Mower (Glenn) v. State

credit for time served in the instant case, we disagree. NRS 176.055(1) does not apply because Mower's confinement was not "pursuant to a judgment of conviction for another offense." There is no indication in the record before us that federal authorities placed a hold on Mower after his arrest leading to the instant conviction. Further, the State does not challenge the following assertion made by Mower on appeal: From the date of arrest through the date of sentencing, the federal government did not issue any writs to obtain custody of appellant. Additionally, there has not been any correspondence or any information indicating that the federal government is seeking custody of appellant; except for . . . a written statement made by the Presentence Investigation [report] writer that the federal government would seek parole revocation after the Nevada case is completed. It appears that Mower was taken into custody and confined solely due to the instant offense and is entitled to credit for the time served prior to his sentencing. See State v. Dist. Ct. (Jackson), 121 Nev. 413, 416, 116 P.3d 834, 836 (2005) ("[D]espite its discretionary language, the purpose of NRS 176.055 is to 'ensure that all time served is credited towards a defendant's ultimate sentence." (quoting Kuykendall v. State, 112 Nev. 1285, 1287, 926 P.2d 781, 783 (1996))). Therefore, this matter must be remanded to SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 2 (0) 1947A EWE& , an" the district court for the awarding of 141 days' credit for time served and the amending of Mower's judgment of conviction. Accordingly, we ORDER this matter REMANDED to the district court for proceedings consistent with this order. 1 2 J. Hardesty J. Douglas J. cc. Hon. Valorie J. Vega, District Judge Clark County Public Defender Attorney General/Carson City Clark County District Attorney Eighth District Court Clerk Footnotes [1] The fast track statement submitted by Mower does not comply with the Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure because the procedural history and statement of facts do not contain any citations to the record. See NRAP 3C(e)(1)(C) and NRAP 28(e)(1). Counsel for Mower is cautioned that the failure to comply with the briefing requirements in the future may result in the imposition of sanctions. See NRAP 3C(n). [2] This order constitutes our final disposition of this appeal. Any subsequent appeal shall be docketed as a new matter. SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 3 (0 1 ,147A SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 4 (0) 1947A 4‘