast Media, 22 Inc.), 439 F.3d 558, 561 (9th Cir. 2006); Heritage Pac. Fin., LLC 23 v. Montano (In re Montano), 501 B.R. 96, 105 (9th Cir. BAP 2013). 24 Under the abuse of discretion standard of review, we apply a 25 two-part test. First, we "determine de novo whether the 26 [bankruptcy] court identified the correct legal rule to apply to 27 the relief requested." United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247 , 28 1262 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc). And, second, if the bankruptcy [11] 1 court identified the correct legal rule, we then determine under 2 the clearly erroneous standard whether its factual findings and 3 its application of the facts to the relevant law were: 4 "(1) illogical, (2) implausible, or (3) without support in 5 inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the record." Id. 6 (internal quotation marks omitted). 7 Whether the sale log was in defendants’ control for 8 discovery and disclosure purposes was a question of fact. See, 9 e.g., Nosal v. Granite Park LLC, 269 F.R.D. 284, 290-91 (S.D.N.Y. 10 2010); DL v. District of Columbia, 251 F.R.D. 38, 46 (D.D.C. 11 2008). We review the bankruptcy court’s control finding, and all 12 other factual findings, under the clearly erroneous standard, 13 which requires us to consider whether those findings were 14 “illogical, implausible, or without support in the record.” See 15 Retz v. Samson (In re Retz), 606 F.3d 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2010). 16 DISCUSSION 17 Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine 18 issues of material fact and when viewing the evidence most 19 favorably to the non-moving party, the movant is entitled to 20 prevail as a matter of law. Civil Rule 56 (made applicable in 21 adversary proceedings by Rule 7056); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, [22] 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). Material facts that would preclude 23 summary judgment are those which, under applicable substantive 24 law, may affect the outcome of the case. The substantive law 25 determines which facts are material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 26 Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 27 Civil Rule 56 “mandates” summary judgment when, after 28 adequate opportunity for discovery, the adverse party fails to [12] 1 present evidence in response to a summary judgment motion 2 sufficient to establish the existence of an essential element of 3 that party's case, on which that party would bear the burden of 4 proof at trial. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322 . As the Supreme 5 Court explained, “In such a situation, there can be ‘no genuine 6 issue as to any material fact,’ since a complete failure of proof 7 concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case 8 necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. at 322-23 . 9 Here, Wackerman as the plaintiff would have the burden of 10 proof at trial to establish all of the elements supporting his 11 claim that defendants violated the automatic stay. See Fernandez 12 v. G.E. Capital Mortg. Servs. (In re Fernandez), 227 B.R. 174 , 13 180-81 (9th Cir. BAP 1998). This burden would require Wackerman 14 to present evidence at trial that the sale occurred after 15 Wackerman filed his bankruptcy case. Before the bankruptcy case 16 was filed, there was no automatic stay to violate. See Hillis 17 Motors, Inc. v. Hawaii Auto. Dealers' Ass'n, 997 F.2d 581 , 585 18 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating that automatic stay arises upon the 19 commencement of the bankruptcy case); Pierce v. Carson 20 (In re Rader), 488 B.R. 406, 411 (9th Cir. BAP 2013) (same). 21 Wackerman has not disputed that the critical event in terms 22 of the foreclosure was the completion of the auction sale on 23 May 14, 2012. Under California law, the recordation of the 24 trustee’s deed of sale relates back to the date the auction sale 25 actually occurred so long as the deed is recorded within fifteen 26 days of the sale. See Cal. Civ. Code § 2924h(c); Bebensee–Wong 27 v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n (In re Bebensee–Wong), 248 B.R. 820 , 28 822–823 (9th Cir. BAP 2000). Wackerman also has not disputed [13] 1 that ReconTrust recorded the trustee’s deed on May 29, 2012, 2 within fifteen days of the sale. 3 Instead, Wackerman contends that the time of the actual sale 4 was a genuine issue of material fact. According to Wackerman, 5 his declaration in opposition to the summary judgment motion was 6 sufficient to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of 