People v. Funderbunk

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Bonnie G. Wittner, J., at suppression hearing; Cassandra M. Mullen, J., at jury trial and sentencing), rendered October 26, 2010, as amended December 10, 2010, convicting defendant of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree, and sentencing him, as a second felony drug offender, to a term of four years, unanimously affirmed. The court properly denied defendant’s suppression motion. The only police activity challenged on appeal is an officer’s act *516 of opening a car door during a lawful traffic stop, which ultimately led to the recovery of contraband. Defendant concedes that the police were entitled to order the occupants to come out of the car (see People v Robinson, 74 NY2d 773 [1989], cert denied 493 US 966 [1989]), but argues that they were not entitled to open a car door without individualized suspicion of criminality. Opening a door is a minimally intrusive safety precaution, incident to a valid automobile lawful traffic stop (People v David L., 56 NY2d 698 [1982], revg on dissent 81 AD2d 893, 895-896 [2d Dept 1981]). Such an action is comparable to, and actually less intrusive than, ordering the occupants to exit the car. We find nothing in People v Garcia (20 NY3d 317 [2012]) to suggest that David L. should no longer be followed. Here, an officer acted reasonably in opening a door because the car’s excessively tinted windows obstructed the view of the car’s interior, including the rear seat passenger area, and the officer heard a fellow officer direct the rear passenger to stop moving and place his hands in view. Accordingly, opening the door was a reasonable safety precaution (see e.g. People v Gonzalez, 298 AD2d 133 [2002], lv denied 99 NY2d 558 [2002]). We perceive no basis for reducing the sentence. Concur— Tom, J.E, Friedman, Andrias, Feinman and Kapnick, JJ.