JAMES RICHARD COLLINS, Movant-Appellant v. STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent-Respondent.

Nancy Steffen Rahmeyer, J. James Richard Collins (“Movant”), a pri- or and persistent felon, entered an Alford 1 plea to the class C felony of domestic assault in the second degree, a violation of section 565.073. 2 Pursuant to a plea agreement, Movant was sentenced to six years imprisonment and a pending burglary charge was dismissed. Movant thereafter filed a pro se motion for post-conviction relief under Rule 24.035, which was later amended. Following an evidentiary hearing, the motion court denied relief. Mov-ant appeals; we affirm. The findings of the motion court are presumptively correct. Cook v. State, 198 S.W.3d 378, 381 (Mo.App.S.D.2006). Therefore, our review is limited to determining whether the motion court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law are clearly erroneous. Rule 24.035(k); Conley v. State, 301 S.W.3d 84, 87 (Mo.App.S.D.2010). Under that standard, the motion court’s findings and conclusions are presumptively valid and we will reverse only if “we are left with the definite and firm impression that a mistake has been made.” Bantle v. State, 165 S.W.3d 233, 235 (Mo.App.S.D.2005). On appeal, Movant only challenges the motion court’s ruling as to a single claim raised in his Rule 24.035 motion — that Movant’s plea counsel was ineffective for failing to abide by Movant’s request to interview a “key witness” named Wayne Maggard (“Maggard”), whose “testimony would have helped prove [Movant’s] innocence in this case.” We begin by noting that, in deciding to plead guilty, Movant generally waived any future complaint he might have “about trial counsel’s failure to investigate his case.” Simmons v. State, 100 S.W.3d 143, 146 (Mo.App.E.D.2003). 3 Movant’s claim that he was denied effective assistance of counsel, therefore, is only relevant *224 to the extent that it impinges on the volun-tariness and knowledge with which the plea was made. Id. “In order to succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on inadequate preparation or investigation, [a movant is] required to allege what infprmation plea counsel failed to discover; that a reasonable investigation or preparation would have resulted in the discovery of such information; and that the information would have aided or improved his defense.” Gooch v. State, 353 S.W.3d 662, 666 (Mo.App.S.D.2011) (quoting McVay v. State, 12 S.W.3d 370, 373 (Mo.App.S.D.2000)) (alteration in original). At the evidentiary hearing on Mov-ant’s Rule 24.035 motion, Movant testified that before pleading guilty he had been assured by plea counsel that Maggard “had disappeared and that there was no way of getting in touch with him.” Mov-ant further testified that, after he was incarcerated pursuant to his guilty plea, he reached Maggard by telephone, whereupon Maggard informed Movant that he had tried to call plea counsel “several times” without response. The motion court, apparently, did not believe Movant’s testimony and was under no obligation to do so. See Gold v. State, 341 S.W.3d 177, 180 (Mo.App.S.D.2011). Indeed, the motion court instead credited the testimony of plea counsel that all attempts to contact Maggard either by phone or in person were unsuccessful. Deferring (as we must) to this finding, the record before us indicates plea counsel could not locate Maggard, and that Movant was fully aware of this fact at his plea hearing. Yet, at that hearing, Movant expressed complete satisfaction with plea counsel’s performance and indicated that it was his intention to plead guilty. 4 The motion court found, and we agree, that the foregoing evidenced that Movant’s plea was entefed into knowingly and voluntarily, thereby waiving his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See Berry v. State, 214 S.W.3d 413, 417 (Mo.App.S.D.2007); McVay, 12 S.W.3d at 374. Accordingly, we deny Movant’s point and affirm the judgment of the motion court. Don E. Burrell, J. — Concurs Mary W. Sheffield, P.J. — Concurs Footnotes [1] North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970). [2] All references to statutes are to RSMo 2000, and all rule references are to Missouri Court Rules (2014), unless otherwise specified. [3] The principle applies with equal force in the context of this case because an Alford plea is treated no differently than a guilty plea in which a defendant admits that the particular act charged was committed. Fisher v. State, 192 S.W.3d 551, 554 (Mo.App.S.D.2006). [4] At his guilty plea hearing, Movant stated that it was his intention to plead guilty; that he understood the plea agreement; that he had enough time to talk with plea counsel; that he told plea counsel everything that he needed to know; that no one prompted or pressured him to answer untruthfully; the plea counsel did everything Movant had asked him to do; and that he had no complaints about plea counsel’s services.