7 material fact concerning the time of the sale. We disagree. For 8 summary judgment purposes, “[a]n issue is ‘genuine’ only if there 9 is sufficient evidence for a reasonable fact finder to find for 10 the non-moving party.” Far Out Productions, Inc. v. Oskar, [11] 247 F.3d 986, 992 (9th Cir. 2001). The bankruptcy court here 12 determined that all of the statements in Wackerman’s declaration 13 regarding the time of sale were inadmissible. Wackerman has not 14 challenged on appeal this evidentiary ruling, nor does there 15 appear to be any legitimate basis for doing so. On their face, 16 Wackerman’s statements regarding what a third party told him 17 about the time of sale are hearsay. Moreover, Wackerman 18 effectively conceded that he had no personal knowledge as to the 19 precise time of sale because he admitted that he did not witness 20 the sale. 21 Consequently, Wackerman presented no admissible evidence 22 regarding the time of sale. In contrast, defendants presented 23 admissible evidence on this issue in the form of the McKeighan 24 MSJ Declaration, in which McKeighan declared that the sale 25 occurred at 10:06 a.m. Given this uncontroverted evidence 26 regarding the time of sale, no trier of fact reasonably could 27 have found in Wackerman’s favor on the sale timing issue. As a 28 result, we reject as meritless Wackerman’s argument that the sale [14] 1 timing issue was a genuine issue of material fact that should 2 have prevented the court from granting summary judgment. 3 Alternately, Wackerman argues on appeal that the bankruptcy 4 court should have given him more time to obtain admissible 5 evidence in support of his position on the timing issue. But 6 there is a fatal flaw in this argument. Wackerman never 7 requested, either orally or in writing, a continuance of the 8 summary judgment proceedings in order to afford him additional 9 time to find his unidentified third-party witness regarding the 10 sale timing issue. 11 We have carefully reviewed all of Wackerman’s submissions 12 prior to the time the court ruled on defendants’ summary judgment 13 motion, and he simply did not ask for any such continuance. We 14 do not need to consider issues raised for the first time on 15 appeal, where the trial court had no opportunity to consider 16 them. See United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 17 260 , 270 n.9 (2010) ("We need not settle that question, however, 18 because the parties did not raise it in the courts below."); 19 Scovis v. Henrichsen (In re Scovis), 249 F.3d 975, 984 (9th Cir. 20 2001)(stating court will not consider issue raised for the first 21 time on appeal absent exceptional circumstances). Wackerman has 22 not demonstrated the existence of any exceptional circumstances 23 that would justify our consideration of this issue in the first 24 instance. 25 Even if we were to consider the merits of Wackerman’s 26 argument regarding a continuance of the summary judgment 27 proceedings, we would not reverse. Absent a request for 28 continuance of the proceedings from Wackerman, it would be [15] 1 inappropriate for us to hold that the bankruptcy court abused its 2 discretion by not granting such a continuance. See Johnson v. 3 Reilly, 349 F.3d 1149, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003). 4 Although Wackerman did not ask for a continuance of the 5 summary judgment proceedings, Wackerman did argue in the 6 bankruptcy court that defendants did not fully comply with the 7 disclosure requirements set forth in Civil Rule 26(a)(1) and (e) 8 (made applicable in adversary proceedings by Rule 7026). Because 9 defendants did not fully comply with these requirements, 10 Wackerman asserted, denial of the summary judgment motion and the 11 reopening of discovery was appropriate. 12 On appeal, Wackerman has renewed this argument, focusing on 13 the fact that defendants did not disclose the sale log before 14 they filed their summary judgment motion. According to 15 Wackerman, the court erred when it found that defendants did not 16 have “possession, custody or control” of the sale log for 17 disclosure purposes. See Civil Rule 26(a)(1)(a)(ii) (requiring 18 parties to disclose all documents within their “possession, 19 custody or control” which they may use to support their claims or 20 defenses). As Wackerman puts it, the evidence presented in the 21 summary judgment proceedings established that McKeighan and LPS 22 were defendants’ agents and, consequently, defendants effectively 23 controlled the sale log for disclosure and discovery purposes. 