Rogler v. Millard

the decedent had promised to give appellant an additional $25,000 beyond her residual share of the estate. Thereafter, in their June 2012 summary judgment motion, respondents pointed out that there was no evidence to support the existence of such a promise,' and they also contended that appellant's conduct fell squarely within the terms of the trust's no-contest clause. In opposing respondents' summary judgment motion, appellant did not address this argument, much less explain how her conduct fell within the exceptions to either NRS 163.00195 (addressing the enforcement of no-contest clauses in trusts) or NRS 137.005 (addressing the enforcement of no-contest clauses in wills). Thus, at the time that the district court granted summary judgment, appellant had produced no evidence from which to infer the existence of the $25,000 promise, and had provided no legal argument as to why the explicit terms of the no-contest clause should not be enforced in light of the allegation regarding the $25,000 promise contained in appellant's January 2012 objection. 2 Wood, 121 Nev. at 729, 121 P.3d at 1029. Nor has appellant provided any argument on appeal demonstrating why, in light of these circumstances, the district court's grant of summary judgment to respondents on this

'Notably, in contradiction to appellant's allegation that "prior amended trusts had this [$25,000 promise] clause in it," respondents submitted copies of the two previous versions of the decedent's trust, neither of which contained such a clause.

2Appellant argues on appeal that the district court improperly granted summary judgment without ruling on several of her pending motions. But a review of these motions reveals that they contain no discussion of the alleged $25,000 promise, nor any references to discovery- related matters that could have reasonably been directed toward obtaining evidence in support of the promise's existence.

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issue was erroneous. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court properly enforced the trust's no-contest clause against appellant. Further, in light of our conclusion that the district court properly enforced the no-contest clause against appellant, appellant is no longer an "interested person" capable of challenging the remaining determinations in the district court's summary judgment order. See NRS

132.185; NRS 164.005; Linthicum v. Rudi, 122 Nev. 1452, 1455, 148 P.3d 746, 748 (2006) (recognizing generally that only an interested person has standing to seek judicial intervention in a trust's administration). Accordingly, we need not consider appellant's arguments regarding the propriety of the distribution to the decedent's widow or the propriety of appointing respondents as co-personal representatives of the decedent's estate. Personhood Nev. v. Bristol, 126 Nev. , 245 P.3d 572, 574 (2010) ("This court's duty is not to render advisory opinions but, rather, to resolve actual controversies . . . ."). We therefore ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.

ceert4; J. Hardesty

Douglas

Cksza Cherry , J.

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cc: Hon. Gloria Sturman, District Judge Edar Y. Rogler Jeffrey L. Burr, Ltd. Eighth District Court Clerk

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