John Lofton v. Verizon Wireless (Vaw)

MEMORANDUM * 1. In this putative class action, John Lofton alleges, inter alia, that Verizon Wireless LLC (“Verizon”) violated the California Invasion of Privacy Act, CaLPenal Code §§ 630-638, when Colleeto — one its debt collectors — called his cellular phone and recorded two calls without his consent. Colleeto called Lofton on June 4 and June 7, 2012 intending to reach a Verizon customer with the initials “K.B.” Upon discovering it had reached a wrong number, it recorded both calls without notifying Lof-ton that the recordings were being made, pursuant to Verizon’s written policy permitting its debt collectors to skip the standard disclosure in such cases. On January 22, 2014, Lofton filed a motion for class certification and preliminary injunction. The district court denied the motion on the basis that Verizon had modified its policy so as to require disclosure on every outgoing call that the call would be recorded, and Lofton had failed to demonstrate that Verizon had imminent plans to revert to its prior policy. Lofton appeals the denial of the preliminary injunction. 2. The party seeking a preliminary injunction bears the burden of demonstrating, among other things, a likelihood of irreparable harm absent injunctive relief. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008). Generally, a party may not moot a claim for injunctive relief simply by voluntarily ceasing the alleged misconduct, because it could then resume its activity after the claim is dismissed. Rosebrock v. Mathis, 745 F.3d 963, 971 (9th Cir.2014). The party asserting mootness thus bears a “heavy burden of persuading” the court that the challenged conduct cannot reasonably be expected to start up again. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), 528 U.S. 167, 189, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000). Even where the defendant’s voluntary cessation does not moot a claim for injunctive relief, however, we consider cessation of the alleged misconduct in determining whether the plaintiff has carried his burden of demonstrating a likelihood of irreparable harm. See TRW, Inc. v. F.T.C., 647 F.2d 942, 953-54 (9th Cir.1981). 3. Lofton contends he demonstrated a prima facie case of irreparable harm under Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849 (9th Cir.2001), abrogated on other grounds by Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 504-05, 125 S.Ct. 1141, 160 L.Ed.2d 949 (2005), thereby shifting the burden to Verizon to demonstrate that its policy change mooted his claim. In Armstrong, we explained that a plaintiff may demonstrate a likelihood of future injury by showing that his past injury stems from the defendant’s written policy, or is part of a pattern of officially sanctioned behavior. Id. at 860-61. Armstrong, however, sets forth tests for constitutional standing to seek injunc-tive relief. Id. Moreover, unlike in Armstrong, no class has been certified in this action. Accordingly, Armstrong does not control. 4. Here, Verizon has revised its written policy to require its debt collectors to disclose on every outgoing call that the call is being recorded. It has also adduced evidence that Colleeto blocked future calls to Lofton, and that Verizon terminated its contract with Colleeto. Considered in *422 light of this evidence, the mere fact that Verizon formerly maintained a written policy permitting its debt collectors to record calls to wrong numbers without notifying the recipient that it was doing so does not demonstrate a likelihood that Verizon or its debt collectors will call Lofton again and record the call without disclosing this fact. Because Lofton failed to carry his burden of demonstrating a likelihood of irreparable harm, his motion for preliminary injunction was properly denied. AFFIRMED Footnotes [*] This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.