24 See United States v. Int’l Union of Petrol. & Indus. Workers, [25] 870 F.2d 1450 , 1452 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Control is defined as the 26 legal right to obtain documents upon demand.”). 27 The bankruptcy court disagreed with Wackerman. It 28 specifically found, based on McKeighan’s declaration testimony, [16] 1 that she kept the sale log for her own internal records and that 2 her business relationship with defendants was too attenuated for 3 the court to find that defendants had the legal right to require 4 McKeighan to turn over the sale log. Wackerman has not persuaded 5 us that these findings were illogical, implausible or without 6 support in the record. Thus, they were not clearly erroneous. 7 See In re Retz, 606 F.3d at 1196 . Because Wackerman has failed 8 to demonstrate reversible error in the bankruptcy court’s 9 determination that defendants complied with Civil Rule 26(a)(1) 10 and (e), we must reject Wackerman’s argument regarding 11 defendants’ disclosures. 12 Wackerman also challenges on appeal the bankruptcy court’s 13 denial of his reconsideration motion. When, as here, the party 14 seeking relief from a judgment or order files a reconsideration 15 motion within fourteen days of entry of that judgment or order, 16 we review the reconsideration motion as a motion for relief from 17 judgment under Rule 9023. See In re Montano, 501 B.R. at 112 . 18 Rule 9023 incorporates Civil Rule 59(e), and the same standards 19 apply to both rules. Id. In order to justify relief under 20 Rule 9023, the movant must show: “(a) newly discovered evidence, 21 (b) the court committed clear error or made an initial decision 22 that was manifestly unjust, or (c) an intervening change in 23 controlling law.” Id. (citing Duarte v. Bardales, 526 F.3d 563 , 24 567 (9th Cir. 2008)). 25 In this case, Wackerman sought to present newly discovered 26 evidence to the court. To support its request for relief based 27 on newly discovered evidence, Wackerman needed to establish: 28 “that [he] discovered the evidence after [the summary judgment [17] 1 proceedings], that [he] could not have discovered the evidence 2 sooner through the exercise of reasonable diligence, and that the 3 new evidence is of such magnitude that it would likely have 4 changed the outcome of the case.” Far Out Productions, Inc., [5] 247 F.3d at 998 (citing Defenders of Wildlife v. Bernal, 204 F.3d 6 920, 929 (9th Cir. 2000)). 7 The bankruptcy court held that Wackerman had satisfied the 8 first and third elements for relief from judgment based on newly 9 discovered evidence. As the bankruptcy court found, McMonegal’s 10 declaration testimony, obtained by Wackerman shortly after the 11 conclusion of the summary judgment proceedings, likely would have 12 caused the court to conclude that a genuine issue of material 13 fact existed regarding the time of sale, had Wackerman timely 14 presented McMonegal’s declaration testimony while the summary 15 judgment proceedings were still pending. 16 However, the bankruptcy court also found that Wackerman had 17 failed to establish the second element for relief based on newly 18 discovered evidence: that he had exercised reasonable diligence 19 in finding McMonegal and obtaining his testimony. Wackerman has 20 not offered any real explanation why this finding was illogical, 21 implausible or without support in the record. Even though 22 Wackerman knew from the outset of his adversary proceeding, an 23 adversary proceeding he commenced in August 2012, that he would 24 need to prove that the sale concluded after the bankruptcy case 25 was filed, and even though he knew there were third party 26 witnesses to the sale but did not know their names, all he was 27 able to muster in the way of proof of his diligence in attempting 28 to identify and locate witnesses before the April 2013 conclusion [18] 1 of the summary judgment proceedings was the following three2 sentence statement: 3 Prior to the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, I made diligent efforts to locate a witness 4 who was present at the May 14, 2012, foreclosure hearing. My efforts included, but were not limited to, 5 asking people I knew, and other persons who I believed lived in Mariposa, California, if they were present at 6 the foreclosure auction or knew of anyone who was present at the foreclosure auction. On or about 7 April 6, 2013, Daniel McMonegal, came forward, and informed me that he was present at the foreclosure 8 sale. 9 Wackerman Dec. (April 30, 2013) at ¶ 2. As the bankruptcy court 10 found, this evidence was conclusory and raised more questions 11 than it answered regarding Wackerman’s diligence. For instance, 12 the bankruptcy court explained, Wackerman’s testimony did not 13 demonstrate when Wackerman began looking for witnesses, nor did 14 Wackerman specify how or when he communicated with others 15 regarding his inquiry. At bottom, the court was left with no 16 real idea of the extent and timing of Wackerman’s efforts to 17 identify and locate witnesses. Under these circumstances, we 18 cannot hold as clearly erroneous the bankruptcy court’s finding 19 that Wackerman failed to satisfy the reasonable diligence element 20 for presenting newly discovered evidence. 21 Wackerman alternately argues that the bankruptcy court 22 should have granted his request for another chance to present 23 evidence regarding his diligence, a request he orally made at the 24 time of the reconsideration motion hearing, after the bankruptcy 25 court had announced its tentative ruling that it was prepared to 26 deny the reconsideration motion because Wackerman had not 27 demonstrated reasonable diligence. 28 Neither in the bankruptcy court nor on appeal has Wackerman [19] 1 cited any legal authority supporting his claim that the 2 bankruptcy court should have granted him another chance to 3 present evidence. Wackerman merely opines that too much was at 4 stake for the bankruptcy court to deny him this additional 5 opportunity. 6 The record supports the bankruptcy court’s decision to not 7 give Wackerman another chance to present evidence. The extent of 8 Wackerman’s diligence was an issue where the evidence was readily 9 available to Wackerman without the need to seek out information 10 or documents from third parties. And yet in support of his 11 diligence, Wackerman only was able to muster three conclusory 12 sentences, as set forth in his April 30, 2013 declaration. Only 13 after the court indicated that it was prepared to rule against 14 him on this issue did Wackerman for the first time ask for 15 another chance to submit evidence of diligence. And yet he gave 16 no indication why he could not and did not provide more evidence 17 in his April 30, 2013 declaration. 18 Federal courts have inherent authority and broad discretion 19 to manage cases taking place before them and to structure 20 proceedings in a manner that is consistent with the fair, 21 efficient and expedient administration of justice. See U.S. v. 22 W.R. Grace, 526 F.3d 499, 509-10 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc); 23 S. Cal. Edison Co. v. Lynch, 307 F.3d 794 , 807 (9th Cir. 2002). 24 Here, the bankruptcy court in essence found that Wackerman knew 25 and understood that his diligence was at issue for purposes of 26 his reconsideration motion and that Wackerman already had been 27 given sufficient opportunity to present evidence on this point. 28 We cannot say that this finding was illogical, implausible or [20] 1 without support in the record.4 Nor can we say that the court 2 abused its discretion in denying Wackerman another chance to 3 present evidence on the diligence issue. 4 CONCLUSION 5 For the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the bankruptcy 6 court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants and its 7 denial of Wackerman’s reconsideration motion. [14] 15 4 At first blush, the bankruptcy court appears to have 16 mis-spoken when it commented on Wackerman’s prior opportunities to address the issue of his diligence. The bankruptcy court 17 commented that Wackerman had been given two prior opportunities to address this issue. Strictly speaking, Wackerman only had one 18 true opportunity to address this issue: in his April 30, 2013 19 declaration. Before Wackerman filed his April 2013 reconsideration motion, his diligence in identifying and locating 20 McMonegal was not at issue. 21 Nonetheless, when the court’s comments are given a fair reading in the context of the entire record, we think all the [22] court really was trying to say was the following: (1) that 23 Wackerman filed two declarations during the combined course of the summary judgment motion proceedings and the reconsideration 24 motion proceedings, both of which discussed Wackerman’s efforts to identify and locate third-party witnesses to the sale; 25 (2) neither of these declarations gave the court any real insight 26 into the extent of Wackerman’s efforts; and (3) after having announced its intention to rule against Wackerman’s 27 reconsideration motion based on his inadequate demonstration of reasonable diligence, the court was not obliged to give Wackerman 28 another chance to present evidence regarding his diligence.